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Introduction
Capitalism has been around for something like 500 years, and has held 
sway over for the vast majority of the earth for about 30. The reason this 
is worth pointing out is because, for many of its supporters, capitalism 
is far from perfect but it is the model that most fits with the reality 
of what human beings are actually like. A common argument goes as 
follows: humans are competitive, and some humans are much better 
than others (cleverer, harder-working and so on), and so a system which 
relies on competition and inequality, while it might seem a bit harsh, 
is basically appropriate. To try and do otherwise (i.e. build a system 
based on co operation and equality) might be tempting but is ultimately 
utopian and thus doomed to fail.
But these kinds of argument, while posing as pragmatic, are also 
utopian in their own way. If capitalism really fits that well with human 
nature, then governments would not have to intervene so frequently and 
extensively to stop it falling apart. Anyway, as soon as we understand 
the comparatively short historical roots of capitalism, we are forced to 
recognise it for what it is: a system with a particular set of rules, among 
many others with different rules that have existed in the past, and 
which might exist in the future. Given that life on earth still has about 
five billion years left to run before the planet is engulfed in the sun’s 
death cycle, it seems presumptuous to imagine that the system we have 
currently is the one that is best suited to the human condition.
The point of saying this is not to speculate about what the world 
might be like over the rainbow. It is simply to observe that, while we 
are in the middle of an era, it is very difficult to see beyond it. Various 
things about the world that appear second nature to those living within 
a specific system can start to appear very strange when looked at from 
a wider perspective. For example, in feudal Britain most people did not 
consider whether the belief in the king’s right to rule being bestowed 
directly by God would appear ridiculous from the vantage point of 
the twenty-first century. Likewise, it is possible that, in centuries to 
come, people may also see something ridiculous in a system whereby 
supermarkets load their shelves with completely unnecessary quantities 
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of food that gets thrown in the bin at the end of the day, while some 
people struggle to afford proper nutrition. So this book is, in part, an 
attempt to make life under twenty-first-century British capitalism look 
strange. 
One of its strangest elements is the question of class. Most people 
do not particularly want a society divided along class lines. But rather 
than do anything about this, people tend to invent ideas (e.g. ‘meritoc-
racy’, ‘social mobility’) that make it seem a bit less offensive. Hence, it is 
often argued that the ideal society should be one of ‘equal opportunity’, 
where every individual succeeds or fails on their own merits. This way, 
we would still have a class-divided society, but at least we would know 
that the people at the bottom truly deserved to be there. 
Until recently, people that talked too much about class were 
considered to be dinosaurs from the age when poor children toiled 
day and night, losing their fingers amid the power looms of northern 
England in order to avoid the workhouse. The mainstream centre-left in 
Britain, supposedly sympathetic to working-class concerns, swallowed 
this argument whole, and it was elevated to one of the central dogmas of 
British politics from the 1990s until about 2015. But now this line looks 
very dated. Instead, the fashionable thing to say about class is not that it 
doesn’t matter, but that the way in which it matters is changing. Nobody 
really disputes that, for instance, the ‘Brexit’ referendum of 2016 revealed 
substantial differences in the worldviews and aspirations of people from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, though how to interpret this is 
more controversial. 
Initially, the re-emergence of class was driven by conservative voices. 
There is a powerful story that can be told about British politics (and 
indeed politics in any number of countries), about the divide between 
cosmopolitan elitists who love globalisation, and the ordinary people 
who are menaced by it. People on the right have been very good at 
playing on this idea, and they have, at times, used it to make discussion 
of class almost inseparable from neuroses surrounding nationalism and 
immigration. After assuming power, Theresa May tried to embody this 
worldview, though not very persuasively. But however bad things became 
for her, they were much worse for the centre-left,* who found themselves 
rendered irrelevant by their failure to find their own way of addressing 
* By which I mean your Blairs, Browns, Milibands, etc.
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the topic of class that didn’t involve either empty platitudes or borrowed 
nationalism.
The reason British politics has suddenly become interesting is because 
we have the opportunity to see whether a more radical version of the 
left can do any better. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party 
throughout 2017 was highly successful: to understand that this is the 
case, you need to compare its results not with previous election victories 
such as 1997, which might as well be 200 years ago given how much has 
changed since then, but with what is happening to equivalent parties in 
other countries in 2017. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, 
even in the US, established parties of the mainstream left look increas-
ingly weak and directionless. In the UK, by contrast, following the 2017 
general election there was actual enthusiasm and optimism.
Many people argue, however, that the current progress of the Labour 
Party was mainly based on its resonance with idealistic (and compar-
atively highly educated) young people offended by Brexit, rather than 
any kind of reconnection with the ‘working class’. The fact that they 
gained ground in places like Kensington and Canterbury while losing 
it in places like Sunderland provided some symbolic support for this 
idea. Indeed, for some, after briefly starting to matter again after Theresa 
May’s 2016 conference speech (where she really did talk about class a 
lot), class is now once again being replaced, this time by age, as the most 
important divide in British politics.
Ultimately, the problem is that the way class is invoked in British 
politics is usually inconsistent, shallow and self-serving. It obviously 
matters, but we need to find better ways of understanding it. That is 
the point of this book. In it, I look to revitalise a very different way 
of thinking about class which is barely recognised today, and which 
is rooted in a Marxist analysis of the relationship between labour and 
capital. Looked at this way, class can help us to understand why, for 
instance, young people (even those from affluent and educated back-
grounds) might be increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo in this 
country, to an extent which cannot be even remotely understood by 
crude divisions of people into socio-economic categories defined by 
letter classifications (e.g. A, B, C1, C2, D, E). Understanding what 
labour and capital are, and why the relationship between them matters, 
enables not just a vague and moralistic rhetoric about elites versus 
everyone else, but also sheds light on the wider workings of the British 
economy, government and society.
4 . class matters
the rest of the book
I will continue as follows. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the 
ways in which the concept of class has been used and abused in Britain 
in recent years, taking in both political jargon and academic research. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss the Marxist view of class, showing how it differs 
from the ideas discussed in Chapter 1 and identifying what I see as its 
most important elements. In Chapter 3, I provide a general overview 
of the way the British economy has changed in recent decades, with 
a particular focus on the way in which the ‘balance of power’ between 
labour and capital has shifted in favour of the latter. I argue that the 
Marxist ideas explained in Chapter 2 are important for understanding 
these general trends.
After this, the second half of the book engages with a series of specific 
topics such as work, technology and government, arguing that, in each 
case, Marxist theories about class are important and helpful in allowing 
us to understand them better. In particular, it helps us to explain how 
and why these things take the (often strange) form that they do in our 
society, as well as the ways in which they may be evolving. Firstly, I look 
at work: the place around which millions of people’s lives revolve. I use 
insights gained from my analysis of class to consider why the experience 
of being a worker is, for so many, one of exploitation, alienation, frus-
tration or boredom. Next, I examine government, making the argument 
that, in numerous fundamental respects, British political institutions 
are inevitably structured by the need to help capital at the expense 
of labour. This discussion of government carries over into Chapter 6, 
where I present a more in-depth discussion of the political context as 
it relates specifically to ‘equalities’ issues, with particular attention paid 
to gender and immigration. In Chapters 7 and 8, I consider how class 
relationships impact the evolution of new technology and the role of the 
media respectively. Finally, at the end of Chapter 8 I return to the British 
political scene and consider what the book’s analysis tells us about its 
possible futures. 
1 
The ‘Economy that  
Works for Everyone’
platitudes
I will govern for the whole United Kingdom and we will look to build 
an economy that works for everyone, not just the privileged few.
Theresa May, after becoming prime minister 
of the United Kingdom, July 2016
We want to see a break with the failed economic orthodoxy that has 
gripped policymakers for a generation, and set out a very clear vision 
for a Labour government that will create an economy that works for 
all not just the few.
Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party, May 2016
Class is a communist concept … it groups people together and sets 
them against each other.
Margaret Thatcher, 19921
Very few people claim they want an economy that only works for some. 
Given this, we might wonder why senior politicians keep talking about 
how they want an economy that works for everyone. If everyone agrees 
on this, why keep bringing it up as if it were controversial?
The idea of the economy that ‘works for everyone’ is a platitude. It is 
something that is sufficiently vague that nobody could really disagree, and 
which nobody ever gets around to defining. British politics runs on these 
kinds of statements. Certain things are so roundly accepted as good that 
their actual meaning is rarely questioned: important platitudes of the last 
decade have included ‘balancing the budget’ and ‘social mobility’. More 
recently, these have been usurped by ‘taking back control’ and, as things 
have become more and more chaotic, ‘certainty’ and ‘stability’ (these last 
ones looking more grimly ironic by the day). These are all empty phrases 
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on to which listeners can impute anything they like. Conversely, there 
are other phrases with equally little definition that are used to signify 
Bad Things: ‘red tape’, ‘Westminster elites’, ‘magic money tree’ and so on. 
The platitude of the economy that works for everyone is a particu-
larly important one, because of the sense of fuzzy warmth it provides. 
It conveys the idea that British society could and should be one big 
harmonious unit, where the prosperity of one means the prosperity of 
all, so long as a few issues can be ironed out. As with a healthy human 
body after the removal of an inflamed appendix, once a specific problem 
has been dealt with, the remaining entity is basically one in which all the 
different bits act in harmony. This is a good, uplifting message. 
But such an economy has evidently not arrived and seems unlikely to 
do so in the imminent future. So the business of politics becomes the 
business of identifying new problems that can explain the delay, and this 
is where the message becomes less inspirational. There is no shortage 
of groups or entities that act as the social equivalent of the inflamed 
appendix, and politicians have competed to find the most relevant ones. 
On this basis, in the years following the financial crisis of 2008, the 
political right clearly did much better: migrants, the European Union, 
the unemployed and benefits claimants* evidently captured voters’ imag-
ination more than left-wing concerns like inequality, ‘the bankers’ and 
‘irresponsible capitalists’.2 There has been a shifting astrology of blame 
which has, at times, become surreal and dreamlike, even extending at one 
point to people who don’t have alarm clocks† or who leave their blinds 
closed.3 Sure signs of unacceptable sloth.
The idea of class poses a problem for these kinds of platitudes, because 
it suggests that there are more deep-rooted and intractable divisions in 
society that cannot be resolved without significant upheaval – hence 
Margaret Thatcher’s rejection of the very concept, in the quote above, 
as one imported from communist ideology. It alludes to tensions that 
are imprinted on the heart of society and define the way it works, when 
actually it is much easier to parcel out smaller, more manageable evils, 
whether they are real or not. So it seemed, until quite recently, that class 
had become very unwelcome in mainstream political discussion. 
* Beneits claimants are a vastly larger group than the unemployed, but these two groups 
are often referred to as if they are synonymous.
† In early 2011, Nick Clegg tried hard to popularise the phrase ‘Alarm Clock Britain’ 
as a (wholly unsuccessful) means of signifying the kinds of no-nonsense hard workers he 
wanted to identify with the Liberal Democrats. 
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The Labour Party had a big hand in this. In its New Labour period, 
it had a quaintly uplifting message: yes, class used to matter and it used 
to be terrible, back in the pre-war era when people worked in hellish 
factory conditions. But now we’ve had Labour governments, along with 
the National Health Service (NHS), the welfare state, workers’ rights, 
and so on, and as a result class is not a problem anymore. It still exists, 
but if we can make sure we have ‘equality of opportunity’ (as if this is 
possible when people start life under such different conditions) then 
class divisions don’t have to be divisive. 
Since then the Labour Party’s abandonment of class has come back 
to haunt it. The political right in Britain became far keener to talk about 
class than before. Politicians such as Theresa May and Nigel Farage 
sought to build a close association between the idea of the ‘working class’ 
and a particular set of opinions, most notably related to immigration. 
They cultivated a widespread conventional wisdom that ‘ordinary people’ 
were sick of immigration and the EU, while ‘liberal elites’ loved immi-
gration and hated native British people. This message, while dependent 
on some fairly self-serving stereotypes, proved quite resonant, and did 
the Labour Party very severe damage, particularly in the general election 
defeat of 2015 and in the Brexit referendum, which led to huge internal 
tensions and agonising. In 2017, as May began to look increasingly weak 
and Labour appeared to be gaining ground under Corbyn, the issue 
of class once again became hazy in British politics. For instance, we 
were told that age is now a far more important division than class, and 
had largely usurped the latter as a means of explaining people’s voting 
choices.4
This erratic and unfocused discussion of class, sometimes dismissive, 
usually vague, always self-serving, comes about mainly because the 
concept is nowadays generally understood as a kind of cultural identi-
fication. It is associated with certain accents or certain kinds of job, or 
the kinds of music or TV programmes people like; who their friends 
are, the values they emphasise and the kinds of newspapers they read. 
Consequently, some of the people who talk about class most often are 
self-conscious liberal broadsheet journalists, fretting over whether or not 
they are allowed to pass judgement on people who read The Sun. There 
is a vast body of academic research on how to categorise people into 
different classes according to these social and cultural differences. I will 
summarise some of this later. 
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While recognising the insights that some of this literature can provide, 
I want to get away from this kind of thing. In the Marxist reading, class 
is about something different. It is not, at root, about culture, but about 
the position people occupy within the structure of an economy, including the 
economic function they fulfil and the demands and imperatives they 
face as a result. Some people own businesses and invest money in them 
in order to make a profit. Other people depend on their ability to sell 
their time and skills in exchange for a wage. Some have managerial 
roles whereby they need to control and regulate the second group in the 
interests of the first, while others might be involved in moving money 
about, or maintaining social order. Often, the interests of people in these 
different positions conflict. 
The basic argument here is that these economic roles matter more 
than cultural or social identifiers: they are the building blocks of the 
capitalist economy, and the differences and conflicting interests between 
them not only affect people’s experiences and the pressures they face in 
their own lives, but also have much bigger implications for wider society 
and government. So class is not just about classification: if we look at the 
most important changes in British political economy since the 1970s 
(which I will consider in Chapter 3), we can see that these changes did 
not just affect class relationships, but they were also affected by them. 
Before getting on to this, however, I will look in more depth at how 
discussion around class has developed in Britain over the last decade. 
class since the financial crisis
Britain, like many other countries, had a brief glimpse of what we might 
call ‘class consciousness’ following the financial crisis of 2008. The 
financial sector was identified as the main cause of the downturn, and for 
a while the phrase ‘the bankers’ became closely associated with various 
adjectives: greed, trickery, short-sightedness. There was a consensus that 
large financial institutions had taken on too much risk in order to make 
more money for themselves, and that everyone else was facing the con-
sequences. 
On the surface this seems like a fertile context for class conflict. There 
was, certainly, a lot of protest, and groups on the radical left momentarily 
seemed marginally more relevant than they had done for years. Most 
notable here was the Occupy movement, which began in the US and 
spread to various other countries. Occupy groups gained publicity by 
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staging highly visible protests in centres of financial activity, including 
outside St Paul’s Cathedral. They set up tents and stayed there for several 
months, holding debates, making banners and so on. 
These movements were highly successful in some respects. Mainly, 
they got people talking about the things they thought were important. 
The use of words and phrases such as ‘inequality’ or ‘corporate greed’ in 
the media spiked following their protests, and declined again as Occupy’s 
profile diminished.5
But to what extent was Occupy about class? It aimed itself at bankers 
and the politicians with whom they were presumed to be in cahoots. 
They argued that these people had stitched the system up and had 
become extremely rich at everyone else’s expense. They had a slogan to 
this effect: ‘the 1 per cent versus the 99 per cent’. The problem with this 
slogan is that it is vague. For one thing, it relies on the conspiratorial idea 
that society is governed by a tiny elite out for themselves, as opposed to a 
chaotic society in which elites are as confused as everyone else. With the 
benefit of hindsight, which of these seems to work better as a descrip-
tion of the Cameron–Clegg years? Or the minority Conservative Brexit 
government? Capitalist economies are more confusing and unpredict-
able than this. 
The slogan also buys into the ‘economy that works for everyone’ 
platitude. There is this tiny group who need to be brought down a peg or 
several, but beyond that everyone else exists on the side of righteousness. 
Lumped into the 99 per cent are everyone from students, the homeless, 
professional and blue-collar employees, the unemployed, the retired, 
small businesses and, implicitly, large businesses that work in ‘good’ areas 
like manufacturing rather than duplicitous financiers with their hocus 
pocus. 
This ‘intuitive populism’6 was its main selling point, directed at a ‘1 
per cent’ which is highly opaque but found colourful personification in 
the actions of particular individuals, such as the former Royal Bank of 
Scotland boss Fred Goodwin. Very obvious, unambiguous bad guys, who 
made it easy to parcel off a small niche of society as the villains who were 
ruining it for everyone else. If this is class politics, it is a very narrow and 
personalised version.
Occupy deserves credit for pressuring British politicians, even Con-
servative ones, to talk a lot more than they used to about inequality and 
corporate greed. But these terms are fuzzy. Fighting against inequality, for 
instance, has long been a rallying cry of the left, but the word ‘inequality’ 
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is surprisingly easily subsumed into dry and technocratic language. 
What is inequality, really? Often, it is encapsulated in an esoterically 
calculated figure (i.e. the Gini coefficient) that sometimes gets higher 
(which is bad) or lower (which is good), and which can be manhandled 
in support of any argument. For example, Britain’s Gini coefficient may 
well decline if economic instability takes a chunk out of elite incomes, as 
occurred in 2010–11,7 but this does not mean that anything particularly 
profound or emancipatory has happened.
The danger of this technocratic fuzziness is that the left’s rhetoric 
fizzles out, and this is indeed what happened in the years immedi-
ately after the crisis. David Cameron, the prime minister at the time 
of Occupy’s activity, was able to reel off his own statistics that said 
inequality was falling, enabling every potentially damaging exchange on 
the topic to disperse into a fog of numbers. Politicians on the centre-left 
were repeatedly naive about how widely the anti-inequality message 
would resonate. Concern with inequality is not a new thing in Britain: 
the number of British people who think that the gap between rich and 
poor is too wide has been very high for years and looks like remaining 
so. But what declined throughout the 1990s and 2000s was people’s 
inclination to actually do anything about it. By 2010, the number of 
people supporting policies that redistribute wealth had sunk to about 
one in three, compared to over half in 1991.8 The effect of several years 
of austerity and high-profile attacks on welfare recipients (such as the 
harshly punitive ‘bedroom tax’) did not have a substantial effect on this 
general lack of interest.9 Corbyn’s strategy relied on the idea that people 
were starting to care again, but this cannot be assumed.
So while the old (pre-2015) centre-left put too much faith in people’s 
outrage at inequality, the right were highly adept at finding a narrative 
which was in many respects less accurate (the idea that the financial 
crisis was a result of Gordon Brown ‘spending all the money’ on benefits 
claimants) but, paradoxically, felt more real. They realised that very few 
people identified as ‘the 99 per cent’. Instead, they pursued a strategy of 
flattery. David Cameron and George Osborne developed a category that 
people actually wanted to feel like they were part of. This was the idea of 
‘hardworking people’, and it was given its appeal by the sense, reinforced 
by government, that there were a lot of lazy people about. Everyone 
knows a lazy person with whom they like to contrast themselves. 
The hardworking person became the model citizen of the austerity 
era: they accepted that we were ‘all in it together’, and that you had to 
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pull your weight by making sacrifices without complaining. This idea 
was fleshed out in sometimes poetic ways. The hardworking person was 
enraged by the sight of their neighbours’ curtains being drawn (George 
Osborne talking on the radio: ‘It is unfair that people listening to this 
programme going out to work see the neighbour next door with the 
blinds down because they are on benefits’). They were cruelly bullied by 
trade unions, who admittedly are also made up of hard workers, but of 
the kind that complain (Sajid Javid: ‘these [anti-union] reforms will stop 
the “endless” threat of strike action hanging over hardworking people’). 
And their main interests were gambling and alcohol.*
In policy terms, Cameron and Osborne’s legacy now looks very 
humble indeed. They fell a long way short of their self-imposed deficit-
reduction targets. Indeed, their whole rhetoric and agenda was built 
around eliminating the UK budget deficit by 2020, but this objective 
was ditched as counterproductive and unachievable by their successors, 
Theresa May and Phillip Hammond. They advertised themselves as the 
only choice for ‘stable’ leadership, but then Cameron had to resign after 
accidentally leaving the European Union. Nonetheless, they cemented a 
highly successful political demonology for the early twenty-first century. 
The economy that works for everyone is possible, if by ‘everyone’ we mean 
‘hardworking people’. They flattered enough people into identifying 
with this category to win elections, and were very pointed in showing 
who did not fit. Consider how the role of the unemployed moved from 
victim to perpetrator in Conservative election posters, from Thatcher’s 
first election (an image of people queuing outside an unemployment 
office with the headline ‘Labour’s not working’) to Cameron’s 2015 
re-election (a picture of David Cameron with sleeves rolled up so as to 
look energetic, with the headline ‘let’s cut benefits for those that refuse 
work’).†
This was a far more (electorally) effective variant on the ‘economy 
that works for everyone’ line than the Occupy vision (and even more 
so than the weak dilution thereof upon which Ed Miliband ran the 
2015 election). In the latter case, the barrier to a good economy was a 
* In 2014 Grant Shapps (then Tory chairman) tweeted a celebratory image in response 
to the latest Osborne budget reading thus: ‘BINGO! Cutting the bingo tax and beer duty 
to help hardworking people do more of the things they enjoy.’
† he value of comparing these two posters was inspired by Imogen Tyler’s keynote 
speech at the Work, Employment and Society conference at the University of Leeds, 
September 2016.
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highly opaque and hard-to-define group that many people ultimately 
suspected were untouchable anyway. The hardworking people phrase, 
by contrast, enabled the Conservatives to present themselves as the 
improbable conquerors of Labour’s territory. Until very recently, Labour 
itself accepted their narrative (and many people in the party clearly still 
do). As the then shadow Work and Pensions Secretary Rachel Reeves 
underlined, Labour had become desperate to show that ‘we are not the 
party of people on benefits. We don’t want to be seen, and we’re not, 
the party to represent those who are out of work … Labour are a party 
of working people, formed for and by working people.’10 Here, the glib 
division between the ‘working class’ and those who are out of work is 
taken as read. As I will argue later, according to the Marxist view this is 
one of the most stupid things anyone can possibly say about class. 
During Theresa May’s first few months in office, the Conservative 
version of class warfare assumed a fuller expression. A Conservative MP 
hoped, in a French newspaper, that May might be the first politician 
of the new ‘post-liberal’ settlement,11 being unafraid to recognise that 
many people’s lives have been much damaged by social and economic 
liberalism. On assuming her position, May gave a speech in which she 
repeatedly used the phrase ‘working class’ and put strong emphasis on 
themes of social and economic justice. For example, she talked about 
fighting against the burning injustice that, if you’re born poor, you will 
die on average nine years earlier than others …
If you’re from an ordinary working class family, life is much harder 
than many people in Westminster realise. You have a job but you don’t 
always have job security. You have your own home, but you worry 
about paying a mortgage. You can just about manage but you worry 
about the cost of living and getting your kids into a good school … 
I know you’re working around the clock, I know you’re doing your 
best, and I know that sometimes life can be a struggle. The government 
I lead will be driven not by the interests of the privileged few, but by 
yours.
Why did this approach fail for her? Probably not because it is a weak 
line: it isn’t (as evidenced by the pressure which mounted on Corbyn 
throughout 2017 to say more right-wing-sounding things about immi-
gration, and the number of people in the Corbyn movement who share 
a similar critique of liberalism). More likely, she just expressed it in an 
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implausible way – you can’t say these things and then lecture nurses on 
live TV about how naive they are to ask for a pay rise. 
The most interesting thing for our purposes is what right-wing 
people mean when they talk about the ‘working class’. At her first party 
conference, May was using this language, sometimes in a self-contra-
dictory way. She wanted to create ‘a programme for government to act 
to create an economy that works for everyone – an economy that’s on 
the side of ordinary working class people’. The first half of the quote is 
the platitude we have encountered many times already. The second half, 
though, seems to define a specific group within society and explicitly 
put government in its corner – so, by definition, not an economy that 
works for everyone – what about the liberal elites? It is, in its fuzzy and 
self-serving way, a message of class conflict. 
This kind of language built on the way Cameron and Osborne were 
implicitly using the idea of class. By ‘working class’ in the above quote, 
May essentially means the same thing as Cameron’s ‘hardworking 
people’: a kind of fuzzy-but-warm haze that almost everyone thinks they 
are a part of. But she was drawing out a particular element of this far 
more strongly than before. In passages like the following, the meaning 
becomes much sharper:
[I want] to put the power of government squarely at the service of 
ordinary working-class people. Because too often that isn’t how it 
works today. Just listen to the way a lot of politicians and commen-
tators talk about the public. They find your patriotism distasteful, 
your concerns about immigration parochial, your views about crime 
illiberal, your attachment to your job security inconvenient. They find 
the fact that more than seventeen million voters decided to leave the 
European Union simply bewildering.
Here, various things are meshed together. There is a concern about job 
security lifted from the trade union movement and the political left. It 
is true that this has been threatened by ‘liberal elites’; May was aware 
of just how much this is the case, having been an integral part of these 
efforts in the Cameron government. Then there is the old-school Tory 
stuff: the EU, patriotism, law and order, and so on. These themes are 
presented as if they are all part of the same big basket of Working-Class 
Issues. So the working class is defined as people who worry about job 
security, who love the Queen, who want the death penalty and who want 
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to leave the EU. And, of course, who dislike immigration. May was the 
most anti-immigrant British prime minister for a very long time, with 
a tendency to make sure that anti-immigration sentiment remained 
high-up on the list of working-class issues as she defined them. So her 
key line was probably this one: ‘if you believe you’re a citizen of the 
world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very 
word “citizenship” means.’
This is a very important quote. Here, the elite opponents of the 
working class are cosmopolitans. In other words, people that revel in a 
world of open borders and diversity; put succinctly by the musician 
Wynton Marsalis as meaning that ‘you fit in wherever you go’.12 It is 
obvious that many people have lost some very important things because 
of globalisation: international competition and economic restructur-
ing (most importantly the decline of heavy industry in Britain) have 
rendered working lives in many regions insecure, and caused the frag-
mentation of communities that once had more cohesive identities and 
senses of purpose. Employers and investors are highly mobile, and their 
decisions to move elsewhere has serious consequences for those that 
depend on them for work. So, unsurprisingly, many people do not want 
to fit in wherever they go, and may distrust things that do. It is easy to 
see why, in this context, it has been an open goal for the Conservatives to 
conflate support for migration and free movement in the EU with anti-
working-class elitism. It is also worth noting that the most cosmopolitan 
thing in the world is capital, but we will return to this later.
This caused serious problems for Labour, and will keep resurfacing 
irrespective of periods of electoral optimism. It is supposed to be ‘the 
party of the working class’, but the associations that go with this term 
have, as we have just seen, been changing in a way that is much more 
conducive to Conservative talking points. In some quarters, it seems that 
the phrase ‘working class’ has become largely synonymous with criticism 
of immigration. It has become unusual to find a politician or journalist 
who uses this term without then segueing into this topic. For instance, 
The Sun, which always used to complain about class politics, now features 
leader columns with titles like ‘Rage of the Working Class’. But what is 
the working class raging about? Only one thing, apparently:
Our population has just rocketed by 513,273 in one year, 335,600 
from migration. It is not racist to protest at the calamitous effect this 
is having on working people who bear the brunt of it.
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Prosperous middle class home owners in London love all the Polish 
plumbers and cleaners. For working people the influx has meant low 
pay, stagnant for a decade as housing costs have soared. It means 
schools and surgeries are full up.
It means being branded ‘thick’ by supposedly educated Remain 
supporters too dim themselves to see that the rational desire for our 
Government to control immigration has nothing – zero – to do with 
prejudice or narrow-mindedness.13
Obviously, we are not just talking about a British phenomenon here. The 
tying together of this kind of ‘identity politics’ and the working class has 
fatally undermined centre-left parties in many countries. This is perhaps 
most obvious in the United States, where Donald Trump worked hard 
to befriend the leaders of predominantly white trade unions (notably 
in the building trades, whom he will needed for his border wall) while 
preparing for conflict with those more likely to represent immigrant 
workers and ethnic minorities (e.g. in the public sector).14 
But despite all this, the UK Labour Party actually performed sur-
prisingly well in the 2017 elections compared to sister parties in other 
European countries such as France, Greece, Spain, Iceland or the Neth-
erlands. This resilience coincided with a strong shift to the left under 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, a fact which caused much surprise and 
worry among commentators wedded to liberal political orthodoxy. 
How did this happen? At first, it seemed like Corbyn would not 
manage to reverse Labour’s downward spiral. In the initial stages of his 
leadership, he appeared more afraid of talking about class than the Con-
servatives. In his 2016 conference leader’s speech, a week before May’s, 
Corbyn did not use the phrase ‘working class’ at all. He used the woollier 
term ‘working families’. The success of what we might call the ‘Con-
servative class warrior’ as described above was one reason why Labour 
preferred to keep things vague, relying on broader condemnations of 
inequality and reiterations of the ‘economy that works for everyone’ 
platitude. It was unnerved by the rawer kind of class conflict expounded 
by the Tories which centred on nationalism. Labour appeared snookered, 
prompting various doom-laden prophecies from even the most sympa-
thetic observers.15 Brexit brought these anxieties to almost intolerable 
levels for Labour and was the central cause of a failed leadership coup 
in 2016.
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The situation became much brighter with the general election of 2017, 
which left Labour in an unexpectedly strong position having attracted 
more votes than most commentators, and most of their own MPs, 
had thought possible. Suddenly, doom-mongers became optimism-
mongers.16 But it is wrong to imagine that Labour’s agonising around class 
has been resolved: almost certainly, it will come back. Their most high-
profile constituency triumphs in 2017 came in places like Kensington 
where they attracted new support from anti-Brexit rich people, or in 
places with a heavy student vote like Canterbury. Meanwhile, there were 
swings away from the party in places like Sunderland which had voted 
very strongly for Brexit. The fact that the biggest sources of new Labour 
support were among the young and the highly educated17 suggests, at 
least on the face of things, that Labour remains highly vulnerable to the 
‘right-wing class warrior’ argument.
On the other hand, the face of things can be deceiving. The argument 
of this book will be that a lot of the discussion and analysis mentioned 
so far is based on very shallow readings of class, which sees it as a means 
of sorting people into categories, rather than something which in many 
respects defines the way in which society works. Let us take a stereotyp-
ical Corbyn-supporting educated young person working in a graduate 
job. (By ‘young person’, we shouldn’t imagine a teenager: Labour support 
was higher in each age band up to those in their forties). Their voting 
choice may tell us that Labour had simply realigned to hoover up a more 
privileged demographic, thus moving away from their ‘working-class 
base’. But it may also tell us something else: perhaps the problems that 
used to be associated with this ‘working-class base’ are now starting to 
spread across society more widely. Insecurity, the boredom and frustra-
tion of working life, the sense that government is powerless to act to 
address urgent and distressing social problems because it needs to avoid 
offending ‘the markets’: these are all ‘class issues’ and they affect a very 
wide spectrum of people indeed. 
The point is that we need, urgently, to consider how we understand 
the idea of class. Class is clearly important in Britain today. As we have 
seen, it has become a fashionable topic for some surprising people, 
and the source of terrible worry for others. But the way in which the 
term is used and understood has been manipulated in a political and 
self-serving manner. In some ways it appears to be almost worthlessly 
vague, such as when it is associated with ‘hardworking people’. At other 
times, it becomes darkly and misleadingly specific, as in the conflation of 
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‘working class’ with anti-immigrant sentiment. In trying to get beyond 
this, I will start by looking at some other, more academic, discussions 
around class in twenty-first century Britain. 
class and classification in academia
Phillip Mirowski has argued that since the 1970s there has been a 
concerted effort by politicians to designate more and more people as 
‘middle class’.18 This, he suggests, is a good way of minimising social 
conflict, since if everyone feels middle class they presumably have more 
invested in the status quo. The previous section, however, showed a 
slightly different picture emerging in relation to current British politics, 
whereby politicians allude much more frequently, and in a more celebra-
tory way, to the ‘working class’, all the while associating it strongly with 
nationalism and patriotism. But what about when we move away from 
front-line politics? 
There are various academic writers who have sought to rehabilitate 
class as a key focus when analysing society. Probably the most high-
profile recent work is Social Class in the 21st Century by Mike Savage 
(written with several colleagues at the London School of Economics). 
This book was informed by a large piece of research called the ‘Great 
British Class Survey’, conducted in conjunction with the BBC. People 
were asked to fill in an online questionnaire about their earnings, job and 
living situation, as well as various questions about their social networks 
– the kinds of people they know and socialise with. The survey then 
assigned respondents to one of seven categories, which they identified 
as the new class structure in Britain. These are the elite, the ‘established 
middle class’, the ‘technical middle class’, the ‘new affluent worker’, the 
‘traditional working class’, ‘emerging service workers’ and the ‘precariat’. 
In developing this sort of categorisation, Savage is seeking to 
do various things. First, he wants to offer a more nuanced hierarchy, 
moving beyond the vague terminology of ‘working’ and ‘middle’ classes. 
In this sense, the book is about classification: he argues that we need 
to be able to delineate people’s class positions accurately, and then 
understand the characteristics of each category. This, he suggests, also 
serves an important political purpose. It helps us to empathise more suc-
cessfully with those at the bottom of society, and to be more critical of 
the unfair advantages accruing to those at the top. For this reason, the 
first paragraph of Savage’s book puts emphasis not on class itself but 
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inequality. Ultimately, it is claimed, understanding class helps us fight 
inequality.
Another of Savage’s objectives relates to the idea of ‘social mobility’, 
which is rarely far behind when the issue of inequality is raised. Social 
mobility is when someone born into a poor family has plenty of oppor-
tunities to make it up the social scale, and presumably when people from 
affluent backgrounds see their life prospects decline (though the latter 
point is rarely as celebrated by those who have turned social mobility 
into a catchphrase). Savage says that these class distinctions are an 
important barrier to social mobility. If you’re born in the elite, you have 
friends and contacts who are also in the elite, and you know how to 
conduct yourself in a way that other members of the elite like, so you 
tend to stay in the elite. 
Third, to make this social mobility argument, Savage highlights 
different kinds of ‘capital’ – meaning attributes that someone possesses 
or develops which they can use to enhance their class position. These are: 
economic capital (referring to someone’s wealth and income), cultural 
capital (their tastes and preferences) and social capital (their friends and 
social networks). People who have a lot of these kinds of capital tend to 
use them to get more and climb higher, thus breaking social mobility 
and reinforcing class divisions. 
In this sense, Savage is highly influenced by the French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu, who pioneered the use of ‘capital’ in this way. Bourdieu 
argued that vast portions of our lives and societies are shaped by different 
classes’ access to these kinds of capital. People from more affluent class 
backgrounds have certain kinds of interests, certain contact networks, 
certain senses of humour and certain ways of expressing themselves, and 
this is not even to mention the additional advantages that being born 
with money can buy (better education, more secure living conditions 
and so on). He used the idea of ‘symbolic violence’: the things that more 
affluent people like are held up as the most important things needed to 
get ahead in society, whereas the things working-class people like and 
the way they behave are presented as what not to do. The fact that a 
certain set of mannerisms and cultural reference points get you much 
easier access to influential social networks, for instance, is a kind of 
‘symbolic violence’.
Bourdieu is celebrated for giving a rich depiction of the lives of people 
in different class situations, and, in particular, showing how these distinc-
tions reproduce themselves from generation to generation.19 Ultimately, 
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Bourdieu provides a very good way of explaining why social inequal-
ities do not change, and why there is little social mobility. Bourdieu’s 
work, as shown by its influence on writers such as Savage, is probably the 
dominant way of addressing class in academic sociology; it’s an exercise 
in classification, characterising the nature of differences and showing 
why they don’t go away. As I have already noted, after the 2017 election 
there was a popular argument that age had replaced class as the most 
important factor influencing voting choice.20 This is interesting. If our 
concern is mainly about defining a set of classes and showing why the 
differences between them matter, this development poses a problem: 
why bother, when it seems that age is more important in explaining 
people’s worldviews anyway? I will come back to this in the final section 
of the book, where I consider the situation in Britain following the 2017 
general election.
Notice that the bottom of Savage’s scale is something called ‘the 
precariat’,* which is drawn from the work of Guy Standing, another 
academic with fairly high media visibility and a flair for coining 
neologisms.21 Standing has become a very influential writer on class, 
because he posits the existence of an entirely new class, and a ‘dangerous 
one’ into the bargain.† The precariat, for Standing, is a diverse group, 
with the defining feature being insecurity. For instance:
1. Their ‘industrial citizenship’ is insecure. By this, Standing means that 
they have little security in the world of work. They will lack legal or 
institutional protection against job loss, work opportunities may be 
short term and prone to dry up, they will have little access to oppor-
tunities to gain skills that could enable them to access better jobs; 
and they will generally have nobody to speak up for them at work 
(such as trade unions). 
2. They will also have income insecurity, and will likely not know 
whether they will be able to provide for themselves and their 
dependents in the medium term. This is partly a natural result of 
point one, but also reflects various other things: the weakening of 
welfare ‘safety nets’, for instance. People in the precariat are also less 
likely to have family or community networks they can draw on for 
support. In this sense, the precariat is connected with the idea of 
* his is a portmanteau, mixing together the words ‘proletariat’ and ‘precarious’. 
† he subtitle of his book he Precariat is ‘the new dangerous class’.
20 . class matters
‘disaffiliation’, which French sociologists have been writing about for 
some years:22 ‘disaffiliated’ people, like the precariat, are cut off from 
access to both secure work and other sources of support and income 
provided by wider society.
3. They also, apparently, do not feel like part of the ‘traditional working 
class’. They do not identify with trade unions, the traditional repre-
sentatives of this group, and they do not necessarily value the same 
things the post-war trade union movement valued (such as wage 
growth and job security). Instead, they might demand other kinds of 
social protection; things like a ‘universal basic income’, for instance 
(we return to this idea later). 
Point three – that the precariat has completely different needs and aspi-
rations from the ‘traditional working class’ – is probably Standing’s most 
controversial point, and he is often criticised for not providing enough 
evidence. Expressed this way, the question becomes not simply ‘how do 
we define different classes?’ but also ‘what do different classes want?’ In 
this sense Standing is no doubt unsurprised by the tying together of class 
and attitudes towards immigration described in the previous section. For 
him, one of the dangers of ‘precarity’ is how easily it can be associated 
with nationalist political projects: insecurity becomes the rejection of glo-
balisation which becomes the rejection of foreigners. Hence, if nothing 
more positive can be offered to them, in the worst-case scenario he sees 
the precariat as the core demographic of future fascist movements.
So the state of the art in academic discussion of class tends to emphasise 
the need for finer distinctions, taking into account the relative decline of 
‘traditional working-class’ jobs and the growth in white-collar or service 
work. It also emphasises barriers between classes, examining how class 
distinctions (e.g. in access to different kinds of social, economic and 
cultural capital) reinforce and reproduce themselves, acting as a brake on 
social mobility. There is also a growing concern with insecurity among 
those at the bottom, as exemplified by Standing’s work on the precariat. 
One thinker who does not feature heavily in the work of high-profile 
British academic analysts of class such as Savage or Standing is Marx. 
To some extent Marx is seen as too blunt. After all, he focused primarily 
on the relationship between only two groups – worker and capitalist – 
whereas nowadays we want to see more nuance. The kind of economy 
he was analysing (principally Britain in the nineteenth century) was one 
where mechanised industry was just emerging, and in which the new 
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actors on the scene were the emerging ‘proletariat’ of factory workers 
and the ‘bourgeois’ mill owner. But the UK economy is highly complex, 
featuring huge amounts of professional, knowledge-based and service-
based work, which obviously presents a challenge for this kind of binary 
distinction. 
Another reason why Marx appears at odds with the spirit of the age is 
that he has very little interest in ‘social mobility’, at least in the warm and 
fuzzy way we understand it today. Who could deny that people should 
be able to rise in the social hierarchy if they have good ideas and work 
hard? As we shall see, Marx does talk a lot about social mobility in a 
sense, but in a way that inspires less enthusiasm: he looks in some depth 
at the downwards social mobility of people who may have once been 
self-sufficient small producers, but who were reduced to the status of 
disposable factory hands by the development of capitalist industry. 
It is true, then, that if our main purpose is to find increasingly fine ways 
of categorising different groups of people, and explaining the barriers 
between them, Marx’s writing offers little help today. But thinking about 
class should not be purely about classification, however nuanced, as an 
end in itself. As I said earlier, for Marx class is more about the position 
and function that people occupy within the structure of an economy, and 
the way in which these different roles interact and conflict. For instance, 
someone who depends on selling their time and skills in exchange for 
a wage may have conflicting interests with someone who depends on 
making a profit by manufacturing and selling goods at a competitive 
price. This is the case even if they both have the same views on the 
relative value of the opera versus The X Factor, have the same accents and 
went to the same school. 
The key point is this: when talking about class, our objective should not 
be simply to provide a comprehensive categorisation of groups of people 
and the differences between them, but to consider how the interactions 
between people with different economic roles affects the working of society as a 
whole, from the experiences people have at work, to the development and 
application of technology, to the economic and social policies pursued 
by governments. Unlike Bourdieu or Savage, whose emphasis is on how 
class divisions persist, Marx’s interest is on how the conflict between 
different classes leads society to change, and hence to the undermining 
and disruption of the status quo rather than its preservation. 
2
Alien Powers:  
Class in Marxist Thought
One important difference between Marx and the other writers discussed 
in Chapter 1 is that, for him, class is less about cultural and social 
attributes and more about the way the economy is structured, particularly 
in the workplace. Marx’s focus was primarily on commodity production. 
In other words, those workplaces where goods are produced, to be sent 
out later into the marketplace for sale. Of course, there are many other 
kinds of workplaces, where tangible commodities are not produced (for 
instance in the service industry, finance or the public sector). I will come 
to these later, but for now I will focus on how Marx thought class dis-
tinctions worked in commodity production. 
Marx utilises something generally called a ‘labour theory of value’. In 
broad terms, this is the belief that the value of a particular commodity 
is determined by the amount of labour that has gone into it. Things 
which require more labour, tend to be more valuable.* In the productive 
workplace, commodities are produced using a combination of two main 
inputs: human labour and machinery. Machinery can reduce the value 
of commodities, by reducing the amount of human labour required to 
make them. Commodities are then sold and the money reinvested to 
make more commodities. 
* here are a lot of caveats that need to be explained here, which are discussed in Marx’s 
work and which have also been discussed at great length ever since. When talking about 
how much labour goes into a commodity, Marx refers to ‘socially necessary labour time’. 
What this means it that, if I spend two days making a chair that is identical to one that was 
made in a factory in ten minutes, my chair is no more valuable than the factory one. What 
determines value is therefore not the actual eforts of particular individuals, but the amount 
of labour it should take to make something given the technology available. If new chair-
making technology is invented that reduces the amount of labour required to make a chair, 
then we would expect the value of chairs to decline. However, also note that ‘value’ here is 
not the same as price, since sellers make all sorts of decisions about pricing in order to gain 
competitive advantages against their rivals, selling commodities below or above their value. 
he point, though, is that Marx would expect the real prices of things, over time, to follow 
the same trends as their value, which in turn follows ‘socially necessary labour time’.
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The owner of the factory hopes that s/he makes a profit in this process. 
But where does this profit come from? This is where class divisions come 
in. According to Marx, workers produce more value in a day’s work at 
the factory than they receive in wages. The difference between the value 
the worker produces and the value of their wage goes back to the factory 
owner (i.e. the capitalist), and Marx calls it surplus value. If the capitalist 
can then successfully sell these commodities at their value, then this 
surplus value is converted into hard profit. 
How is the capitalist able to gain this surplus value? If workers aren’t 
being paid the full value of what they’ve produced, why don’t they just 
make and sell things themselves without the capitalist taking a cut? This 
is because of a very important point: one of the defining characteris-
tics of capitalism is, for Marx, the fact that the ‘means of production’ 
(the technology, organisational resources and other equipment needed 
to produce commodities) are owned by the capitalist. The worker can’t 
do these things on his/her own, because they don’t have access to the 
equipment and investment power they need. Admittedly, at some stage 
they may have done. In pre-capitalist Britain, many would have worked 
in their own homes using their own equipment (e.g. small-scale weavers). 
But under capitalism the most modern and efficient machinery becomes 
concentrated in the hands of capitalists, and workers therefore have no 
choice but to sell their time and skills to them in exchange for a wage.
Broadly, Marx concerns himself with two main classes: labour and 
capital. Labour refers to those people who do not own the means of 
production, and who depend on being able to sell their time and skills 
to those that do. Capital refers to those that do own the means of 
production, and who depend on hiring labour and extracting surplus 
value, in order to make a profit. If we consider class analysis as primarily 
a means of categorising people, then this is obviously quite blunt. Even 
setting aside the fact that there are many people who don’t easily fit 
into either of these categories, there is so much variation within them: 
it refuses to distinguish between the vast discrepancies in skill, status or 
pay levels between individuals within the class of ‘labour’, for instance. 
The worker involved in designing the iPad, versus the worker involved 
in its manufacture. 
But this is to miss the point. We are not talking here about ways 
of sorting individuals into particular categorisations, but as a means of 
explaining the processes and pressures that define capitalist societies. 
Take ‘capital’, for instance. As Anwar Shaikh points out, capital should 
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not be taken to denote a group of individuals with shared cultural 
and social characteristics, but an economic process which is enacted by 
particular individuals or groups.1 Money is invested in order to make 
something, which is then sold, hopefully for more money than was 
originally invested. Then this augmented sum is reinvested and the cycle 
begins again. Marx represents this with a very simple formula: M-C-M'. 
Money is invested (M), used to make commodities for sale (C), and a 
larger sum is created (M'). When anyone enters into this process, he or 
she is acting as capital.
If the M-C-M' cycle is broken, and the people with the money stop 
investing it (and either fritter it away on personal consumption or just 
hoard it under their mattresses), they stop being capitalists. So, when I 
refer to capital from now on, I mean all those people or agencies, be they 
the sole owners of a company, shareholders, major investment organisa-
tions or whatever else, who are involved in investing money in order to 
extract ‘surplus value’. Likewise, when I refer to labour I mean all those 
people that depend on their ability to sell their time and skills to capital 
as a means of carrying out this process, usually in exchange for a wage. 
By fulfilling this function, they create surplus value which the capitalist 
can then try to realise as profit and reinvest.
I need to stress something very important here, which takes my 
analysis of class a very long way away from those discussed in Chapter 
1. ‘Labour’ as a class under capitalism is not necessarily something you 
are: it would be insultingly reductive to pick a particular individual with 
all of their complexity, and say ‘this person is labour’. It is something you 
do; a role you fulfil within the wider economy. Someone could be within 
the ‘elite’ according to the kinds of cultural activities they like, food they 
eat and people they meet, but if they end up spending eight hours a day 
selling their time and skills to someone else in exchange for a wage, then 
for that period they are acting as labour and experience the pressures and 
demands that go with this role. 
Therefore, the point is not to claim that these categories are exhaustive, 
nor that they explain the life conditions of everyone who fits into either 
of these broad groups. Obviously they do not. But they do offer a way of 
understanding the kinds of pressures and conflicts that characterise all 
capitalist societies. The twenty-first century British economy is highly 
diverse, with a huge service industry and a much more high-tech man-
ufacturing sector compared to the cotton mills of Marx’s day (to name 
just two of the most obvious differences). But this book will argue that 
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these pressures and conflicts continue to play out in similar ways, even if 
the surroundings look very different. Capitalists need to keep extracting, 
realising and reinvesting surplus value, and if they don’t the economy 
will stop growing. The importance of this cycle characterises our world 
as much, if not more, than it characterised Marx’s. 
So this analysis is, in some respects, quite ‘depersonalised’. Unlike 
other writers, I am less interested in the personal attributes that make 
someone ‘working’ or ‘middle’ class, (or whatever other categorisation 
we might develop). Consequently, I am also less interested in language 
such as ‘corporate greed’ or ‘irresponsible capitalism’. Certainly, there 
is greed and irresponsibility in the corporate world, as elsewhere. But 
more interesting is what happens when capitalism is simply working as 
it is supposed to. In this respect, Marx’s distinction between labour and 
capital leads to various important points, which we will now examine. 
conflict in the workplace
For Marx, capital can only function if it is continually able to extract 
surplus value. In other words, if it is able to get more value out of workers 
than it gives them in the form of a wage. Whether capital is invested by 
a kindly old philanthropist, or by a predatory multinational investment 
fund, it has to extract this surplus value, otherwise no profit can be made 
and the business will fail. If large numbers of capitalists are unable to do 
this, then the economy will stagnate or contract. The quantity of surplus 
value that a worker can furnish in a given working day is variable. If 
workers can gain higher wages or shorter working hours without a cor-
responding increase in productivity (e.g. through new working methods 
or technological improvement), then surplus value diminishes. 
This means that, by definition, capital has an interest in trying to limit 
wages and extend working time. Labour, conversely, has an interest in 
the opposite: most workers would ideally like to reduce working time 
and raise wages. This is the kind of observation that seems very obvious, 
but in Marx’s view there is something odd, even irrational about this 
situation. It suggests that, under capitalism, the process of making things 
to satisfy human needs – one of the most important activities in any 
society – is built on a massive conflict of interest. Capital needs to get as 
much from labour in exchange for as little as it can get away with, and 
this basic fact creates the additional need for all sorts of other things: 
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For capital, the drive to extract more surplus value becomes both 
art and science. It is something that capitalists try to measure and 
calculate as precisely as possible, and they are continually inventing new 
techniques and methods that can help them in this effort. For example, 
in pre-capitalist societies, Marx suggests, things like rest and communal 
times were regulated by social and cultural expectations – mealtimes, 
for example, were a social experience and a lynchpin of community 
interaction – but during the capitalist working day they become things 
to be strictly measured, monitored and haggled over.2 Office workers are 
expected to eat at their desks, call centre workers’ trips to the toilet are 
meticulously counted and professionals are judged on whether or not 
they are replying to emails at two in the morning. The capitalist, Marx 
argued, would inevitably seek to find ways around limits to working 
hours (for instance through government legislation), through various 
‘small thefts’ of the worker’s time.3 
In Marx’s view, wages and the length of the working day reflect a 
balance of power between the distinct class interests of labour and 
capital: who is more organised, and which side is more able to get their 
way? The capitalist wants as much surplus value as s/he can get, but there 
are limits, particularly their inability to push workers beyond what can 
be tolerated socially and even physically: ‘Capital … takes no account of 
the health and the length of life of the worker, unless society forces it to 
do so.’4
The point here is that the division between labour and capital in 
capitalist economies means there is a continuous conflict of interest 
around the amount of surplus value that gets extracted. Today, as I will 
show, there is no shortage of examples of ‘bad employers’ who commit 
cynical ‘small thefts’ against workers. But the mistake is to attribute these 
instances to the greedy personalities of those involved. Capitalists need 
to extract as much surplus value as they can. If they don’t, then others 
will outcompete them. So this ‘greedy’ behaviour has a ‘rational’ basis: 
every other capitalist does it, and they need to remain competitive. The 
way this conflict plays out in modern British workplaces will be the 
subject of an in-depth examination in Chapter 4. 
Before moving on, we also need to recognise that, according to Marx, 
the inevitability of class conflict under capitalism would also produce 
the likelihood of class consciousness and resistance. In other words, the 
people comprising the classes of capital or labour are likely to, over time, 
start to identify shared interests with other people in the same group, 
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and act accordingly. Marx is therefore interested in the development of 
forms of collective organisation on the part of workers, most obviously 
trade unions. 
In the Communist Manifesto he argues that whether individual 
confrontations between workers and employers were won or not is less 
important than the ‘main thing’, which is that workers became more 
confident about, and committed to, organising collectively to advance 
their interests against capital. Capital, however, can also be class-
conscious (arguably it finds it easier to be so than labour), and when it 
is it can have a very powerful voice. Consequently, Marx is not surprised 
to find institutions like unions being treated as ‘heinous crimes’ to be 
legislated against severely,5 following collective lobbying of government 
by capitalists. He comments on the hypocrisy of liberal theorists who 
defend free trade but not the freedom of workers to organise. This is a 
remark which, as I will show, has very obvious relevance today.
The idea of class consciousness among labour is probably the single 
area where it is easiest for the theorists of classification to blow vast 
holes in Marx’s argument. It does seem fairly evident that the shared 
‘class’ identities we find emerging in reality are much less likely to 
reflect the broad division between labour and capital as Marx defines 
them, compared to the more nuanced gradations identified by writers 
like Savage. Marx’s definition of labour, for instance, would include 
a relatively glamorous job such as working in digital software design, 
alongside lower-skilled and lower-status work such as on an assembly 
line. Obviously, there are likely to be major social divisions between 
these groups that are probably better understood in terms of ideas like 
social and cultural capital, and this poses a big problem for the Marxist 
version of class consciousness. 
Nonetheless, I have already said that Marx’s ideas around class should 
be looked at as a means of explaining the pressures that shape the devel-
opment of society as a whole. In this respect, there are two reasons 
why his ideas around class consciousness and interest have an obvious 
relevance. First, because it puts us on the lookout for more subtle signs of 
‘resistance’ against capital among workers even in apparently quite sedate 
environments without any stereotypical hallmarks of class consciousness 
(such as militant trade unions). I come back to this point in Chapter 4. 
Second, because the Marxist view enables us to see how class conflict 
is reflected in various different areas of British life, such as in the way 
government policy evolves, or the way culture and media operate. I will 
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discuss this extensively later. First, I will identify some of the key aspects 
of Marx’s analysis of class which will resurface throughout the rest of 
the book. 
dependency and discipline
Since workers depend on selling their time to capitalists in exchange 
for a wage, it follows that their well-being (under capitalism) is also 
highly dependent on the smooth running of the M-C-M' cycle. If this 
process is interrupted (for example, if enough surplus value cannot be 
extracted, if goods cannot be sold profitably or if new profitable invest-
ments cannot be found) then the result may be a crisis which leads to 
unemployment or wage cuts. Capitalism therefore means that workers 
are at the mercy of a process which is largely out of their control. If 
that process falters, labour suffers, as has been the case since the crisis 
of 2008, which precipitated a long and deep decline in British workers’ 
relative pay as capitalists sought to return to profitability (see Chapter 3).
For now, the point is that, in Marx’s argument, capitalism tends 
to create a larger and larger group of people who are dependent on 
selling their time to the capitalist, and who, as a result, are ultimately 
in a vulnerable position with limited control over their own destiny. 
For Marx, it is important to stress, this includes those people who have 
waged jobs, but also those people who either have no job at all or who 
drift erratically in and out of the labour market. Marx does not distin-
guish too sharply between these groups because they share an important 
characteristic: they are all separated from the ‘means of production’ and 
in this sense they are all dependent on capital. When capital moves to 
make redundancies, or to take on staff, people are buffeted between these 
categories by decisions over which they have no say.
The vulnerability of labour in this context is often discussed using 
highly fatalistic and quasi-scientific language, such as the jargon of 
‘supply and demand’. It is fairly common to hear people justify life-
ruining things like redundancy using these kinds of highly abstract and 
self-consciously neutral terms. For instance: we might agree it’s a shame 
that many train guards are being laid-off, but accept it as inevitable due 
to advances in ticket machine technology. Supply has come to outweigh 
demand, and so there must be an inevitable adjustment to these market 
conditions. In this kind of argument, supply and demand are spoken 
about as natural ‘laws’ to which humans must adapt, in the same way as 
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we must learn to cope with the law of gravity, or our inability to breathe 
under water. 
But this is not how Marx sees it. The balance between supply and 
demand is, in some key respects, regulated directly by capital. By seeking 
to grow, capital expands the demand for labour, but by investing in 
labour-saving technology or by laying people off for whatever other 
reason, it can also decrease this demand. Capitalists can choose whether 
to invest in technology that directly replaces workers without improving 
‘customer service’ (such as ticket machines), or invest in technology that 
improves service without necessarily making people redundant (such 
as expanding or improving train capacity). So it is nonsense to talk 
about the supply and demand for labour as if they were neutral laws of 
economic gravity. ‘Les dés sont pipés.* Capital acts on both sides at once.’6
I need to add another point. For Marx, it is a misconception about 
capitalism that it is against what would now be polemically termed ‘big 
government’. In Marx’s view, government plays a very important, and 
often quite coercive, role in managing and manipulating the supply of 
dependent labour. In the first volume of Capital, he considers the mass 
movement of people from the countryside to emerging cities in the early 
years of the industrial revolution. They were drawn by the ‘carrot’ of job 
opportunities in capitalist industries, compared to a life of grim rural 
struggle. But they were also pushed by the stick. Government, Marx 
argues, was highly active in depriving people of the means to support 
themselves in the countryside. For instance, by violently enforcing the 
enclosure and privatisation of common land that they were using for 
subsistence. And then, he says, once people lost access to the land, they 
were apt to be treated as ‘voluntary criminals’ and subjected to more leg-
islation, such as restrictions on begging, which stretch all the way back 
to the Tudor period but which intensified in capitalism’s early years.7,†
So in Marx’s view the idea of ‘meritocracy’ – i.e. that capital was capital 
and labour was labour because of the superior ingenuity and hard work 
of those in the former group – is the worst kind of ‘insipid childish-
ness’, and a kind of all-ages fairy tale.8 Instead, he argues that a bullying 
government was an essential component in the birth of the modern 
* ‘he dice are loaded.’
† here is an interesting aside here: Marx also discusses public policy around 
international migration. But whereas in our time this idea is associated with neuroses 
around immigration, Marx writes about restrictions on emigration, for fear that people 
leaving the country would jeopardise the labour supply.
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capitalist labour market, forcibly pushing people into a vulnerable 
position in order to increase labour market supply in capitalist industry’s 
formative years.
Marx uses the term ‘industrial reserve army’ to describe those people 
who were not employed but who drifted in, out and around the labour 
market, ready to be called upon by capital. These people often existed in 
the most desperate poverty. If we follow Marx’s argument, it is ridiculous 
to draw a clear dividing line between the ‘working class’ (who are in work) 
and the unemployed (who are not), as is conventional wisdom today 
(recall the Rachel Reeves quote in Chapter 1). The reason this is wrong 
is because their fates are tied closely together. By its very existence, the 
‘reserve army’ exerts a disciplinary pressure on those within work since 
the more unemployed people there are, the more the worker fears for 
his or her own position. It is therefore a source of labour market supply 
which, to some extent, can be manipulated to weaken the bargaining 
power of labour. Consequently, the reserve army is not a burden on 
capitalist economies: it is a resource, which ‘belongs to capital just as 
absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost’.9 
Finally, I want to note another implication of Marx’s argument. He 
does not believe that unemployment and poverty can ever be eradicated 
on a lasting basis in capitalist societies, because capital depends on 
these things both as a ready resource and for disciplining the in-work 
population. If there was no unemployment and poverty, labour would be 
less scared to demand higher wages and reduced working time, and so 
would become insufferably overconfident from capital’s perspective. It is 
for this reason that he criticises influential liberal theorists such as Adam 
Smith, whose social conscience was demonstrated by his arguments in 
favour of the education of workers. Marx believed that other thinkers, like 
the French politician and writer Germain Garnier, though apparently 
much crueller in their outlook, were more in tune with the nature of 
capitalism. Whereas Smith wanted to see improved education for the 
poor, albeit ‘in prudent and homeopathic doses’,10 Garnier countered 
that such education could actually be a big problem for capital. This is 
because capitalists depended on the disposability and malleability of the 
worker, and their total dependence on the requirements of capital, which 
unnecessary education might jeopardise. 
On the face of things, these kinds of comments seem a long way 
from the ‘knowledge economy’ which supposedly drives modern Britain, 
though as I shall argue later, this kind of rhetoric does need puncturing. 
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They do, in fact, fit much more closely with current employment policy, 
which emphasises quickly pushing people into low-skilled jobs rather 
than providing them with training and skills.11 In any case, these themes 
of dependency and discipline will recur throughout the book. 
subordination of the individual
Marx is frequently characterised in quite a blunt way as a ‘collectivist’ 
thinker, i.e. someone who is primarily concerned with group categories 
and with little interest in the specific characteristics and concerns of 
individuals. This is not necessarily fair, since much of his argument 
relates to what he sees as the subordination of genuine individuality in 
the capitalist workplace. Capitalism is ‘individualistic’ in the sense that 
if you lose your job you are on your own. But in many other respects it is 
all about enforced collectivisation.
Under capitalism, as we have seen, workers produce things in order 
that they can be sold on the market. While the things they produce may 
have ‘use value’ (i.e. a practical or recreational purpose), the reason they 
are produced is so that the capitalist can realise their ‘exchange value’ (i.e. 
how much one can expect them to sell for) in order to make a profit. 
This is another occasion where something which appears as a statement 
of the obvious is actually, according to Marx, revealed as a somewhat 
strange and specific state of affairs when considered from a wider per-
spective. Producing things purely so they can be sold for profit leads to 
all sorts of peculiar nonsense: large amounts of unnecessary commodities 
that go unsold because demand was not as high as first thought; the 
expenditure of untold billions and unquantifiable amounts of human 
effort on the creation of an advertising industry, whose sole purpose is 
to convince people that they need things that they self-evidently don’t; 
periodic crashes and crises when invested money cannot return a profit. 
One might ask: why don’t we just decide what we want and then produce 
it as a ‘use value’, and be done with it?
The fact that, under capitalism, things are produced primarily for 
sale in a competitive market, means that, in Marx’s words, ‘the process 
of production has mastery over man’.12 In other words, human needs 
are subordinated to the service of something much more abstract – the 
continuation of the M-C-M' cycle. For Marx, however, note that ‘human 
needs’ here do not just concern what is produced but also how things are 
produced. In this respect, he argues that there is something fundamentally 
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anti-human about the way production is organised under capitalism. He 
believes that the main thing that distinguishes humans from animals is 
our ability to enter into a self-directed creative process. A spider’s web 
or the honeycomb of bees are impressive creative achievements. But 
such creatures do these things by instinct only. Humans have purpose. 
They can decide and design their own work in order to fulfil their own 
individual objectives.13 
If we accept Marx’s view, then it suggests there is something wrong 
with the very structure of capitalist workplaces, because they are charac-
terised by the exact opposite situation. Workers produce the things they 
are told to produce in the manner they are told to produce them, for the 
sole purpose of returning a profit to someone else. In this process, the full 
spectrum of human creativity is stunted:
[Capitalist manufacture] not only subjects the previously independent 
worker to the discipline and command of capital … [but also] converts 
the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular 
skill as in a forcing-house, through the suppression of a whole world 
of productive drives and inclinations, just as in the states of La Plata 
they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow … the 
individual himself is divided up, and transformed into the automatic 
motor of a detail operation.14
As machinery progresses, Marx argues that we have a process of rapid 
‘socialisation’, i.e. the bringing together of individual workers (who 
may previously have been working on their own account as small-scale 
producers) into a large collective group with a narrowly defined division 
of roles, as in a factory. In this sense, capitalism is a highly collectivist 
system rather than an ‘individualist’ one. This socialisation occurs under 
the control of the capitalist and new technology is used to pursue the 
ends they define. As such, the machine is no longer a tool the worker can 
use to express him or herself, but instead comes to sweep aside individual 
initiative and decision making:
In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker’s means 
of labour. Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least … to 
transmit the worker’s activity to the object … Rather [the worker’s 
efforts] … merely transmit the machine’s work, the machine’s action, 
on to the raw material – supervises and guards it against interrup-
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tions. Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and 
makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose handling 
therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the machine which 
possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso 
… The worker’s activity … is regulated on all sides by the movement 
of the machinery and not the opposite.15
In this sense, machinery, from the point of view of the worker, is an ‘alien 
power’. They have no control over it, but its demands come to define 
the physical and mental actions they must perform for large stretches of 
their life. Marx suggests that as machinery progresses it takes on more 
and more complex tasks, meaning that labour’s jobs become more menial 
and workers themselves become more interchangeable. The machine, 
under capitalism, becomes the worker’s enemy. In the early years of 
industrialisation this was rendered very vividly by the Luddites: clan-
destine bands of workers who destroyed new industrial equipment in 
Yorkshire, Derbyshire and neighbouring counties, and whose name has 
become associated with a distrust of technology. Individuals acting as 
labour are often deprived of the capacity to show initiative or creativity. 
Instead, they ‘now produce only for society and in society … individuals 
are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside 
them as their fate’.16 
So Marx believes that, for labour, there is the continual danger 
that the capacity for individual expression will be stunted, as workers’ 
initiative and creative agency becomes more and more subordinated to 
a production process designed by and for capital. This is not just about 
technology, but also the development of various forms of management 
supervision. For Marx, there must always be a requirement for some 
form of supervision over the worker, because of the inherent conflict of 
interest between labour and capital.17 
Liberal theorists are fond of conflating the ‘free market’ with the 
freedom of individual humans, arguing the purest state of freedom exists 
when people are able to buy and sell as they want. In Marxist terms, this 
is ridiculous. It completely overlooks the workplace, which is, after all, 
the central facet of many people’s lives. When we look at the workplace, 
we might suppose that the more anarchic (i.e. the more competitive 
and unrestricted) the marketplace, the more intense the discipline that 
needs to be exerted over the worker therein.18 Domenico Losurdo has 
shown how liberal philosophers during the industrial revolution, while 
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they vaunted ‘freedom’ in the marketplace, advocated ever fiercer and 
more intrusive control over employees.19 Jeremy Bentham’s concept of 
the panopticon – a building where a central observer could continu-
ally survey every other person in every other room – could have been 
applied to a prison, but could also have been applied to the workplace. 
And this is not to mention the alarm and violent responses provoked by 
the revelation that workers were trying to form trade unions to represent 
their interests.20 I return to this idea of workplace control in Chapter 4.
alien powers and loss of control
The final point to emphasise about Marx’s writing on class is the most 
complicated and arguably the most important. Even though dividing 
society into labour and capital is fairly blunt as a way of categorising 
individuals’ experiences and social status, it has a much greater value in 
a different respect. Different pressures and imperatives act on people 
depending on where they sit in the economic structure of society – 
whether they rely on their ability to sell their time and skills in exchange 
for a wage, or whether they depend on extracting profit, or whatever 
else. As I have shown, the main such imperative is the need to maintain 
the M-C-M' cycle, which is urgent for both capital and labour, but the 
process of doing so involves all sorts of conflicting interests and forms of 
control. How these pressures play out has significant implications for the 
way in which society develops and changes. Why is this? 
Capitalism is highly dynamic, and needs to expand. We have seen 
that to be a ‘capitalist’, in Marx’s definition, is to be defined primarily 
by the processes and imperatives you enact rather than your personal 
characteristics. You have to extract surplus value, realise it as profit, and 
then reinvest it in expanded form. If you don’t do this, your business is 
outstripped by competitors and you fail. Therefore, according to Marx, 
the need for capital to get continually bigger is comparable to a religious 
duty: ‘accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the Prophets!’21
This means that individual capitalists are driven by a force outside of 
themselves – competition. Competition forces the capitalist to extract 
more surplus value from his or her workers, or fall behind. The competitive 
marketplace is a funny thing in Marx’s thinking: on the one hand, it is 
the product of a lot of different individuals pursuing their own interests 
in the ways they see fit. In this sense it appears to be quite anarchic and 
subject to individual strategising. But as individual capitalists are pushed 
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to compete harder to gain over their competitors, the collective result 
is a pressure that acts on all these individuals and which is beyond any 
of their control. ‘As much as the individual moments of this movement 
arise from the conscious will and particular purposes of individuals 
… their own collisions with one another produce an alien social power 
standing above them.’22 Competition exerts a ‘reciprocal compulsion’23 
on capitalists that strips them of their autonomy and binds them to a 
system which imposes its rules on them. 
As we have already seen, this has important implications for capital in 
the workplace. Conflicts around wages and working time do not simply 
‘depend on the will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. 
Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production 
confront the individual capitalist as a force external to him.’24 Limiting 
wages and cutting break times becomes an imperative rather than a 
preference. 
We should note that at this point we do run into quite fundamen-
tal philosophical differences that set Marx apart from other thinkers. 
Liberal theorists such as Hayek also refer to the way in which the 
individual under capitalism is buffeted by pressures that are out of his or 
her control; the difference is that, for him, this is all part of the fun. He 
warns, for instance, against ‘planning designed to protect individuals or 
groups against diminutions of their income, which although in no way 
deserved yet in a competitive society occur daily, against losses imposing 
severe hardships having no moral justification yet inseparable from the 
competitive system’.25 It is sad that people suffer morally unjustifiable 
hardship, but the only alternative is not to have a competitive system, 
and nobody wants that. 
Furthermore, the idea of alien powers has much wider ramifications 
for society and, especially, for government. The last thing governments 
want are economic crises. If capitalists are not successfully extracting and 
reinvesting profits in their country, then they will not have economic 
growth. So governments in capitalist societies are dependent on the 
well-being of capital as a class; if capitalists are not investing, then the 
government has serious economic and social problems. 
For this reason, government is also subject to ‘alien powers’. When 
they impose potentially unpopular measures, such as austerity policies, 
they tend to rationalise this in a certain way. They appeal to abstract 
imperatives which are forcing their hand. British capitalism must be 
competitive. We have to reduce the tax burden and labour regulations 
36 . class matters
in order to increase business confidence. Borrowing must be decreased so 
as to win the approval of the markets. These italicised phrases are highly 
abstract concepts which are ‘alien powers’ in the Marxist sense. They 
are amalgamations of the competitive interactions between thousands 
of individuals, which become a collective entity that has coercive force 
over capitalists and governments. I come back to this idea in Chapter 5.
There is another sense in which the idea of ‘alien powers’ applies 
here. Labour and capital perceive the world around them very differ-
ently. Various writers, particularly inspired by the French philosopher 
Henri Lefebvre, have distinguished between the two ideas of ‘place’ and 
‘space’.26 ‘Place’ refers to something concrete. A place is where people live 
and work, where they develop roots and communities, and so on. ‘Space’ 
is something calculating and impersonal: to think about the world in 
terms of ‘abstract space’ is to think unsentimentally about how you can 
configure a supply chain most profitably. When capital invests in the 
construction of a factory in a given area, the lives of workers and their 
families are configured around this. Communities, networks and services 
spring up, and over time that place might even develop a distinctive local 
culture built around the nature of work in the area. But capital is not 
sentimental, and if it becomes more profitable to relocate that factory 
elsewhere, it will generally do it. In this sense, the way capital perceives 
geography itself is alien and remote from the perspective of labour. 
Things which become completely central to the latter can be discarded 
remarkably easily by the former. 
The consequences of this kind of remoteness are all around us. For 
example, in Britain James Meek reported on Cadbury’s relocation of 
production from its Somerdale plant near Bristol to Skarbimierz in 
Poland.27 Two groups of people in different countries found themselves 
being played off against each other by capital:
Sometimes, globalised consumer capitalism links communities [in 
Britain and Poland] … links them, in that strange way of globalisation, 
without doing anything to bring them together … I asked [a Polish 
worker] how she felt about what had happened to the British factory. 
‘I never really thought about it’, she said. ‘We lost so many jobs here in 
Brzeg … We didn’t feel sorry that others lost theirs … it’s somewhere 
else in the world. We don’t physically know these people.’28
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Capital’s remote calculations in abstract space had severe implications 
for the Somerdale workers’ sense of place. Something had been lost that 
others would struggle to understand. In many cases this had unsurpris-
ing political consequences.
[The workers interviewed] all voted in June [2016] for Brexit. A few 
years ago [one of them] joined Ukip … as we talked about chocolate-
making’s lack of industrial glamour, a certain amount of bitterness 
towards the public in general spilled out … ‘People didn’t get the 
history. It didn’t mean anything to them. They didn’t care whether 
they were going to get their Crunchie from Poland.’29
People’s lives thus come to be governed by forces whose workings are 
distant and nebulous, but whose actions have painful consequences.
The point here is that the division between labour and capital within 
societies, even if broad and not necessarily comprehensive (see the next 
section), reveals important insights into the way society works. This is 
not just about the way different people interact with each other at work 
– it has much wider implications for the way in which societies and gov-
ernments evolve and change over time. In the chapters that follow I will 
pick apart these implications in greater detail. 
beyond production
I have said that Marx’s analysis of class focused on commodity 
production, i.e. making goods for sale in the market. What about other 
things, such as the service sector, finance or the public sector? If physical 
commodities are not being made for sale in these contexts does that 
mean Marx’s argument about labour and capital does not apply? What 
about small entrepreneurs and the self-employed?
Many service industry workers – for instance in areas such as ware-
housing, logistics, retail or call centre work – clearly act as labour, in 
Marx’s terms, for various reasons. As Mandel argues, they share 
the central characteristic that they are separated from the means of 
production and required to sell their labour power.30 Usually, the people 
that employ them are capitalists, in that they intend to profit from 
their investment. In addition, these kinds of workers are often essential 
parts of the M-C-M' cycle. Surplus value cannot be realised without 
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logistics workers or retail workers. Where more complex commodities 
are concerned, we can also say that people in areas like customer support 
are an important part of this cycle. 
Because they are part of realising the M-C-M' sequence, these kinds 
of workers are likely to experience the same kinds of pressures that 
commodity producers do. Their break times are barriers to the expansion 
and acceleration of this cycle, and their wages come out of the surplus 
value created in production (since the costs of transporting and selling 
commodities is a deduction from the profit made on them). For this 
reason, Marx devotes large sections of the second volume of Capital to 
explaining how capital is constantly seeking to increase the speed of cir-
culation so profits come back faster.31
So the ‘realm of circulation’ – where goods are traded once they have 
been produced – is very important, and what happens there is very closely 
linked to what happens in production. For one thing, I have already 
argued that the force of competitive pressure in the marketplace acts as a 
kind of alien power over capitalists. A competitive marketplace sharpens 
their instincts, intensifying drives to extract more surplus value and 
intensifying the need for discipline over labour. But it is also important 
to note that there is large potential for disruption in the circulation 
process, and this can have serious consequences. Blockages or interrup-
tions in circulation, perhaps because of limits to the size of the market or 
other logistical barriers, can mean a lack of profitable investment oppor-
tunities. This, in turn, leads to capitalists opting not to invest and instead 
sit on their money.32 By accumulating large ‘hoards’ of money that can’t 
be invested immediately but which cannot simply lie idle, the seeds of 
the banking and financial systems emerge (see Chapter 3).
It is therefore clear that various positions which do not easily fit into 
the labour–capital relationship nonetheless revolve around it in some 
way. People in managerial roles, for instance: the reason for their existence 
is the conflict of interest between labour and capital, which creates a 
ubiquitous need for supervision in the workplace. As capital becomes 
more sophisticated the role of management assumes more complicated 
forms, as shown in Chapter 4. Various professions emerge which are, 
in key respects, defined by the need to maintain the smooth running of 
capitalist processes – accountancy and legal professions, for instance, to 
say nothing of advertising and marketing work. The financial sector is 
a more complicated issue to which I return later. The public sector is a 
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special case, which will be discussed in some depth in Chapter 5. In the 
meantime, we now turn to Chapter 3, which presents an overview of 
the way in which the British economy has developed in recent decades, 
and considers the ways in which the Marxist ideas already surveyed 
might apply. 
3
Changing Class Dynamics in Britain
introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined the way in which Marx uses the concept 
of class, comparing it to other perspectives from politics and academia. 
The purpose of this chapter, by contrast, is to paint a broad-brush picture 
of how the British economy has evolved over recent decades, with a 
particular focus on the way in which the relationship between labour 
and capital has changed. 
It is practically impossible to discuss economy and society in Britain 
over the last 40 years without talking about inequality. The story is 
striking – as we shall see, an extended decline in inequality that followed 
World War II was dramatically reversed during the 1980s, and has 
followed a more ambiguous path since then. Because of this reversal, 
most people on the left in Britain see inequality as the central evil of 
British society, and complaining about inequality dominates left political 
rhetoric today. However, in Chapter 1 I argued that this was a problem. 
Inequality is a woolly and abstract term, and has been employed in ways 
that do not resonate widely. Admittedly, identifying inequality as the 
main social enemy has been effective in some ways, since any politician 
from right or left generally now needs to at least pretend to care about 
it. However, it has produced a fairly limited political discussion, with a 
fixation on technocratic measures like tinkering around with tax rates. I 
agree with the author who says:
Reducing social inequalities to income alone – the size of people’s 
wallets – is a very myopic approach. One reason why, for all the 
talk about inequality in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, there 
has been limited public outrage and no sustained political effort to 
attack it is, I suspect, the exclusive focus on income and wealth in 
mainstream debate.1
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As Branko Milanović has shown, increasing inequality in Britain is not 
simply a product of national circumstances, but part of a much wider 
pattern of the changing global distribution of wealth.2 The big global 
winners since the 1980s have been the ‘emerging middle classes’ of 
countries such as China and India, as well as those who were already 
in the top 1 per cent of the world’s wealthiest (for the most part, people 
who were already rich in North America and other developed countries). 
The biggest losers are ‘working-class and lower-middle-class Americans, 
Europeans and Japanese’, who remain on the 80th percentile of global 
wealth but have descended to that point from much higher.3
One of the stories these figures tell is that labour’s position in countries 
like Britain is declining. But this decline needs to be understood on more 
levels than the abstract technical question of income distribution. In this 
chapter I will look in greater depth at important changes in the rela-
tionship between labour and capital in Britain, including the increasing 
difficulties for British workers in representing their own interests and 
having a say in their workplaces, as well as key policy interventions 
that were more or less explicitly designed to strengthen capital’s hand. 
There have also been important changes in the structure of the British 
economy (such as the growing importance of finance and f inancialisa-
tion), which have made capital more unreachable – harder to negotiate 
with and to restrain. In short, British labour has become more vulnerable 
and more subject to fierce discipline from capital and government – a 
process which has been more visceral than can be encapsulated in a 
Gini coefficient.
inequality and the balance of class power in 
britain
‘Class Compromise’
Most analyses of British political economy since World War II show 
a sustained low level of inequality (comparatively speaking) from 1945 
through to the 1970s. They then show it rising very sharply during the 
1980s, before assuming a murkier pattern over the last 25 years. Figure 
1 shows two lines.4 One is the Gini coefficient, which is the most 
commonly used statistical method for calculating income inequality in a 
country. The other line is the 90:10 ratio, which quantifies the relation-
ship between the consumption of those on the 90th percentile of British 
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society versus those on the 10th percentile. Both measures fit this rough 
outline. Figure 25 takes a longer-term view and shows another possible 
measure of inequality: the percentage of all national income going to the 
richest 1 per cent. Here, there is a striking U shape, with the 1980s once 
again the turning point. 
In Marxist terms, the retreat and resurgence of inequality reflects 
shifts in the balance of class power between labour and capital. The 
post-war period is often described as one of ‘class compromise’ or ‘social 
compact’,6 in which labour benefitted from a political commitment to full 
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employment and welfare state expansion, both of which mitigated the 
fear of unemployment for workers, in turn enabling rapid wage rises and 
the sustained growth of consumer demand. Moreover, this ‘compromise’ 
rested on the fact that labour was comparatively well-organised, with 
high levels of trade union density and a large proportion of workers’ 
terms and conditions being set by collective agreements negotiated 
between employers and unions. 
It is important to stress that this period of decreasing inequality is an 
outlier when put into historical perspective. The Marxist historian Eric 
Hobsbawm referred to it as a ‘Golden Age’ in which labour managed to 
make material concessions from capital that would have been unthink-
able in the years before, and the years after. Trade unions were the main 
manifestations of workers’ power. In Britain, in the decades leading up 
to World War II, collective bargaining had gradually progressed from a 
proscribed activity to something that was institutionalised nationally; 
during the war, the need for urgent increases in productivity and good 
labour relations catalysed the creation of government institutions in 
which employers and trade unionists would negotiate wages across 
entire industries, minimising the scope for disruption and conflict. 
In this respect the groundwork was laid for a more ‘coordinated’ 
approach to the labour market which insulated workers against market 
forces. During the post-war period, collective bargaining was a powerful 
means of ‘taking wages out of competition’; in other words, by setting up 
national standards, they weakened the pressure on capital to use wage 
cuts as a means of competing with each other, forcing them to compete 
on other things such as efficiency, product quality, marketing and so on.7 
The ‘alien power’ of competition which pushes capital to extract more 
surplus value in exchange for less pay was temporarily restrained by 
these measures. It is therefore not surprising that union membership has 
tended to be associated with narrowing inequality,8 and, conversely, that 
the declining scope of collective bargaining and union influence implies 
the opposite. Note how the sudden and rapid drop in the number of 
workers whose terms and conditions are decided by collective bargaining 
(see Figure 3)9 coincides with the pick-up in inequality identified 
previously as well as the stagnation in the wage share.10
Before getting carried away with the idea that unions were driving 
the rise in worker prosperity over this period, we should remember 
that market conditions were highly favourable to labour. World War II 
had reduced the labour supply (since lots of people had been killed or 
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injured), and the reconstruction effort had increased demand. Hence 
collective bargaining and the coordination of wage policy at national level 
arguably also served to protect capital from potentially more rapid wage 
rises that may have been possible under the circumstances. The Marxist 
economist Ernest Mandel argued that government efforts to expand the 
planning of wages, rather than leaving them up to the market, were not 
so much for the benefit of labour but a (temporary) means of providing 
stability for capital, preventing labour costs getting out of hand due to 
labour market tightness.11 Moderate union leaders who were willing to 
remain on good terms with government and employers were a necessary 
condition for this. So was the increasing concentration of capital into 
fewer, larger, ‘monopoly’ firms which cultivated extensive bureaucra-
cies, and which were shielded from market pressures. These provided 
readily identifiable counterparts for industry-level collective bargaining 
between labour and capital. 
No Compromise
The key point is how fragile the post-war era was. It rested on the 
assumption of a sustainable compromise between two ‘partners’ (i.e. 
labour and capital) who would continue to find mutually acceptable 
compromises over wages and working conditions. The problem is that, 
as we have seen, these classes inevitably engage with each other on a 
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vastly unequal footing, and with conflicting interests at the core of the 
relationship. Therefore any institutional compromise between them, 
while it may stabilise things for a time, is likely to be doomed in the long 
run of history. 
As Howell has shown in some detail, the strength of trade unions 
during this period was significantly overestimated, including by 
unions themselves.12 The institutional resources available to British 
unions remained weak in comparison to a country like Germany (with 
stronger legal protection of collective bargaining at industry level and 
institutionalised ‘co-management’ at workplace level). By contrast, 
to advance their demands against management, British unions relied 
more on being able to mobilise people on the shop floor, particularly 
through strikes – a situation which came to a head in the late 1970s 
and the fabled ‘winter of discontent’. Their belief in this approach even 
led them to reject attempts, for instance under Jim Callaghan’s Labour 
government, to institutionalise more strongly collective bargaining 
over wages and other aspects of work on a national scale.13 They saw 
this as unnecessary. But they underestimated how forcefully Margaret 
Thatcher’s government would attack their capacity to conduct strikes, 
and overestimated how strongly they would be able to resist those attacks.
So the post-war ‘compromise’ was dismantled surprisingly easily. 
First, labour was incapacitated very effectively by the blunt force of 
government legislation; the Thatcher government introduced policies 
that stringently regulated the conduct of strikes and other forms of 
union activity. Employers felt more up for a fight, and more willing to 
take radical steps to minimise the influence of organised labour, typically 
justified in terms of increasing international competition. The vanguard 
here was Rupert Murdoch’s dispute with print unions at Wapping in 
1986. Here, Murdoch’s company, News International, which at the time 
owned four British newspapers, sought to relocate its production from 
Fleet Street to Wapping. Workers at the new site would need to agree to 
new restrictions including no-strike clauses and more ‘flexible’ working 
arrangements. In the strike action that followed the breakdown of talks 
over the move, 6,000 workers taking part in the action were dismissed, 
and the new site was put into operation with the help of members of a 
different, more employer-friendly union. The strike continued for over a 
year and ended in defeat, with production on the new terms beginning 
in earnest at Wapping. 
46 . class matters
The dispute is significant because it shows an employer who had 
become impatient with the collective bargaining of the post-war decades, 
and who wanted to escape these restraints. News International was 
therefore at the forefront of a trend: capital was becoming emboldened 
to stage big showdowns with labour. It is also significant because of the 
extent to which government enthusiastically and explicitly intervened 
on the side of capital, particularly through extensive policing and the 
use of new legal restrictions on trade unionists. Thatcher’s government 
had outlawed secondary strikes, where workers not directly involved 
in a dispute go on strike in support of another group. It also imposed 
limits on the number of people allowed to stand on picket lines (a major 
tool in trying to enforce a strike), and made offences against these rules 
punishable in the criminal courts.14 Combined with the role of the 
police, reprising their highly politicised function initiated during the 
miners’ strike a year earlier, there was an intensified sense that the law 
and the government were not entirely neutral mediators between labour 
and capital.
Aside from a more aggressive outlook, the forms assumed by capital 
were also becoming harder to pin down. Large, ‘vertically integrated’ 
firms (where multiple functions from sales to research to production 
were performed in one organisation) began to shift towards ‘vertical dis-
integration’; in other words, subcontracting and outsourcing. This meant 
that the ‘bargaining partners’ with which unions had to try and engage 
became smaller, more diffuse and under fiercer competitive pressure.15 
Companies, influenced by new managerial ideas around ‘organisa-
tional culture’, also expanded their use of human resource management 
techniques and sought to use this as a replacement for dealing with 
trade unions.16 Team-building exercises and the employee suggestion 
box enabled managers to present a veneer of caring without the incon-
venience of independent collective representation. Government also did 
its bit to make collective bargaining harder. Institutions that had been 
established to regulate conditions in given industries on a national scale 
were dismantled – the National Dock Labour Board being a case in 
point.17 Industries that had served as bastions of union strength were cut 
back or privatised. 
One thing many on the left share with conservatives is their roman-
ticisation of small businesses against the corporate juggernaut. This 
sentiment is intuitively presented as part of the ‘inequality’ narrative 
of corporate elites versus the little people; the latter term presumed to 
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include both workers and ‘small businesspeople’ who should no doubt be 
considered in ‘the 99 per cent’. But we can now begin to see that this is 
misplaced. Evidence shows that societies dominated by larger firms tend 
to be more equal than ones with high numbers of small businesses.18 
What I have said so far gives us some idea of why this may be: larger 
corporations are more tangible ‘bargaining partners’ enabling a more 
organised labour market, and they are also less likely to be under intense 
competitive pressure. As such, the belief that inequality is inherently bad 
and that small businesses are inherently good is self-contradictory.
These developments had unsurprising results. The share of national 
wealth going to labour began to decline, in comparison to the share 
going to capital. Özlem Onaran has estimated that, once we exclude 
elite managerial salaries, the percentage of gross domestic product taking 
the form of workers’ wages reduced by about 11 per cent between 1975 
and 2008.19 During this time we also see a steady rise in the proportion 
of the British labour force in low-waged jobs, from around 12 per cent 
in the mid-1970s to just over 20 per cent in the late 1990s20 (the increase 
tailing off after this until the crisis period). Moreover, Costas Lapavit-
sashas has shown how the productivity of British workers over the same 
period increased far more rapidly than wages, suggesting that employees 
are producing more for their employers while getting less in return.21 
Correspondingly, the Marxist economist Michael Roberts estimates 
a significant (albeit temporary) upswing in the rate of profit (i.e. the 
amount of surplus value returning to the capitalist in relation to the 
amount of capital invested) over the Thatcher years.22 These are the pre-
dictable outcomes of a shift in the balance of class power. 
All of this is not to draw a simple cause-and-effect relationship between 
‘disorganisation’ (i.e. declining union strength and collective bargaining 
coverage) and inequality. Correlation does not mean causation. To some 
extent, both may be consequences of wider changes: ‘globalisation’ and 
the opening up of labour forces in other parts of the world, technolog-
ical change, and even the increasing role of finance in the UK economy 
(to which I will turn shortly). However, it is clear that union decline 
has exacerbated the problems facing labour and made the latter more 
vulnerable; more likely to come through these transitions in worse shape 
than it might otherwise have done. The point, then, is that organised 
labour has been effectively disciplined: British workers have less capacity 
to challenge capital collectively, and have become more vulnerable to its 
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fluctuations and demands. Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 2, capital 
cannot function without this discipline. 
Again, when discussing workforce discipline, we should recognise that 
we are talking about an international trend rather than a national one. 
Comparable comments could be made of many countries. These trends 
have been even more severe in the United States, and slightly cushioned 
but nonetheless present in major continental European economies such 
as Germany and France. They are also evident in emerging economies 
like China (although this case is more controversial).23 This means that 
Thatcherite legislation in Britain can only really be the ‘how’, rather 
than the ‘why’, of this disciplinary programme. Indeed, Thatcher herself 
was very honest that she was acting under the coercion of alien powers, 
as exemplified in her mantra of ‘there is no alternative’. 
From a capitalist perspective – the most important perspective in 
capitalist society, after all – this was largely true. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
capitalism cannot function unless surplus value can be extracted, realised 
and profitably reinvested. So while it is probably true to say that British 
Conservative politicians do not like rising equality and an organised 
labour market, the more important point is that capitalism as a system 
does not like these things. 
The economic crises affecting Britain in the 1970s, which Thatcher’s 
government was mandated to address, were in part a consequence of what 
Marxists have termed the ‘profit squeeze’.24 Wages were rising, dimin-
ishing the surplus value accruing to capitalists. Union strength was also 
weakening the supervisory functions of firm-level management. The tax 
regimes and institutional commitments (such as collective bargaining) 
imposed on business during the post-war period were also becoming an 
intolerable burden. Rising equality was, ironically, therefore also a source 
of imbalance, as labour extracted more in wages at the expense of surplus 
value. In that sense, reasserting the dominance of capital was, ironically, 
a necessary rebalancing from capital’s perspective. Governments cannot 
ignore this logic, though a more precise discussion of how they relate to 
it will need to wait until Chapter 5. 
New Labour, ‘Partnership’ and Labour Discipline
The 1980s experienced a great leap forward for class power and 
inequality in Britain. What has happened since then? Since the 1990s, 
the trajectory of inequality in Britain has been more ambiguous. It 
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appears to have been hindered by the minimum wage introduced under 
New Labour, which supported incomes at the lower end of the labour 
market.25 Also under New Labour, increases in welfare payments may 
have reduced overall levels of poverty and inequality.26 In the latter case, 
however, changes benefitted children and pensioners far more than 
workers without children, whose relative position may even have got 
worse under Blair and Brown. Support, in other words, was aimed at 
future and former members of the workforce, rather than strengthening 
the position of labour itself. 
New Labour used taxation and welfare policy to adjust incomes in 
a way that mitigated inequality statistics, while largely continuing and 
even exacerbating the class discipline of the Thatcher years. While trade 
unionists were afforded some (limited and loophole-ridden) new rights, 
the main bulk of anti-union legislation remained in place. Indeed, even 
the union-friendly legislation of the time generally came with an explicit 
agenda of fostering ‘partnerships’ between workers and employees, in 
which it was understood that labour deserved a voice, but not to the 
extent that it might actually challenge the prerogatives of capital.27 
Partnerships – as manifested through things like the union-learning 
agenda28 – were supposed to follow the theory that a more ‘construc-
tive’ (i.e. management-friendly) form of trade unionism could make life 
easier for employers while also strengthening trade unions’ presence in 
the workplace.* Evidence suggests that partnership strategies, while they 
might put unions on better terms with managers, tend not to create a 
strong counterbalance to management, with partnership workplaces 
typically suffering more problems of management bullying, lack of 
meaningful dialogue or problems with working time, than ones where 
unions took a more oppositional approach.29 British capital is arguably 
too short-termist and authoritarian to allow meaningful partnerships to 
emerge – an idea to which I will return shortly.30 This calls into question 
the central New Labour idea that there can be widespread ‘mutual gains’ 
between labour and capital in the workplace (rather than one advancing 
* he union-learning agenda was a scheme, supported by the Union Learning Fund, 
to involve trade union representatives in administering workplace education and training 
schemes. his had obvious potential scope for common interest between labour and capital, 
which led it to be criticised by some observers as a kind of co-opting of unions into a non-
threatening and excessively employer-friendly attitude. Others, however, contested this, 
arguing that by channelling more resources to representatives in the workplace, these kinds 
of initiatives could strengthen independent trade unionism, even setting aside the actual 
content of training initiatives (see endnote 82).
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at the other’s expense), but the rhetoric of partnership was very important 
in making the party respectable to centrist opinion. 
With regard to welfare policy under New Labour, there is something 
else that needs noting. While many benefits increased quantitatively, 
there was also an important qualitative change in the way the benefits 
system was administered. Like his American analogue Bill Clinton, 
Blair greatly expanded the use of ‘conditionality’ in the benefits system, 
where recipients were expected to meet certain objectives and targets or 
risk being sanctioned. In other words, supposedly more generous welfare 
services also become more punitive, seeking to push recipients into the 
lower end of the labour market and make it harder for them to turn down 
the jobs offered, however bad they might be.31 In these measures, we can 
see an infrastructure developing that allowed government to take a more 
direct role in monitoring and manipulating the industrial reserve army.
Post-Crisis
The economic crisis that destroyed New Labour as a political force 
had ambiguous effects on inequality as a statistical measure. It has 
been argued that the crisis and subsequent austerity measures reduced 
inequality, since top incomes took a significant hit while certain benefits 
for those on the lowest incomes (again, particularly pensioners and 
children) were protected.32 This provided the Cameron government with 
the ammunition to claim, somewhat optimistically, that their tenure had 
been an egalitarian one. This smoke and mirrors serves to highlight the 
problems of thinking about inequality in the abstract. When we look at 
the power relations between labour and capital, once again the picture is 
a little different. 
The biggest victims of the post-2008 period have been wage earners, 
particularly those at the lower end of the labour market. More optimistic 
analyses of living standards and inequality under austerity have tended 
to overlook the divergence between pensioners and wage earners, with 
the former’s condition remaining stable but the latter’s becoming notably 
worse.33 In the crisis’s aftermath, as unemployment rose, investment 
stalled and companies sought to cut costs, the biggest declines in income 
being among those in low-paid jobs.34 Consequently, the current crisis 
is quite distinctive in the sense that, unlike in previous crises where 
profits were severely hit, the share of wages in relation to profits has 
not appreciably increased.35 It is also distinctive, not necessarily in the 
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depth of wage declines (though this has been extensive), but in the length 
of the squeeze on wages (see Table 1).36 Hence, while worklessness has 
declined since its post-crisis heights, poverty has remained stable and 
in-work poverty has increased.37 There has been a sort of ‘squashing’, 
where middle-income families are less distinguishable from poor ones 
– the fact that this is happening while median household incomes are 
rising reflects how the incomes of elderly people have made solid gains 
owing to the protection of pensions and benefits.38
Table 1 TUC data on crises and earnings decline 
Crisis 1865–7 1874–8 1921–3 1976–7 2007–14
Duration of earnings crisis (years) 2 4 2 2 7
Depth of real earnings decline (%) −10 −1.7 −8.2 −6.6 −8.2
The majority Conservative government that took office in 2015 also 
greatly expanded the disciplinary apparatus surrounding labour. For one 
thing, there is the Trade Union Act. This was an incoherent and melo-
dramatic piece of legislation, albeit one which is likely to have significant 
effects.39 Its main provision was to impose new restrictions on whether 
or not trade unions are allowed to call a strike. It has some contradic-
tions: the central conceit is the need to curb strike action at a time when 
strike action is at a historic low, and it demands high voting turnout 
in trade union strike ballots while simultaneously limiting participation 
(for instance, by preventing unions from holding strike votes online). 
These contradictions are interesting and tell us something about the 
relationship between government, capital and labour: I will return to the 
subject in Chapter 5. For now, suffice to say that the Act is a particularly 
route-one form of labour discipline inspired by Thatcherite retro-chic.
More sophisticated than this were welfare changes spearheaded by 
Iain Duncan Smith, albeit building on New Labour initiatives. The con-
ditionality and punitive sanctions were expanded and intensified, being 
applied to the disabled and long-term ill, and increasingly to those in 
low-paid jobs who were reliant on benefits to support wages.40 In the 
case of disabled people, it seems likely that the process of forcing people 
to attend ‘fit for work’ assessments, and the efforts to pressure people 
back into the labour market at any cost, contributed to a great many early 
deaths.41 Once again, discipline of the labour force is the central issue: not 
of trade unionists this time but over people in and around the ‘reserve 
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army’. According to Jay Wiggan, these changes have increased compe-
tition for the lowest-paid jobs, and pushed people into accepting the 
terms of those jobs without reservation.42 In other words, people’s expec-
tations of what they can get from capital are being forced downwards. 
Table 2 Countries’ experiences of economic and wage growth, 2007–15
 Real wage growth,  Real wage decline
 2007–15 2007–15
Positive annual GDP growth,  Norway United Kingdom
 2007–15 Slovak Republic
 Sweden
 Germany
 France
 Luxembourg
 Austria
 Czech Republic
 United States
 Ireland
 Belgium
 South Korea
 Japan
 Israel
Negative annual GDP growth,  Denmark Italy
 2007–15 Latvia Portugal
 Slovenia Greece
 Spain
 Finland
While these trends are not unique to the United Kingdom (as we 
have seen), I should stress that this country is highly specific in some 
respects. As Table 2 shows, it is the only OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) country that experienced 
wage decline at the same time as the economy was growing.43 This reflects 
the extent to which the ‘British model’ has been based on forcing people 
into low-wage employment, and how successful we have been at creating 
a tightly disciplined labour force which imposes minimal demands on 
capital. To understand this more fully, however, it is important to look 
more closely at the way in which the position and character of labour 
and capital have changed over the same period. 
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financialisation, capital and class discipline
In understanding the changing relationship between capital and labour, 
we need to recognise wider contextual factors in the British economy. We 
know that since the 1970s there have been shifts in the way government 
has regulated labour–capital relations. Regulations over trade unionists 
and benefits recipients (i.e. labour) became much tighter, while 
regulation over the decisions capital could make in investing, trading and 
in the labour market, became much looser. One particularly important 
area of deregulation was in finance, notably with the Thatcher govern-
ment’s ‘big bang’ of liberalisation which consolidated London’s place as a 
hotspot for the international financial services industry, and correspond-
ingly increased Britain’s reliance on this sector. Understanding the way 
in which the character of capital in Britain is changing requires attention 
to these developments.
Britain, alongside the United States, is arguably the ‘purest, most 
advanced form’ of so-called ‘financialisation’.44 This term describes a 
trend whereby capital looks more and more towards purely financial 
channels as a source of investment and profit (i.e. as opposed to producing 
commodities for trade in the ‘real’ economy).45 There is an extensive 
literature on the way in which capital has been diverted from productive 
investments towards financial ones, particularly in Britain. More inter-
esting for this book is how this affects the relationship between labour 
and capital. 
According to Lapavitsas, financialisation means three key empirical 
developments.46 First, companies have become less reliant on bank loans 
in financing their operations, and more on their own financial activities, 
such as trading in securities, bonds, equity and foreign exchange. Second, 
the role of banks has changed as a result, towards lending to consumers 
and also towards greater involvement in commercial investment banking. 
And finally, households themselves have become more embroiled in the 
financial system through escalating private debt and the extension of 
retail financial services, such as mortgages, credit cards, student loans 
and so on. This trend is by no means unique to Britain, but it is particu-
larly pronounced here. 
How does the financialisation of the British economy affect the way 
capital relates to labour, and vice versa? For one thing, it has changed 
capital’s priorities. Financialisation implies a fixation on so-called ‘share-
holder value’; i.e. the prioritisation of maintaining and bolstering share 
54 . class matters
prices ahead of productive investment in equipment or personnel.47 In 
this sense, things like business psychology and speculation come into 
play; the watchwords become ‘confidence’ and ‘expectation’, since share 
prices are greatly influenced by all kinds of hard-to-predict contingen-
cies. Because of this focus on shareholder value, financialisation means 
we are more likely to see capital pursuing ‘downsize and distribute’ 
strategies rather than ‘retain and reinvest’ ones. In other words, efforts 
to reduce firm resources and labour costs in the short term will take 
precedence over longer-term investment in developing the workforce 
and technology/infrastructure, in order to improve the perceived health 
of the firm from the perspective of investors.48
Fichtner’s study of hedge funds – the shock troops of financialisation 
– provides a good illustration of this kind of activity.49 Even by capital’s 
standards, hedge funds are highly opaque, suffering very few regulations 
around transparency and reporting. When they invest in non-financial 
companies, they often play a highly ‘activist’ role in trying to increase the 
company’s share value, by forcing down its operating costs (e.g. money 
spent on productive investment and labour expenses). In such cases,
Initially, the hedge fund typically communicates its demands to the 
management of the target company in private. If the management is 
not willing to fulfil its demands, the activist hedge fund will typically 
launch a public campaign to build up pressure. In most cases they are 
able to attract like-minded investors (mutual funds, banks or other 
hedge funds) that buy in on the target company stock in anticipation 
of a success of the hedge fund… In some cases activist hedge funds 
cooperate by forming a ‘wolf pack’ that has more financial clout to 
enforce its demands vis-à-vis the target company.50
This makes financialisation quite frightening both for management 
and labour at workplace level. Their position becomes much more 
dependent on the perceptions of financial investors who may move their 
money around quickly and unexpectedly, and according to sometimes 
unpredictable criteria. Such investors – like investment institutions and 
professional fund managers – are remote from the day-to-day life of 
the workplace, and consequently are ‘generally much more mobile and 
rapidly threatening than the old forces of the product market’.51 The 
cumulative effect of all of their individual transactions becomes like a 
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swarm guided by the ‘collective power of opinion’,52 which can lose or 
gain confidence in a firm’s management for opaque reasons.*
This swarming of financial investors, all pursuing shareholder value, 
is more commonly known in business journalism as ‘the markets’ and 
it is the archetypal ‘alien power’ as I have used the term. To watch the 
business news is to realise that ‘the markets’ cannot be reliably predicted, 
and experts’ explanations of their behaviour (whether the share price 
of a particular firm has gone up or down, for instance) are only ever 
offered as rationalisations after the event. They are thus hard to read 
and their mood is only discernible in their reactions. From the perspec-
tive of the workplace, ‘the markets’ force management to compete for 
investment, which often means shedding costs and demonstrating an 
immediate-term path to greater profitability. As such, workplace-level 
management comes to seem like an innocent victim of financialised 
pressures: it’s the shareholders and investors that are really turning 
the screws. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that financialisation-era 
protest movements such as Occupy have little to say about class divisions 
in the workplace.53
While Marx’s analysis of finance remains underdeveloped (he died 
before finishing the third volume of Capital), it is clear that he was 
interested in its unpredictable and opaque elements. Financial capital 
appears, to Marx, as ‘the most irrational form of capital’, where money 
seems to create more money out of thin air rather than through the 
manufacturing of commodities.54 The circulation of financial invest-
ments is, as we have seen, often quite remote from workplace reality, 
and so from the point of view of managers and workers their movement 
seems highly arbitrary, even as they hold life-and-death power over 
many firms.55 The more esoteric and ‘psychological’ influences that come 
into play with regard to finance is something Marx hinted at but which 
remains underdeveloped in his work.56 I will try to develop it more in 
Chapter 5, showing the implications it has for government policy.
All of this means that financialisation has made British capital more 
short-termist, more concerned about ‘market confidence’ relative to 
* For instance, when United Airlines beat up one of their own passengers due to the fact 
they had overbooked a light (quite shocking, but still one of early 2017’s more uplifting 
news stories), their share price unsurprisingly fell. But the extent of this fall was very 
unpredictable. It is only by observing the data after the event that these kinds of things are 
worked out and ad hoc explanations can be ofered. his is not a science: it all depends on 
what mood investors are in at the time.
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investing in workforce or productive infrastructure of the workplace in 
the longer term. As a result, there is evidently a connection between 
the extent of financialisation in the British economy and the country’s 
weak industrial productivity growth,57 with inevitable knock-on effects 
including stagnant wages. Financialisation has also made capital less 
willing to tolerate having to deal with labour. Daguerre directly blames 
the emergence of the financial class for the collapse of the post-war 
‘social compact’ between labour and capital.58 Indeed, the subordination 
of financial capital was probably a necessary condition for the creation 
of cohesive collective bargaining institutions and wages policy in the 
aftermath of World War II.59 International statistical research also 
indicates that the extent of financialisation is inversely proportional 
to the reach and influence of regulatory labour market institutions.60 
And Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell have shown how, right across 
Europe, states have been proactive in reshaping methods of labour 
market regulation so that they impose less of a burden on capital, instead 
maximising the discretion of employers to act in a rapid and unencum-
bered way in response to market pressures.61 The short-term pressures 
implied by financialisation probably also contribute to the difficulty 
of establishing meaningful workplace ‘partnerships’ between unions 
and capital.62
labour discipline and ‘precarity’
There has clearly been a shift in the power balance between labour 
and capital since the 1970s. In some respects the signs have been very 
obvious: declining trade union strength and collective bargaining, greater 
wage inequality, more low-wage work. In other respects the pattern is 
more ambiguous. The make-up of British labour has, during this time, 
itself become more complex: more ethnically and culturally diverse, 
with higher rates of female participation and higher rates of inward and 
outward migration.
One complex issue is the question of insecurity. If capital has become 
more ‘impatient’, and labour has been under greater disciplinary 
pressure, we might also infer that work has become more insecure. This 
is certainly the idea underpinning the ‘precariat’ concept (see Chapter 
2), and the assumption about growing insecurity has become a truism, 
especially but not exclusively on the political left. But what this actually 
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means is complicated, and some of the most important assumptions of 
this argument are not borne out by hard data.* 
One obvious measure of work insecurity is so-called ‘atypical’ work 
(i.e. short-term contracts, agency work and other forms of more 
casualised employment relationships). There has been an international 
trend towards greater levels of atypical work from which Britain has not 
been excluded, though its progress across the labour market has been 
uneven.63 These trends have given rise to much discussion of ‘precarity’, 
which, as we saw, refers partially to short-term work but also tends to 
encompass a range of other factors (such as unpredictability of income, 
low prospects for a stable career and an inability to exercise agency over 
the conditions and patterns of work). One problem with this broad 
definition is that, as Choonara points out, some of these factors (e.g. the 
need to do jobs as defined by management with little scope to exercise 
your own skills and agency) apply much more widely to labour itself 
under capitalism and hence can’t really be used to characterise a distinct 
‘precariat’ class. 
The idea of a growing precariat fits nicely into the story of financialisa-
tion narrated in the preceding section; a more disembedded and rootless 
form of capitalism with fewer commitments to labour and more com-
mitments to short-term shareholder value. The problem is that existing 
data for the United Kingdom tend to show only fairly modest increases 
in forms of atypical employment, and overall levels that are relatively low 
by international standards.64 It is in supposedly more highly regulated 
countries such as France that temporary work has risen more rapidly.65 
In Britain, the rise has been more ambiguous and modest, increasing 
from 5 per cent to 8 per cent of the workforce between 1984 and 1997, 
before stagnating and indeed declining since then.66 Choonara shows 
that the amount of time, on average, British people spend in their jobs 
has actually remained relatively stable over this period, suggesting there 
has not been a mass shift to hiring and firing at will, and individuals 
remaining in one job for several years remains the norm. While things 
like zero-hours contracts have expanded significantly, they remain a 
small proportion of the workforce as a whole.67
* In clarifying my own thoughts about the issue of insecurity and ‘precarity’, I found 
Joseph Choonara’s work helpful, particularly two presentations; one at the Centre for 
Employment Relations, Innovation and Change doctoral conference, University of Leeds, 
May 2016; one at the International Labour Process Conference, University of Sheield, 
April 2017.
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One explanation for this may be that, to put it bluntly, the UK labour 
market has already been more ‘precarious’ than those of other European 
countries for a long time, but that this is manifested in different ways. 
For instance, it is one of the easiest European countries in which to fire 
someone. So much so, that according to some observers there is actually 
little obvious scope for further deregulation that would make much 
difference, leading to more extreme proposals to undermine job security 
(such as the Beecroft report which the Coalition government considered 
in 2012) being ditched.68 On the face of things, we might surmise that 
British capital does not feel the need to demand the mass casualisation of 
labour. To some extent, economic crisis and austerity has had an impact: 
while it has not led to massive increases in temporary work overall, 
temporary work has been a disproportionately large component of job 
growth under austerity. Moreover, the level of ‘involuntary temporary 
work’ (i.e. where workers want permanent work but cannot obtain it, 
rather than being in temporary work because they find it convenient) has 
also increased in the last decade.69 
Standing, as one of the primary popularisers of the precariat thesis 
in the United Kingdom, has sought to counter potential criticisms 
by arguing that Britain has seen ‘casualisation by stealth’ using other 
means. For instance, there have been repeated increases in probationary 
periods during which workers can be made redundant more easily.70 
In this respect, the Coalition government of 2010–15 was particularly 
innovative, with measures such as the imposition of fees to bring 
employment tribunals making it much less risky for employers to 
terminate people’s contracts, and precipitating a rapid and dramatic fall 
in the number of cases brought for unfair dismissal.71
Self-Employment and the ‘Gig Economy’
Another potential kind of precarity is the abuse of ‘self-employment’. 
This is, indeed, an area in which Britain probably leads its European 
neighbours. Self-employment accounts for a very large proportion of 
the employment growth we have seen since the crisis, and the number 
of self-employed workers now approaches the size of the public sector 
workforce, which has been shrinking.72 In liberal discussions, there 
remains a widespread assumption that self-employment is a form of 
freedom, albeit one purchased at the cost of heightened insecurity and 
unpredictability, and even that its expansion is creating a new upwardly 
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mobile voting constituency for the Conservative Party to hoover up. 
Consider the following passage from The Telegraph:
An army of public sector workers, heavily unionised, with generous pay, 
lots of time off, and lavish pensions. Councils stuffed with bureaucrats 
doing non-jobs, and quangos recruiting a growing army of diversity 
workers. An over-manned and feather-bedded public sector that is 
intent on voting itself ever more generous pay and conditions. That 
may well be many people’s idea of the dominant force in the British 
labour market.*
And yet, here is something surprising. That dominance is not 
really true.† In fact, the total number of self-employed workers is fast 
catching up with the numbers in the public sector. The ‘gig economy’ 
is triumphing over everything else. As that trend gathers force – and 
there is no reason why it should not – people who work for themselves 
are going to become an ever more powerful economic and political 
force.73
It is important to move beyond the kind of hyperventilating naivety 
embodied here. It is true that some self-employed workers welcome 
the trade-off between freedom and risk.74 It is equally true that self-
employed workers are more vulnerable: their earnings have fallen much 
more dramatically than the employed since the crisis.75 For journalists 
and some politicians, these risks are all part of the mythology of the 
free worker who does not need their life to be planned out for them.‡ 
Enthusiastic liberals have little time for those who end up in self-
employment but don’t buy into this mythology. Uber drivers recently 
launched a successful legal challenge to their company, in which they 
argued that their self-employed status was unfair and that they should 
be treated as employees with the holiday and sickness rights that entails. 
* ‘Many people’ here should be read as meaning ‘Telegraph readers’. 
† his is one of the least surprising things to have ever been described as ‘surprising’ in a 
national newspaper.
‡ Work and Pensions Secretary Damian Greene: ‘Just a few years ago the idea of a proper 
job meant a job that brings in a ixed monthly salary, with ixed hours, paid holidays, sick 
pay, a pension scheme and other contractual beneits. But the gig economy has changed 
all that. We’ve seen the rise of the everyday entrepreneur. People now own their time and 
control who receives their services and when. hey can pick and mix their employers, their 
hours, their oices, their holiday patterns. his is one of the most signiicant developments 
in the labour market. he potential is huge and the change is exciting.’.
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Some were not impressed at this challenge to ‘freedom’. One, who 
accuses these workers of ‘missing the point of self-employment’, argues:
[Uber’s] … main argument both in court and in the email Uber UK 
have sent out this weekend claims that drivers work for Uber precisely 
because they value being their own boss and being self-employed. In 
doing so, they therefore have the freedom to choose when, where and 
how long they drive for. Uber says this can be substantiated by drivers’ 
opinion polls. It worries me with this case that there is a constant 
attack on our democratic rights freedom of choice, of freedom to set 
up new types of company that have undoubtedly benefited millions – 
of freedom of choice for people who do prefer to be self-employed … 
The representatives of the Uber drivers in this case argue that these 
self-employed people should not have the right to be self-employed 
and this does not undermine their flexibility and freedom.76
Note the almost religious invocation of the words ‘flexibility’ and 
‘freedom’: freed from the burden of sickness and holiday pay – what a 
relief ! 
The recent government-initiated Taylor Review into ‘gig economy’ 
practices provides a nice case study in capital’s ability to continue getting 
its own way. The review advised the creation of a new status with weaker 
employment rights than a standard employee but more than the self-
employed. This was framed as a step-forward for workers’ rights, but only 
seems as such until we recall that the court decisions mentioned above 
suggest that gig economy workers already have rights, it’s just that they 
usually go unenforced. In other words, creating a new status rather than 
focusing on enforcement is a step backwards, rather than forwards.77 
The authors write: ‘we want to incentivise employers to provide certainty 
of hours and income as far as possible and to think carefully about how 
much flexibility they can reasonably expect from their workers’.78 All 
well and good, except that we should, by now, be aware of how limiting 
this phrase ‘as far as possible’ actually is in a capitalist economy.
Sometimes, a self-employed person acts as labour in the same way as 
a waged employee, it’s just the legal terminology that differs. ‘Platform 
capitalists’ like Uber are great achievements in the art of labour 
discipline, marshalling and directing thousands of ‘workers’ over whom 
they exercise a significant amount of control, with much less danger of 
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having to make reciprocal commitments. Thus speaks the CEO of the 
crowdworking platform CrowdFlower:
Before the Internet, it would be really difficult to find someone, 
sit them down for ten minutes and get them to work for you, and 
then fire them after those ten minutes. But with technology, you can 
actually find them, pay them the tiny amount of money, and then get 
rid of them when you don’t need them anymore.79
Like the productive worker who is separated from the means of 
production, such workers are also separated – this time from the organ-
isational mechanisms (i.e. the app and its database) that link customers 
with the service. It is this ownership of the ‘means of circulation’ that 
enables the company to makes its profits.
Elsewhere the abuse of ‘self-employed’ labour is more brutal, as in 
the construction industry,80 or certain parts of the service sector. In 
some cases, workers are essentially pushed into self-employment despite 
being tied to one ‘employer’ just like any other worker. See, for instance, 
Geraint Harvey et al.’s study of fitness instructors who are nominally 
self-employed: this means they have no employee rights but nonetheless 
are only allowed to operate in a particular gym (and sometimes have 
to pay ‘rent’ for the privilege).81 A self-employed person who is only 
allowed to deal with one company at a time: here it seems to be capital 
that is ‘missing the point of self-employment’!
Feeling Precarious
Nonetheless, despite rises in self-employment and fluctuations in 
other kinds of ‘atypical’ work, it seems much of the ‘precariat’ argument 
overstates how instantly disposable the British labour force has become. 
Hence, in understanding employment in Britain, it is equally important 
to focus on what is happening within ‘stable’ jobs, rather than becoming 
fixated on increasing casualisation as the central narrative. By doing 
the latter, we miss ways in which workers in ostensibly secure work are 
experiencing tougher discipline. As Choonara points out, saying that 
someone has ‘stability’ in their job is not necessarily a good thing. It may 
also indicate a lack of opportunities to find something better, or the need 
to cling on to a bad job because of fear of the alternative (something 
particularly important post-2008). 
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This observation may help to explain why, as Duncan Gallie and his 
colleagues have shown, in spite of the mixed picture in terms of job 
casualisation, British workers evidently feel more insecure.82 Insecurity, 
however, is not captured so much in statistics on temporary or agency 
employment, but in other more complex ways. More than fearing actually 
losing their jobs, British workers seem to fear future pay reductions, as 
well as more qualitative worries such as losing the ability to decide how 
their work should be done, or being pushed into less interesting roles 
with fewer opportunities to develop skills. Discipline in this context does 
not mean rendering labour completely disposable, so much as squeezing 
more out of it in the workplace in the form of intensifying pressures and 
diminishing rewards. 
Robert MacDonald has argued that statistics relating to job tenure 
and the kind of contract someone has can mask other forms of insecurity 
that need to be picked up through qualitative analysis.83 This is par-
ticularly important among young people. MacDonald finds growing 
numbers of young people who describe themselves as being trapped 
in low-paid jobs with little path to advancement, and a rising sense of 
there being no way out of this predicament. Indeed, when temporary 
employment did increase in the UK (as in the 1990s), this was heavily 
concentrated among young and old, rather than those in-between.84 
Tracy Shildrick finds that young people are often scarred by their expe-
riences of casualised and low-paid work, losing confidence in their 
capacity to navigate in the job market.85 Transitions from school into 
work are becoming more difficult and risk-laden, a situation which is 
exacerbated by the retrenchment of services such as careers advice under 
austerity.86 And Lisa Russell highlights a growing disjuncture between 
young people’s aspirations and the British economic system’s capacity 
to meet them.87 When discussing young workers, it should be added 
that, in general, young people tend to be less informed about, and less 
engaged with, trade unions.88
There is another reason why the sense of insecurity may be increasing 
in Britain. Even if overall rates of ‘atypical’ employment have not 
increased dramatically, insecure contracts have proliferated more evenly 
across the workforce as a whole. As Janet Smithson and Suzan Lewis put 
it: ‘It is possible that the public perception of rising levels of insecurity 
may be more to do with whom it now affects (graduates and profes-
sional workers as well as manual workers) than with an overall rise in 
the phenomenon.’89
changing class dynamics in britain . 63
In other words, sections of the workforce which have been considered 
relatively privileged have begun to feel the vulnerability inherent in 
being a source of labour under capitalism more strongly. I come back to 
this in some detail in Chapter 4. For now, consider a phenomenon such 
as internships, which are helping to normalise low pay and insecurity 
in high-status careers such as the media or creative industries. The 
importance of internships is growing among graduate workers, increas-
ingly becoming as important as a degree itself in some fields.90 Unpaid 
internships, which are an important way of accessing more glamorous 
careers,91 have a curious parallel with workfare policies, despite being 
typically targeted at young people from much more affluent back-
grounds. Both normalise the idea of ‘experience’ as something you get 
instead of pay, rather than while doing paid work. Despite the differences 
in access to social, cultural and economic capital among the average 
creative industries intern versus the average workfare victim, in both 
cases internships contribute to labour discipline: they displace more 
secure and well-remunerated opportunities, and create new reserves of 
highly malleable labour with lowered expectations.92
It seems that work insecurity is becoming more egalitarian in Britain. 
The link between university education and pathways into a secure 
working life has weakened.93 Casualised and unreliable contracts are 
creeping into areas such as academic research and lecturing.94 Kim 
Hoque and Ian Kirkpatrick also find that agency work and temporary 
contracts have risen among managers and public service workers in the 
UK, leading to these kinds of workers feeling increasingly marginalised 
in their jobs.95 I pick up these threads in Chapter 4, after a brief summary 
of the conclusions that can be drawn so far.
conclusion
The picture that comes across in this chapter is obviously a complex 
one. For various reasons, including the growing financialisation of the 
British economy, capital has become harder to negotiate with. As such, 
the labour market has become more disorganised, with weaker tools for 
labour to represent its interests. Government has intervened more or 
less explicitly in support of capital, either by forcibly disrupting trade 
union strength, by liberalising key industries, or by creating an expanded 
apparatus for monitoring the reserve army as with ‘workfare’ policies. 
This has had the effect of expanding the prevalence of low-paid work 
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and a more diffuse sense of insecurity at work. Insecurity has spread more 
widely across the labour force, coming to encompass (particularly young) 
people in seemingly more privileged contexts. 
In making these observations, key themes outlined in Chapter 2 
resurface: the bundling-up of more and more people into an antago-
nistic and dependent labour–capital-type relationship, as well as the 
role of government in disciplining both the working and non-working 
populations. Earlier, I stressed the fragility of the comparatively egalitar-
ian post-war era. The lesson in this respect is a fairly simple one: given 
that capitalism is based on conflicting class interests, a system based on 
‘class compromise’ is always going to be unstable, and the institutions 
of this compromise (collective bargaining, taxes designed to support 
an expanded welfare state and so on) eventually become unworkable 
‘rigidities’ which constrain, rather than support, capital.96
There is also the theme of alien powers. From a Marxist perspec-
tive, these changes have not simply happened because British capital 
and politicians are horrible. We have seen that the structure of capitalist 
economies imposes imperatives on people within it, and first and foremost 
on capitalists themselves. They need to extract surplus value, and they 
need to expand. They need to be competitive and meet the terms of ‘the 
market’. It is certainly true that Margaret Thatcher’s political project 
was inspired by an ideological commitment, which many Conservative 
(and Labour) politicians sincerely believed in for philosophical reasons. 
But it was not just this. From the perspective of the continued survival 
of capitalism, it was very important to break out of the profit squeeze 
caused by (comparative) union strength and rising wages in the 1970s, 
plus the ‘rigidities’ implied by welfare systems and collective bargaining. 
The relationship between capital and labour had to be reworked. 
4Jobs
[From a supervisor’s notebook:] And if I were determined to live 
solely on the flesh of my own staff … the greatest challenge to present 
itself would be maintaining each of them in an edible state while also 
regulating my consumption of these bodies. Perhaps I should try to 
keep them alive; in that case I could simply restrict myself to ingesting 
only those elements capable of regeneration, such as blood. Even so, I 
do dream about their armpits and elbows.1
In this chapter, I will examine the various ways in which British capi-
talists try to consume labour – figuratively speaking, of course. I argued 
in Chapter 2 that the first site of conflict between labour and capital is 
the workplace. Capital has a built-in imperative to extract more surplus 
value from labour, but it needs to do this while maintaining pay and 
conditions at a rate which does not negatively affect profits. The ways 
in which it contrives to accomplish this are highly varied: sometimes 
they are brutally simple and sometimes elaborate and subtle. It requires 
knowledge and technique to suck out as much blood as possible, while 
leaving the ‘armpits and elbows’ intact so that work continues to get done.
Capitalists might try to squeeze out more surplus value through 
seemingly benign methods, such as changes to working techniques that 
increase efficiency. It could also mean downward pressure on wages, 
either in cuts, freezes or below-inflation increases (in other words, a ‘real-
terms decrease’). It might try to offload other commitments to labour, 
such as pensions or holiday provision. It might seek to speed things up: 
the faster the M-C-M' cycle moves, the more profit is made (at least in 
the short term). Then there are cases of what Marx called ‘small thefts’ 
against the employee: reductions to lunch breaks, getting people to stay 
later or to take their work home with them, and so on.
All of this suggests that, underpinning the relationship between 
labour and capital, is the need for control. Whatever the context, capital 
must find ways of controlling labour: it is no use having workers unless 
66 . class matters
they spend their time doing what you want them to do. Managers have, 
for at least a century, sought to turn the art of control into a science. 
In the early twentieth century, Frederick Taylor pioneered ‘scientific 
management’. He was concerned that factory workers of the day were 
exercising too much agency over their own time. They were dictating 
their own pace of work, finding ways to create downtime and manufac-
turing space for socialising with each other on the job. 
The human being is a social animal – and, for that matter, one which 
is not programmed to spend eight hours a day performing repetitive 
tasks for no particular reason – so this kind of procrastination might 
seem quite natural, even a necessary safeguard in the face of crushing 
boredom. But for capital and management it is a problem which needs to 
be solved. The answer for Taylor was quantification: he used time-and-
motion studies to develop tables of how many times the average worker 
could perform a given action in a given time, which could then be used 
to set extensive numerical targets for employees. This method depended 
on breaking down tasks as far as possible into simple, repetitive actions. 
The assembly line was the archetypal ‘Taylorist’ instrument, since a 
worker would just perform the same action over and over again at a 
rigidly predictable pace that was defined by management science and 
enforced by machinery. What can be simplified and measured can be 
controlled. 
In this kind of situation, Marx’s argument that capitalist work 
arrangements crush the individual seems to make a lot of sense. The 
worker’s creative process, a defining characteristic of what makes him 
or her human, is supressed by the need to comply with a template 
laid down elsewhere. But let’s be fair and modern: while this might 
fit the stereotypical Taylorist system, it all seems a far cry from today’s 
‘knowledge workers’ at high-tech enterprises, who apparently sit around 
on bean bags drinking artisanal tea before brainstorming over a game 
of mah-jongg. Nonetheless, I aim to show in this chapter that even the 
hippest workplace has rules.
workplace control
Culturally, it is frowned upon in the United Kingdom to talk in a critical 
way about management and employers. People who do this risk one of 
two outcomes depending on the age of the person they are talking to: 
being accused of reliving the ‘Winter of Discontent’ (something which 
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remains bizarrely scandalising despite all the various much worse things 
which have happened since), or being likened to French workers, who 
kidnap their human resource managers, set fire to tyres and stage mass 
protests if they are asked to stay five minutes late at work (it is said). 
There have, in fact, been some notable scandals surrounding ‘bad 
employers’ in Britain in recent years. Certain cases tend to act as 
lightning rods for criticism, and the individuals involved are presented 
as sacrificial offerings so that everyone else can carry on as normal. For 
instance, in 2016, the British media went through a few weeks of being 
obsessed with Phillip Green, the former owner of (among many other 
things) British Home Stores. He extracted vast sums of money from 
the company for his own enjoyment while its employees’ pension fund 
accrued a crippling deficit. 
It is true that Green’s case is a particularly bad one, with added 
irony: at one point he was an adviser on cost-cutting to the 2010–15 
Coalition government. People like this become the ‘unacceptable face of 
capitalism’,2 whose very existence makes all the other faces of capitalism, 
by definition, acceptable. Cue various commentators rushing to reaffirm 
their faith in the system now that the bad apples have been found out.3 
Once these people have been publicly shamed, the economy can go back 
to working for everyone.
In Green’s case the victims were his workers, but the scandal wasn’t 
really about work; it was too glamorous. A well-connected member of 
the elite who avoids huge amounts of tax was frittering away people’s 
security in retirement. It is much rarer that there is such a furore over 
the way people are actually treated by their employers in the workplace 
itself, although the damage done to human dignity is often just as severe. 
The most significant case in this respect is the recent controversy around 
Sports Direct. This broke when the Guardian newspaper accused the 
company of paying its staff at the Shirebrook warehouse in Derbyshire 
below the legal minimum wage. In fact, while the staff were nominally 
receiving the statutory minimum, the company made them wait through 
lengthy security checks on entering and exiting the site and deducted pay 
for that time. If these security checks were counted as part of the working 
day (which they should have been, since people weren’t standing in them 
for fun), the hourly wage averaged out to less than the minimum. 
Here the problem of low pay was caught out by a particular technical 
and legal calculation, but it is important to stress that concealed behind 
this calculation are many other qualitative issues. By staging these security 
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checks the organisation demonstrated that it distrusted its employees. It 
made a public show of the fact that it could subject them to invasions of 
personal space on a daily basis.4 Workers could be singled out by name 
and shouted at, like a primary school teacher with a naughty child, if a 
supervisor judged them not to be working fast enough. 
Upon starting the job, workers were welcomed with a letter containing 
the lines: ‘your performance on-site will be monitored and if you do 
not meet the expectations of Sports Direct then your assignment will 
be terminated’. This kind of text is one of those things that, to those 
accustomed to living in the system we live in, sounds ‘harsh but fair’, 
like something Alan Sugar would say. How unreasonable it would be 
to expect someone who doesn’t ‘meet expectations’ not to be fired. But 
what are these expectations? In this case they were defined unilater-
ally by management, and so became more like an autocratic system of 
laws over which the worker has no say, but which they have to follow 
for fear of losing their livelihood. As the Guardian reported, at Sports 
Direct, falling short of expectations could involve spending too long 
on the toilet, clocking in one minute late, or the perennial ‘horseplay’. 
For this reason, the reporters also found that the children of Sports 
Direct workers needed to stay at school despite illnesses, because their 
parents were afraid of management punishment if they left work to look 
after them. 
The employers’ initial response to the Guardian’s exposé was that 
many of these practices are standard for UK warehousing work. It is easy 
to sneer at this but perhaps we should take them at their word. Some 
years ago I worked for a labour rights organisation in the United States 
where we uncovered very similar practices at a warehouse in the Deep 
South. There, the employers also used a ‘strike’ system whereby workers 
reported losing their jobs after leaving early to provide emergency 
care for their children, or coming back one minute late after lunch. In 
this sense Sports Direct has merely been engaging in the transatlantic 
diffusion of cutting-edge management techniques. 
Warehouse workers at UK Amazon sites encounter similar methods. 
They were asked to walk up to eleven miles over a night shift, and were 
expected to collect an order every 33 seconds. Enforcing this required 
no human contact: they were monitored by a wearable device which 
bleeped if their pace slackened. According to the undercover reporter 
who worked at the plant: ‘We are machines, we are robots, we plug our 
scanner in, we’re holding it, but we might as well be plugging it into 
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ourselves … We don’t think for ourselves, maybe they don’t trust us to 
think for ourselves as human beings.’5
It is unlikely that this kind of highly intense and dehumanising 
monitoring is unique to retail industry warehousing. Managers across 
the economy have begun to take control over work time much more 
seriously in recent years, and in this they have been egged on by media 
exaggerations about the supposed costs to the economy of people being 
off sick. They have intensified the surveillance of ill workers, through 
measures such as the now-ubiquitous ‘return to work interview’, where 
people are required to explain periods of sickness in intrusive discussions 
about their health. There are also attempts to link sickness absence to 
disciplinary procedures (as illustrated by Sports Direct’s ‘strikes’ system) 
which have proliferated much more widely.6 Surveys show that British 
workers are becoming more conscious of managerial intervention around 
their health and feel increasingly pressured to attend work when ill.7
Beyond these threats relating to absences from work, the Amazon case 
in particular shows the intensive monitoring of workers’ actions while 
they are clocked in. Employees had to perform repetitive and uninterest-
ing tasks for many hours at a time, watched over by an electronic handset 
that would berate them if they slowed down. Here, the machine becomes 
a relentlessly pedantic overseer which is programmed to tut-tut at its 
human victim incessantly. 
In manufacturing, one of the major themes of management literature 
over the last 40 years has been lean production, which has often been 
assumed to make the labour process less alienating for workers and 
reverse various ‘Taylorist’ methods. Lean production as a concept 
originates in Japan, particularly with the car company Toyota. Lean at 
Toyota and other Japanese manufacturers was a shift away from the 
Taylorist workplace, towards a more flexible and team-based model 
of production. It emphasised ‘quality teams’, where groups of workers 
had greater ‘functional flexibility’. In other words, they were supposed 
to collaborate in understanding and performing a wider range of tasks, 
taking part in quality control as well as suggesting new ideas for the 
production process.
But despite these kinds of trends, there are inevitably limits to how far 
control can really be loosened in the capitalist workplace. The efforts to 
transpose ‘lean’ methods to Western workplaces shows this. We need to 
note a general observation: the fact that workers are sorted into teams 
with some greater degree of autonomy does not necessarily mean control 
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is loosened. In some respects, it can become tighter. In Barker’s8 famous 
study of US telecommunications workplaces, the shift to autonomous 
teamworking appeared, counter-intuitively, to lead to much tighter 
restrictions. Previously, while a lot of power was concentrated in a more 
dictatorial manager figure, the fact that one manager can never be omni-
present meant workers could find ample scope to regulate their own pace 
of work and covertly find time to talk with colleagues. But once their 
‘self-managed teams’ were established, free to set their own processes 
and targets, individuals found they were under a much more relentless 
kind of surveillance. Co-workers with whom they would once have been 
co-conspirators against management were suddenly responsible for 
ensuring targets were met, creating a whole new set of monitoring eyes. 
However autonomous the team, the fact that it became bound up in the 
process of surplus value extraction and realisation means these pressures 
are inevitable.
The more humane aspects of lean production were lost in transit from 
East Asia. In Japan, lean production was bolstered by the ‘three pillars’ 
system of employment relations, which implied very strong job security 
and intensive worker training as well as an active trade union role (not 
universal, but applied to a large segment of the workforce). These were 
seen as necessary to enable workers to take part in quality control. Only 
some of these features made it into Western manufacturing: while 
functional flexibility and quality teams have been adopted to some degree, 
job security and stronger trade unionism have not. Control remains 
very intense. In the US, a lean manufacturing worker-turned-academic 
Darius Mehri found that, much like in Barker’s study, quality teams 
fostered a culture of informal peer-to-peer surveillance and intense 
pressure to meet targets.9 The snazzy new office designs intended to 
support teamworking also served these ends: 
The open office space … facilitates both monitoring and bullying. It 
is important that the employee who is the subject of harassment be 
humiliated in front of the other members of his group … at times the 
rules are vague, allowing managers the flexibility to blame the workers 
at will … The most powerful rules are unwritten and can only be 
learned by observation.10
In the UK, Rick Delbridge’s research also shows that workers in lean 
manufacturing remained under a culture of surveillance, with decision-
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making powers only devolved very slightly to employees.11 Managers 
were stricter in holding them responsible for problems, but they did 
not have significant autonomy to address these problems. This meant 
an intensified culture of blame as workers sought to shift responsibility 
on to colleagues for faults that once would have lain with management. 
The consequence was work intensification rather than empowerment.12 
Wayne Lewchuk et al. have also shown that lean production in the British 
car industry has done little to reduce the arduousness of manufacturing 
work.13 Under capitalism, a workplace with genuine individual freedom 
is unthinkable.
Misanthropic Boredom and Surveillance
At two points on the script, workers are encouraged to try joking with 
the customer. The first is during the confirmation of details. There are 
two eligibility questions where the customer is asked to confirm ‘that 
you spend seven out of 12 months a year in the UK?’ and ‘that this 
is where you pay your taxes?’ These questions respectively open the 
door to two jokes: ‘So no long holidays planned this year then?’ And 
‘no escaping that, is there?’ (On a couple of occasions I tried adding 
to the second question ‘unless you are Vodafone’, but this was quickly 
discouraged by the supervisors). The second point … is later in the 
script, during the communication of the exclusion ‘that you won’t be 
covered for death as a result of … participation in any illegal acts’, to 
which almost every worker adds, with feigned laughter, ‘so if you were 
planning to rob a bank we wouldn’t be able to pay out!’ While this is 
presumably a new joke for the customer, the workers will get to enjoy 
it over and over again throughout the day.14
[H]e did another return, again the math squared and there were no 
itemizations on 34A and the printout’s numbers for W-2 and 1099 
and Forms 2440 and 2441 appeared to square and he filled out his 
codes for the middle tray’s 402 and signed his name and ID number 
that some part of him still refused to quite get memorised so he had 
to unclip his badge and check it each time and then stapled the 402 
to the return and put the file in the top tier’s rightmost tray for 402s 
Out and refused to let himself count the number in the trays yet, and 
then unbidden came the thought that boring also meant something 
that drilled in and made a hole … Then he looked up despite all best 
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prior intentions. In four minutes it would be another hour, a half hour 
after that was the fifteen minute break. Lane Dean imagined himself 
running around on the break waving his arms and shouting gibberish 
and holding ten cigarettes at once in his mouth like a panpipe … He 
knew what he’d really do on the break was sit facing the wall clock in 
the lounge and despite prayers and effort sit counting the seconds tick 
off until he had to come back and do this again.15
Huge numbers of British people are bored by their jobs, and this is 
by no means limited to low-skilled or repetitive work.16 Management 
surveillance can make this boredom very hard to cope with. One of the 
UK’s major growth industries is call centre work, the grimness of which 
has been very well-documented by others.17 When I did this kind of 
job, we were told by supervisors to lie to the (usually old) people that 
answered the phone, telling them our long and dreary list of questions 
would only take ten minutes (it could take 45). This was quite spirit-
crushing, especially given that supervisors were often listening in to 
check you were following the script. I found that the time spent at 
the phone on a shift stretched out into seeming infinity: despite the 
shifts being relatively short, the end of the working day seemed like an 
inconceivable utopia right up to the moment you were actually allowed 
to leave.
This tedium and repetition, combined with the embarrassment and 
guilt of lying to people, made me look for any way I could to reclaim 
control over my own time. In one call centre, they (very unusually) had 
a hot chocolate machine which was free for staff to use. I would drink 
six or seven cups over a four-hour shift, not for the drink (this was 
unhealthy), but for the time you could spend just waiting for it to pour. 
Thirty seconds or so where you can think your own thoughts. At most 
call centres nowadays you would not get away with this, so I was evidently 
lucky, though I did eventually end up getting fired. At another job, you 
would be shouted at by supervisors for standing up without permission, 
making drink or toilet breaks out of the question. So to reclaim time 
I was reduced to just dialling the phone numbers in my list as slowly 
as I could, and carefully redialling unrecognised numbers two or three 
times ‘just to be sure’. Nowadays, though, in most outgoing call centres 
computers dial the numbers for staff, affording no means of escape; 
auto-dialling technology imposes a machine’s suffocating rhythm on the 
worker. A friend of mine found the only way of breaking this sadistic 
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rhythm was to spend a few minutes just immediately hanging up on 
people that answered, though he fairly quickly got sacked for this. 
Managers like to pretend they are humanising this intensely 
anti-human activity, though whether they really believe this, or just see it 
as a useful human resource facade, probably depends on the manager. For 
example, they encourage their underlings to ‘be yourself ’, i.e. appear fun 
and authentic, as a means of coping with the ridiculousness of what they 
are doing, as well as the relentless hostility they receive from the people 
they have to call.18 This authenticity is somewhat undermined by the 
wholly synthetic interactions with call receivers, sometimes vulnerable 
older people. As one journalist puts it:
When someone tells you about the rising price of their weekly shop, 
or how their husband was recently diagnosed with bowel cancer, or 
how they’re on their own now, alone in an empty house, continuing 
to flick through your objection handling booklet makes you feel like 
a sociopath.19
Nonetheless, you have to be careful because, as in many other workplaces, 
call centre managers survey staff without telling them. Someone can 
finish a call and then have a manager walk over to tell them they were 
listening and describe where they went wrong. For instance, I was told 
off for jiggling my leg too much, which made me self-conscious for a 
while. There was also something weirdly oppressive about the ‘incentives’ 
management dished out. Incentives are a standby of management 
science; in a call centre you might get a voucher or something if you 
get the most positive responses in a day. I used to wonder whether there 
was something wrong with me for not being enthused by this. But 
apparently it works, or at least managers think it does: expressions of 
power which grimly masquerade as fun are characteristic of the modern 
British workplace, from the recruitment stage onwards. For instance, 
job interviewees have been forced to dance in exchange for a chance 
to work at Curry’s,20 and I have spoken to students who have attended 
job ‘assessment centres’ which are apparently run by frustrated X Factor 
presenters (who will require people to attend from hundreds of miles 
away, only to sort them into groups to be sent home halfway through 
the day). 
The surveillance and monitoring of workers is clearly not limited to 
lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs such as call centre or warehousing 
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work. The nature of the labour–capital relationships suggests that these 
dynamics will emerge anywhere that people sell their time in exchange 
for a wage. Consider Bob Carter et al.’s studies of relatively profession-
alised white-collar jobs in the tax office.21 Following shifts towards 
teamworking (intended as a means of reducing public sector bureau-
cracy) in 2005, they show how the role of the line manager in HMRC 
(Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) changed. Previously, as we 
might expect given the professional setting, line management’s role had 
involved expert knowledge and various staff support functions, enabling 
them to cultivate interpersonal relationships with those under them. 
‘Lean’ policies ended up shifting this relationship to something much 
closer to a labour–capital one. Line managers were made more tightly 
responsible for monitoring team productivity. Quantitative targets were 
increased, and their relationship with staff became more impersonal 
and, importantly, more oriented towards monitoring performance rather 
than support. This led to friction with employees, and it also signalled 
a reduction in the status of line management itself. Their position as 
experts was diminished, since their job now involved simply keeping tabs 
on targets set from above. Their ‘tacit knowledge’ – the subtle under-
standings both workers and managers have which influence how they 
do their work – was usurped by codification and management ‘science’. 
It is no good to oversimplify here. The general point is that any 
labour–capital relationship requires control, but clearly the way in which 
this control is exercised varies greatly in different types of work. Martha 
Crowley’s22 research in the US has shown that whereas service and 
manual workers tend to experience ‘coercive control’, like in the examples 
described above, professionals appear to have greater autonomy. But 
even so, their performance is just as likely as the warehouse operative’s to 
be continually monitored against company objectives. In this situation 
true autonomy is surely a mirage. Professional workers may live in fear 
of the consequences of disappointing their managers and falling behind. 
They typically have to impose intense self-control in order to meet 
organisational expectations – in particular, they are pushed to furnish ‘an 
enormous amount of “voluntary” effort’, which breaks down boundaries 
between work and personal life. Thus arise phenomena like the politics 
of out-of-hours emailing: people feel the need to respond to emails at 
two in the morning, not because the issue is actually urgent, but because 
whoever replies quickest and at the most inconvenient times seems the 
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most dedicated.* As researchers such as Christopher Grey have shown, 
high-status organisational cultures such as those found in accountancy 
impose huge pressures on workers to monitor themselves and conform 
to the correct image.23 They play golf on weekends even though they 
don’t like golf, and they marry people who look like they’ll fit in socially 
with the bosses’ partners. 
For a particularly extreme example of control methods in ostensibly 
high-status white-collar work, look no further than Amazon – a company 
that evidently excels at worker discipline from top to bottom. This is 
from another press exposé, this time of work in their offices conducted 
in the US by the New York Times:
At Amazon, workers are encouraged to tear apart one another’s ideas 
in meetings, toil long and late (emails arrive past midnight, followed 
by text messages asking why they were not answered), and held to 
standards that the company boasts are ‘unreasonably high.’ The 
internal phone directory instructs colleagues on how to send secret 
feedback to one another’s bosses. Employees say it is frequently used 
to sabotage others. (The tool offers sample texts, including this: ‘I felt 
concerned about his inflexibility and openly complaining about minor 
tasks.’)24
The UK is not far behind these pioneering methods. Broadsheet jour-
nalists, ostensibly one of the most elite and glamorous occupations, are 
feeling the tightening of organisational control as their industry goes 
down the pan. The Telegraph, for instance, attempted to install electronic 
sensors at staff desks to monitor their attendance, though the staff 
made such a fuss it only lasted a day.25 They probably got the idea from 
previous reports they had written themselves about increases in the use 
of electronic technology to monitor workers in 2008,26 and again in 
2015.27 In the last case, the subject was wearable technology, another 
US import, which can record whether or not workers go to the gym in 
their free time. This apparently makes them ‘fitter, happier and more 
productive’, though it is not immediately clear why the middle adjective 
necessarily follows from the first and last. 
* For this point I am grateful to Sarah McCann, a talented undergraduate student with 
whom I worked in 2016.
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Journalism, incidentally, is a new frontier in the conflict between 
worker autonomy and management control in other ways as well. 
Up-and-coming prospective journalists may now find themselves 
working at websites where they are paid per click. This imposes a 
fundamental change in the nature of the job: the aim is to compete 
according to a computer-generated metric. There is reduced scope to act 
on what the journalists themselves believe is important or worthwhile; 
instead the incentive is to produce contentious bullshit with misleading-
but-outrageous titles.28 In this sense, the widely discussed phenomena of 
‘fake news’ probably has as much to do with new forms of management 
incentive in the industry rather than the world’s population simply 
becoming more gullible, as is the standard diagnosis.*
The point underpinning all these varied examples is as follows: it 
is natural for capital to try, over time, to find ways of codifying and 
monitoring what labour does. In doing so, it can find better ways of 
manipulating, incentivising and punishing. Obviously, this plays out very 
differently in different contexts and can only go so far. A news website 
can impose quantifiable criteria on a journalist (as in pay per click) but 
it would be perverse and counterproductive actually to dictate what they 
write. This would be going too far, and would count as ‘eating the elbows 
and armpits’, to refer back to the Thomas Ligotti quotation with which 
I began this chapter. Instead, the worker’s creativity is not completely 
removed, but forced into a straitjacket of constraints and incentives. Their 
job becomes more and more about servicing the demands of someone 
else’s system, even if they can sometimes make their own decisions about 
how they do so. 
This is evident in the growth of online workflow management systems 
which proliferate in many professional jobs. Clive Trusson and Donald 
Hislop† have looked at how IT support workers experience ‘deprofes-
sionalisation via control’ through this kind of software infrastructure. 
Theirs is a job based around technical understanding and problem 
solving. But the researchers found that a lot of the initiative was sucked 
out of their research participants’ work by online systems which allocated 
tasks and prescribed particular methods and processes for resolving 
them. When they did find an unconventional way of fixing an issue, 
* You’ll Never Guess Which Supposedly Elite Profession Is Being Deskilled by the 
Combination of the Proit Imperative and New Technology!.
† I saw these authors presenting their indings at the International Labour Process 
Conference, University of Sheield, April 2017.
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they were supposed to input it into this system, so that it could then be 
prescribed to others in turn. The worker’s ‘tacit knowledge’ is continually 
being codified and turned into a management asset.
I will come back to technology in more depth in Chapter 7, but for 
now it is important to stress the potential of the Internet in extending 
workplace control among professionals and ‘knowledge workers’. As 
researchers in North Carolina put it, ‘monitoring and surveillance’ tech-
nologies can be
used to measure, shape, and/or control the behaviour of employees. 
Details of sales, deliveries, contact with customers, phone calls, time 
taken to complete tasks are routinely logged onto computer systems 
and the information used by bosses to evaluate their staff and make 
sure performance targets are hit … Employee surveillance is so 
pervasive in the workplace that one study found managers in a fifth of 
British workplaces admit to monitoring their employees using com-
puter-based systems.29
Hence, while the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ is often considered 
incompatible with Taylorist/‘scientific management’ principles, it is 
amazing what can be achieved with a can-do attitude. In more tradi-
tional industrial settings, the effort management needs to extract might 
be more easily quantifiable. The difficulties in quantifying work in, say, 
the creative industries, or highly skilled white-collar professions, of 
course means that workers are likely to have more discretion and inde-
pendence. But the fact that this is difficult does not mean capitalists do 
not try: in fact, the theory outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that they have 
to try. 
Between the 1980s and mid-2000s, while the average skill require-
ment for jobs in Britain increased, the average level of job discretion 
decreased.30 This suggests that there is no simple relationship between 
being more skilled and having more autonomy at work. Francis Green 
also found a decline in average levels of job discretion between the 1980s 
and 2000.31 This went along with accelerating work intensification, with 
surveys of employees showing that they were experiencing more frequent 
periods of having to work at high speed, and more frequent periods of 
working under tension. After the 2008 crisis, work intensity increased 
again, as did organisational skill demands, but without the correspond-
ing increase in job discretion that the latter might suppose.32
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Control and the Reserve Army in the ‘Creative Industries’
The cutting edge of the British knowledge economy are the so-called 
‘creative industries’: an odd, vague term which encompasses everything 
from interpretive dance through to marketing and software design. It is 
here that the rhetoric of the inspired autonomous worker comes into its 
own. The stereotypical creative worker is the dreamer of revolutionary 
ideas, who views his or her work as a labour of love, and who requires 
absolute freedom from management interference.
In music and the performing arts, the creative core of the creative 
industries, many people clearly do not easily fit the definition of ‘labour’ 
that I have been using so far. Often, people working in this context are 
essentially own-account artisans. In other words, they trade directly with 
customers without selling their labour to a capitalist in exchange for a 
wage, and any ‘profit’ made they keep for themselves. Albeit on a small 
scale, they usually own their ‘means of production’ (their instruments 
or materials, for instance). They certainly have more autonomy in their 
work than most people could dream of, albeit usually purchased at the 
expense of financial security. 
But on closer inspection it is clear that the theme of control is still 
important, because these kinds of jobs do not simply exist independently 
of the wider capitalist system. Robert Hewison has shown how British 
governments (most enthusiastically, New Labour ones) have sought 
to integrate the arts much more closely as a cog within the economy 
as a whole.33 For instance, they have sought to use artistic activity as a 
means of creating a ‘buzz’ which can enthuse capital into investing in 
deprived post-industrial communities. In other words, to appropriate it 
as aphrodisiac mood music for the continuation of the M-C-M' cycle. 
They have encouraged venerable funding organisations such as arts 
councils to change their priorities to support these efforts. In this sense, 
‘culture-led regeneration’ policies have seen the arts being converted into 
a kind of supportive prop for further capitalist development.*
The result is that government has sought to increase its direct control 
over what goes on in arts and culture much more forcefully than it had 
in the past. There has been the imposition of extensive quantitative 
indicators which seek to codify a measurable set of achievements (such 
as levels of audience ‘engagement’, or numbers of people encouraged to 
* his has been the aim, anyway. Its success is debatable. 
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visit a museum) to which funding recipients in the arts are expected to 
work.34 Arts councils, over time, have followed this shift, moving from a 
somewhat stuffy panel of artistic elites making judgements about artistic 
quality, to a more technocratic role in charge of totting up measurables 
defined by politicians.35 
The point here is not that artists end up being completely controlled 
by state and capital – this would be a ridiculous overstatement. In 
practice, of course, they end up finding ways of doing what they want 
while fobbing off requests for bureaucratic form-filling as best they can. 
Nor am I particularly lamenting the demise of ‘art for art’s sake’ in the 
face of political ‘instrumentalism’.36 It is simply to observe that as soon 
as any sphere of activity starts to become more closely bound up into 
capitalist processes, it is inevitable that someone will at least try to find 
new ways of codifying, measuring and controlling the labour contained 
within it. 
Look, for instance, at video games design. Paul Thompson et al., in 
their study of the Australian games industry, found that, among the 
designers and creators of computer games, the quality of jobs degraded 
as companies matured.37 Games companies would have highly developed 
divisions of labour, so that junior staff could find themselves on quality 
control duty, which could mean simply opening the same door in a 
computer game several hundred times a day. And designers themselves 
would rapidly become pigeonholed to a specific role as if on an assembly 
line, such as making imp heads out of pixels. Particularly in the larger 
firms, where the marketing of the console is most important, ‘work was 
more technical, more driven by the hardware and therefore less creative’. 
Games testers – people who are paid to play games – get the worst of 
both worlds. Their actual job epitomises the ‘degradation of fun’, as their 
enjoyment of gaming gets ruined through repetition. But on the other 
hand, the fact that it sounds like a dream job creates a sizeable reserve 
army of people who are desperate to do it themselves, reducing their 
job security and bargaining power.38 Indeed, the creative industries are 
a very good illustration of the reserve army concept: so many people are 
desperate to do ‘creative’ jobs, drifting around the edges of the labour 
market, that employers have no difficulty at all in arguing down labour 
costs.39 The fact that so many people want to pursue careers where they 
can escape the 9.00–5.00 routine and actually spend their life doing 
something they find interesting means that workers’ bargaining power 
has fallen through the floor. It is common to find prospective ‘buyers’ 
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in the arts and creative industries expecting people to work for nothing 
at all.*
I said earlier that many artists resemble independent artisans rather 
than labour, as defined in Chapter 2. The latter may be applied to 
someone working in a games studio, but what about in areas such as 
music and the performing arts? While in some respects, people doing 
these things carry on in much the same artisanal way as they have ever 
done, there are also examples where a labour–capital relationship starts 
to become more evident. Particularly so in the wake of new technology. 
For instance, in Britain, many working musicians who have not reached 
‘big name’ status earn a living through doing ‘function’ work; i.e. playing 
at private parties or weddings, or providing background music at hotels 
or corporate events. Typically, the workers involved here might follow a 
small-scale artisanal model, working on their own or with their bands, 
cultivating direct relationships with customers and selling a product they 
largely develop themselves. In some cases, agents might be involved, rep-
resenting musicians and using their insider contact networks to get them 
more work. By limiting who gets on their books, agents also limit the 
competitiveness of the marketplace.
However, with the Internet, a rapid process of socialisation is 
underway, and the agent business model is changing. Now, most people 
when booking function bands are less likely to go via the esoteric ‘old-
school’ agent, and more likely to type something like ‘wedding band 
north-west’ into Google. In doing so, they will find many sites which act 
essentially as price comparison databases for hundreds of acts, where the 
buyer can compare prices instantaneously. The site takes a cut when the 
buyer selects and pays a band.
While the bands themselves may still work in an ‘artisanal’ way, 
exercising great autonomy over the services they provide and the way they 
divide up gig fees, they are nonetheless integrated into these extensive 
computerised systems alongside thousands of other people. Price com-
petition becomes the order of the day, pushing fees lower and furnishing 
profit for intermediaries. The tacit knowledge of the traditional agent is 
replaced by the algorithmic resources of the online agency. Procedures 
become standardised and streamlined: while many such agencies still 
take a percentage commission, which, in theory, gives them an incentive 
* For constantly updated real-life examples, see the Facebook group ‘Stop Working for 
Free’, or the Twitter account @forexposure_txt.
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to negotiate on the musician’s behalf, they tend not to do this, because it 
involves three or four emails rather than one. Speed is of the essence in 
capitalist circulation. 
Competition means downwards pressure on fees; if musicians join 
one of these agencies and struggle to find work, the agent will warn 
them that it’s because they are charging more than others on the site. 
And because agents have access to such a wide range of artists, musicians 
are often afraid of challenging problems such as low fees, late payments 
or the extraction of extortionate commissions. In many of these cases, 
agents may request that the musicians they represent do not hand out 
their own business cards at gigs, instead dispersing only those of the 
agent. This is interesting because, while the musician is nominally a 
freelancer who interacts with many clients, the agency tries to exert 
some control over who they transact with, making them resemble a 
quasi-employee. The result is a reserve army of people which is at least 
partially dependent on the agent, and integrated into a system which is 
under their control.
This short sketch of developments in the market for function musicians 
is, of course, a niche example. Nonetheless, it illustrates an important 
point. A particular job, like music, ostensibly seems very remote from the 
experience of providing labour under capitalism, as defined in Chapter 
2. But those people doing it can still become a source of labour and 
consequently a source of profit for capital. It’s just that this depends on 
the capitalist finding some way of separating the worker from the things 
they need in order to sell their time and effort. Internet technology has 
enabled intermediaries to emerge who control the channels through 
which workers access jobs, and this leads to a relationship which starts 
more closely to resemble a labour–capital one. 
conflict, resistance and class power
Some observers are hyperbolic about how far surveillance and control at 
work can go. One such refers to his friend, Mara, who works in retail, 
and I will quote his evocative article at length:
What is Mara’s job like? Her sales figures are monitored … by the 
microsecond. By hidden cameras and mics. They listen to her every 
word; they capture her every movement; that track and stalk her as if 
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she were an animal; or a prisoner; or both. She’s jacked into a headset 
that literally barks algorithmic, programmed ‘orders’ at her, parroting 
her own ‘performance’ back to her, telling her how she compares with 
quotas calculated … down to the second … for all the hundreds of 
items in the store …
Mara’s boss sits in the back. Monitoring all twelve, or fifteen, or 
twenty people that work in the store. On a set of screens. Half camera 
displays, half spreadsheets; numbers blinking in real-time. Glued to 
it like a zombie. Chewing slowly with her mouth open. Jacked into a 
headset. A drone-pilot … piloting a fleet of human drones …
The whole scene is like a maximum-security mental asylum 
designed by sadomasochists in a sci-fi movie. If Jeffrey Dahmer, 
Rasputin, and Michael Bay designed a ‘store’ together, they couldn’t do 
any better. Her ‘job’ will begin to drive her crazy – paranoid, depressed, 
deluded – in a matter of years if she continues doing it. No human 
psyche can bear that kind of relentless, systematic abuse.40
An arguably even more dystopian picture is given by another journalist, 
writing about technology which can enable managers to monitor the 
moods of their staff. An innovator is quoted: ‘Conducting weekly one-
on-ones when you have 20 or more people in your team is impractical. 
Therefore, we designed Vibe as a tool to help managers follow the 
morale of their team, see what causes the team vibe to rise, but also be 
notified when the morale drops.’41
These kinds of depictions of total surveillance can make us forget 
a couple of important insights. One: the all-encompassing power of 
technology is often overhyped. This is something I will return to in 
Chapter 7. Two: workers are not simply passive victims of managerial 
control. Admittedly, when we look at the precipitous declines in things 
like strike rates over the last 40 years, Marx’s prediction that capitalist 
class relations inevitably lead to conflict and resistance seems wrong. 
But there probably is a lot more ‘resistance’ to management control in 
British workplaces than we might realise, albeit manifested in more 
unexpected ways. Researchers who have spent time in call centres, for 
instance, have documented in sometimes gruesome detail the way in 
which workers found ways to undermine and even humiliate managers 
with their use of in-jokes and pranks.42 Workers may find subtle ways of 
derailing or obstructing change initiatives imposed by management,43 or 
jobs . 83
of injecting their own agency and skill into the creation of products that 
management is trying to standardise.44
The point, from a Marxist perspective, is not so much that all workers 
will be forced to toil on an assembly line until the revolution, but that in 
any workplace there is a tension which never really goes away, even if it 
is manifested very differently from one context to another. This tension 
is between, on the one hand, a worker’s entirely human desire to control 
their own activity and use their own initiative, and on the other, the 
need for capital to make a profit which is dictated by the alien power of 
competition. This does not mean that all workplaces are always under 
intense control, but it does mean that new attempts at extending control 
will always be lurking around the corner.
Remember that there is a power imbalance between labour and capital 
because the latter controls the resources that the former needs to access 
in order to obtain a wage. It follows from this that capital is able to 
withhold, or threaten to withhold, access to these things – ultimately 
the most important kind of control is the threat that if things do not go 
capital’s way it will deprive labour of its living. In other words, it could 
close or scale down operations at a given site, or outsource, or invest in 
labour-saving technology. This means that insufficiently profitable or 
compliant workers can be rendered disposable.
The fear of losing one’s job is extremely powerful. Even setting aside 
welfare policy, which has successfully made unemployment much scarier 
over the last 20 years, this fear has been exacerbated by other facets 
of government policy, notably legal policy relating to unfair dismissal. 
One of the Coalition government’s sourest achievements – albeit a 
temporary one that backfired* – was the introduction of fees to bring 
employment tribunals against employers in the event of unfair dismissal, 
which resulted in a 70 per cent drop in the number of claims.45 It also 
extended probationary periods, effectively meaning that new employees 
could be dropped under any pretext during their first two years of work 
(New Labour had reduced this ‘qualifying’ period to one year in 1999 
before the Coalition restored it to two). While the manufactured image 
of the chancer frivolously suing their innocent employer was used to 
justify these changes, it is far more likely that many more workers had 
legitimate grievances that were not aired for fear of the legal apparatuses 
ranged against them.46
* It was later overturned by the Supreme Court in July 2017.
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Capitalists and Labour Discipline: Strikes
The right of capital to shed labour is accepted as common sense in our 
society. When a company announces potential redundancies, and if they 
are sufficiently high-profile, they may send someone to be interviewed 
on the news. These interviews are typically conducted in the ‘business 
segment’ of current affairs shows, where critical thinking faculties tend 
to be suspended. In them, the agency of capital in the discussion is not 
made explicit: nobody voices that what is really happening is a decision 
by a small group of wealthy people to destroy the livelihoods of much 
less wealthy people because they judge they are not making enough 
profits. Instead, the danger of redundancies is talked about very much 
in the terms people use to talk about bad weather, with the interviewee 
from the company acting as the weatherman: we hope there don’t have 
to be redundancies, but sometimes that’s just what happens, like snow 
disruption.
Certainly, as I argued in Chapter 2, when capitalists take actions 
that damage workers’ interests, this is generally not because they are 
horrible individuals, but because they are forced to come to terms with 
an alien power known as the marketplace. But it is still important to 
understand the various means through which management get its way. 
We need to ask some important questions: why, at the current juncture, 
is it so difficult for trade unions to extract meaningful concessions from 
employers? Why have they been unable to challenge the extension of 
control and the stagnation of wages? Why are strikes so much less likely 
to be successful than they were a few decades ago? In short, why are the 
representatives of labour as a class so weak?
There were some obvious answers sketched out in Chapter 3: inter-
national competition and economic restructuring, the pressures of 
financialisation and restrictive government policy. But these factors 
just exacerbate the underpinning point: since capital owns the means 
of production, it can decide who can work and who can’t. This places 
some very powerful tools at its disposal, such as ‘whipsawing’. This is 
where employers create competition for jobs between groups of workers 
in order to extract concessions from them. This could take various forms. 
There may be explicit threats (‘if our demands aren’t met, we are moving 
production to a different plant’), frameworks and rules put in place for 
competition (‘we want to make a new investment, so all potential sites 
need to show us their best deal to receive it’) or a more informal under-
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standing (the awareness among workers that, if they don’t make life easy 
for capital, investments may move).47 
It hardly needs mentioning how much easier globalisation has made 
these sorts of techniques: on the one hand it opens up new labour sources 
to be played off against each other. On the other, international competi-
tion makes managers feel a more intense need to extract these concessions 
in the first place. These kinds of ‘coercive comparison’ strategies have 
been very explicitly employed in heavy industry in European countries, 
notably the automotive sector, particularly as the expansion of the EU 
has led to a much wider variation in national wage levels.48
In Britain, the strongholds of trade union strength are becoming 
much more scattered, but they are still likely to be the site of flash-
points of tension between labour and capital. The 2013 dispute over the 
future of the Grangemouth oil refinery, between the union Unite and 
the chemicals multinational Ineos, is an important recent episode. Here, 
the director of Ineos threatened to shut down the plant unless a series 
of demands were met by workers, including less generous pensions, a 
wage freeze and some job cuts – things which had actually been staved 
off in 2008 by strike tactics from Unite. This time, it was the employer 
who went on strike: Ineos staged a lock-out of workers to threaten Unite 
into agreeing terms. By then it was clear that the threat of closure was 
too powerful for Unite and the workers to resist: capital’s wish list was 
imposed in full. 
This dispute was also politically important. During their unsuc-
cessful campaign, Unite members pulled a stunt in which they erected 
an inflatable rat on a company director’s street (rats being a labour 
movement symbol for people who are screwing over a trade union). 
The Coalition government of the time leapt on this as an example of 
union ‘intimidation’, evidently believing that inflatable rats are a scarier 
prospect than the threat to create 800 redundancies. This was used as a 
pretext for further anti-union legislation, which I talk more about below.
Another important conflict was the dispute at the Lyndsey oil refinery 
in 2009 – another situation in which management threats to worker job 
security assumed important and quite ugly political overtones. These were 
‘wildcat’ strikes – in other words, strikes called by workers themselves 
without the say-so of the official union – and included walkouts by other 
workers at different energy sites in support of the Lyndsey strikers, after 
many of them were sacked. The dispute was started when the refinery 
hired in an Italian contractor to provide work at the plant, using the EU’s 
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Posted Worker’s Directive to bring in workers from abroad to get round 
the conditions agreed nationally with the union.
Since the Lyndsey strikers used the phrase ‘British jobs for British 
workers’, aping a slogan the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown had 
adopted, it became very easy for them to be presented as xenophobes. 
Brown leapt at the opportunity to criticise them, just as far-right 
political parties rushed to offer insincere support. This dispute crystal-
lises the disorientation of labour under globalisation. As Theresa May 
might observe, it was capital that was acting as a citizen of the world, 
and that was using its world citizenship to disorganise the workforce. 
The strikers clearly saw little other hope than to try and throw Brown’s 
words back at him, and he condemned them for it with no little amount 
of hypocrisy. These are cases where capital’s superior command of space 
(i.e. its capacity to either go elsewhere itself, or bring other workers to it) 
has forced labour into impossible situations with seemingly no appro-
priate way out.
In these kinds of disputes, capital can invariably rely on outside help. 
Specifically, from government.* A good example here would be the 
Unite–British Airways dispute of 2011. Unite members voted to strike 
in late 2009 in response to management plans to freeze pay, alter working 
practices and cut jobs. The interesting thing about this dispute is what 
happened next. These strikes had a huge effect on the company’s bottom 
line, but came to be heavily disrupted by legal injunctions which the 
employer sought against the union. This was on the grounds that strike 
ballots were conducted improperly, including violations of technical 
balloting procedure. Some observers attributed this to union incompe-
tence, musing that ‘members required to pay an annual membership fee 
of more than £130 could now question how the union had repeatedly 
failed to conduct legally-binding ballots, with all the resources at their 
disposal’.49 
The problem with this argument, though, is that the injunctions in 
question rested on spurious legal technicalities. For instance, the court 
found that ‘Unite failed to carry out its statutory duties by making 
sure that everyone balloted was told the result’, despite employers not 
being able to find a single employee who didn’t know about it.50 This 
injunction was later overturned. Similar injunctions have been repeatedly 
used against unions representing London Underground workers. Still, it 
* And, it goes without saying, from the media, though we return to this in Chapter 8. 
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makes a change to hear about cases where business finds itself on the 
side of bureaucratic pedantry and idiotic restrictions: if these kinds of 
arbitrary obstacles were applied to anyone other than labour, they would 
be described as the worst sort of ‘red tape’. 
So we need to be realistic in recognising the problems facing trade 
unionism. They are, clearly, severe. So far, I have not even mentioned 
another important factor: shifts in workplace cultures. In the service 
industry, people often work in smaller units with less regular shift 
patterns, and they may spend a lot more time in relative isolation (as 
with the warehouse staff walking round with only a bleeping electronic 
tag for company). For all the misery of working in a coal mine, it 
evidently tended to produce a sense of community and shared adversity 
that you simply cannot find in a call centre. This is bad news for 
unions, resulting in torturous internal debates around whether they can 
really make a worthwhile effort to recruit new members in emerging 
industries, or whether their future depends on trying to defend those 
they still retain.
They can still, sometimes, win. Particularly in the service industries, if 
workers can successfully build unions, they may be able to make positive 
gains rather than desperately defending themselves against management 
threats. Staff working for Picturehouse Cinemas in London, for instance, 
based their campaign, which has seen a series of strikes over a two-year 
period, around demands for the London Living Wage. In this case 
management had threatened to undertake mass firings in response to 
the action at the Ritzy Cinema in Brixton, but these were stamped on by 
its parent company for fear of bad publicity. Such cases benefitted from 
high-profile campaigns which could capitalise on their fairly bohemian 
localities in order to embarrass managers.51
Evidently, workers in industries that are typically outsourced have 
an even harder time. Indeed, part of the reason for outsourcing is to 
disorganise: where unions might have managed to secure an agreement 
over conditions for a particular large company, it is unusual that these 
conditions will apply to the outsourced staff as well. John Lewis, for 
instance, receives a lot of liberal kudos for its ‘partnership’ approach 
to employment, but it does not apply this to everyone. Its cleaners 
are outsourced and so the company has no obligation to afford them 
the same privileges: ‘Worse still is that the annual bonus is publicly 
announced every year in store. This means the cleaners are forced to 
watch everyone celebrate and then sweep up the confetti and mop up the 
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spilt champagne as a cruel reminder of their second class status within 
John Lewis.’52 
Service workers in some cases have joined insurgent unions rather 
than established ones, though examples of this are rare. Probably the 
most important recent case is the Deliveroo strikes of 2016. Deliveroo 
is part of the ‘gig economy’, where workers pick up jobs via mobile app 
platforms and are typically considered ‘self-employed’. For this reason 
there is often an assumption that these workers are difficult to organise 
– or even that they are disorganised by definition, given their status. 
Nonetheless, in 2016 they went on strike against Deliveroo’s plans to 
shift them from an hourly rate into a more unreliable ‘per drop’ rate. They 
had some success, deterring the company from the plan, after another 
highly visible campaign which was supported by a crowd-funding 
initiative. There is some evidence that workers at comparable companies 
such as UberEATS are taking note, though it is early days.53 In such 
cases, workers in service industries go on the offensive rather than the 
defensive – typically through more radical emerging unions and poten-
tially through wildcat activity. The really big test here, which is only 
just emerging at time of writing, is the formation of an unofficial pilot’s 
union in Ryanair, whose model is based, in part, on union avoidance, but 
who have apparently pushed their own workforce a little bit too far to 
be sustainable.54 
These are success stories, but they are not widespread. In general, the 
climate for trade unionism is becoming harsher. Unions in the public 
sector – their current stronghold – have seemingly had little response to 
austerity measures targeting public sector staff. There have been various 
strikes, but these have typically been isolated one-day affairs, asking 
members to sacrifice pay in exchange for a largely symbolic gesture. 
More on the Trade Union Act
I referred to the Trade Union Act (2015) in passing in Chapter 3, but 
it is worth looking at in a little more depth here, since it tells us a lot 
about the way in which the British government intervenes in labour–
capital relations. It was pushed through with overwhelming support 
from the right-wing press in the UK, as well as the indirect support of 
the liberal press who, while they opposed the bill itself, have paved the 
ground for it by tut-tutting in editorial columns every time workers go 
on strike. It was also welcomed by pro-business lobbying groups such 
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as the Confederation of British Industry and the Institute of Directors. 
Admittedly, some business bodies such as the Chartered Institute for 
Personnel and Development did criticise it as a somewhat passé and 
uncalled-for rehashing of Thatcherite legislation from the 1980s.55 But 
the problem with these kinds of well-meaning critiques was that they 
were a bit too logical. They were asking: if there is no evidence that 
strikes are damaging the economy, why put new restrictions on them? 
This seems to miss the underlying point, which is that the Act is not 
about solving a problem but about making labour scared of capital.
The headline measure of the Act was to introduce new turnout 
thresholds for valid strike ballots – 50 per cent of eligible voters must 
take part in any strike ballot or the action will be deemed illegal. 
There are more stringent requirements for public service jobs. By these 
measures, around half of the strikes in Britain since 1997 would have 
been disallowed.56 Further provisions, several of which were eventually 
dropped, purported to be about preventing ‘intimidation’ in the course of 
industrial disputes. To this effect the original bill tried to push through 
tighter police monitoring of strikers with the potential criminalisation 
of those picketing incorrectly. The justification for this was the widely 
hyped case of the inflatable rat in the Ineos dispute, but the government 
was frustrated in its attempts to gather any more shocking examples.57 
This will not be surprising for anyone who has actually been involved in a 
strike in Britain in the twenty-first century, which are often friendly and 
community-oriented events populated by very mild-mannered people. 
It is important to point out the hypocrisy behind these kinds of 
policies, because they seem like common sense to so many people who 
don’t follow these issues closely. Of course higher turnouts in strike 
ballots are a good thing, of course strikers shouldn’t intimidate people, 
and so on. But if turnout thresholds are genuinely important in safe-
guarding democratic processes, why only apply them to union ballots 
rather than, say, referenda on EU membership? Or indeed the election 
of MPs. Talking of common sense, it also seems obvious that, to try and 
address the problem of low turnout, unions should be allowed to ballot 
members about strike action electronically, but the government has ruled 
this out, saying they have to stick to posting out ballot papers. So the 
Trade Union Act was sold as a ‘modernisation’ of industrial relations, but 
it was modernisation of a very particular kind that did not, apparently, 
extend to trade unionists being allowed to use the Internet. Of course, 
from capital’s perspective there is no point in imposing restrictions on 
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strikes on the basis of low turnouts if you don’t then take steps to make 
sure turnout stays low. 
Similarly, as the government was consulting over the development of 
the Act, it was striking how relentlessly one-way the issue of ‘intimida-
tion’ became. It has apparently been accepted as self-evident that the only 
intimidation that goes on in industrial disputes is strikers intimidating 
non-strikers (despite the lack of evidence that this really happens at all).* 
People just seem to assume that strikers are intimidating by definition, 
no matter how little support can be found for this claim.
On the other hand, the Act contained nothing to stop the intim-
idation of strikers by management, which is something that actually 
happens in reality as well as in people’s minds. It is common for human 
resource managers to send emails to the entire staff at organisations 
where a strike is planned. They often, particularly in white-collar jobs, 
adopt a collegial tone, warmly addressing those employees who don’t 
plan to strike, before making the request, which is always presented as 
entirely reasonable and practical, that those who do plan to strike inform 
management in advance. They cannot say workers are obliged to do this 
since (for now) they cannot be, but it is clear that pressure is exerted, 
especially on those not fully aware of their rights. 
The nervousness this can cause is compounded by the harder language 
that often seeps in subtly. Workers that take strike action will be in 
‘breach of contract’: three words that conjure the idea in many people’s 
minds that management will be justified in doing whatever they want to 
them by way of reprisal. This perception is exacerbated by the knowledge 
that managers have indeed sacked strikers in cases such as the Lyndsey 
dispute of 2009. The superior legal and organisational resources wielded 
by human resources, and the threat of job loss, mean that this kind of 
thing is several orders of magnitude more intimidating than pretty much 
anything strikers can muster.
It is interesting how social media may open up new routes for 
management action against strikers, though so far attempts to do so have 
been apt to fall flat on their face. For instance, during one of the strikes 
arising as part of a long-running dispute between Southern Rail and its 
workforce, the company tried to use Twitter to recruit members of the 
public into criticising union members. They sent out a tweet encourag-
ing inconvenienced travellers to contact the RMT (the National Union 
* Beyond the now thrice-mentioned inlatable rat of Grangemouth. 
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of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers) directly to express their frus-
trations, under the banner ‘Let’s strike back’, as if they too were innocent 
victims just like the passengers. However, they generally received more 
abuse than support, from people who were old-fashioned enough to 
believe that employers should not be encouraging people to attack their 
staff publicly.58
Anyway, more obvious than the hypocrisy are the holes in the reasoning 
offered in support of the Act. The Regulatory Policy Committee – a 
watchdog tagged with evaluating the costs and savings of new legislation 
– roundly judged the proposals as ‘not fit for purpose’. 59 They noted a 
variety of problems with the legislation, including the weak definition of 
the problem (where are these supposed mobs of violent and intimidating 
strikers? Why bother with more anti-strike legislation when there are 
already so few strikes anyway?) and the questionable wisdom of hiring 
temp agency workers as strike-breaking labour (another proposal of the 
bill that got ditched along the way).
Ultimately, this is the point. Despite its hype, the Act was not actually 
about fairness, modernisation, preventing intimidation or indeed even 
efficiency and good practice in industrial relations. If it had really been 
about any of these things it would have been a spectacular failure. 
Moreover, the Act is not about preventing strikes that have ‘weak 
mandates’; it is about preventing strikes full stop. It is about showing 
workers that it is going to become more and more difficult for them to 
take industrial action, and that if they try to, they will be bogged down 
in costly legal battles. Furthermore, should a strike get through, it is 
also about making strikers aware that the law is not on their side, and 
that if they do take part they will be vulnerable to legally sanctioned 
reprisals. In this sense it is a nice official complement to other, more 
sinister examples of the surveillance of trade unionists, most notably 
the blacklisting of construction workers which has been going on for 
decades, apparently with state collusion, and which is at last beginning 
to blow up in the faces of its perpetrators.60 
We can’t understand the wider political picture here without recalling 
the discussion from Chapter 1, about the way ‘class’ is used in contem-
porary politics. There is an effort to ensure that ‘working class’ no longer 
refers to the people who do the striking, but to the ‘victims’ of strikes; 
i.e. the inconvenienced public. Some right-wing voices, such as the 
columnist Leo McKinstry, are quite lurid in their attempts to drive a 
wedge between trade unionists and other workers: ‘Once trade unions 
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were the authentic voice of the British working class.* Now they are 
noisy pressure groups for a narrow part of the national workforce … 
Something has to be done to emasculate these evangelists for failure 
and conflict’.61 As the party of the working class, the Conservatives have 
even considered setting up their own trade unions for ‘moderate’ workers 
to join.62,†
One thing I have barely discussed in this chapter is work in the 
public sector. There is a lot to say about this. Interestingly, it is in the 
public sector that government attempts to marginalise unions are most 
obvious and evident. Government was always supposed to act as a ‘model 
employer’, with the best equality and diversity policies, the most progres-
sive attitude towards training and so on. While this remains the case in 
some respects, it has emerged as a model employer in a different sense 
too. I will talk about this in Chapter 5.
* As a general rule, people who say that trade unionists used to be on the side of workers, 
but aren’t any more, are the kind of people that have always hated them anyway.
† he man responsible for this scheme is cryptic about the target ‘moderate’ demographic: 
presumably people who are happy to see their own working conditions decline without a 
ight, so long as they know disabled welfare recipients are also being hounded to suicide.
5Government
The economy is the central, critical, irreducible core of this election. 
Everything depends on a strong economy. Every job; every pay packet; 
every business; every teacher’s salary in our schools; every heart 
operation in our NHS; every kind of help we can give the elderly 
and frail.1
The basic argument in Chapters 1 and 2 was that class is not just a 
means of categorising people into different groups. Instead, I argued 
that it is most important to focus on the economic functions of labour 
and capital: the imperatives that act on them, and the way in which 
they interact with each other. Once this is recognised, it quickly becomes 
clear that class has much wider-ranging implications for society as a 
whole than is usually recognised. 
This is most obvious and important when it comes to the question of 
government. In capitalist societies, the prospects for economic growth 
depends on the successful extraction and profitable reinvestment of 
surplus value. David Cameron was right to say that, under capitalism, 
‘everything depends on a strong economy’, but the question is what 
actually is a strong economy? In capitalist terms ‘a strong economy’ can 
only ever be one in which the M-C-M' cycle is running smoothly. If it 
is interrupted or blocked, then we have crisis, unemployment, possibly 
recession or depression. So the role of government has to, inevitably, 
involve finding ways to ensure this process can continue. This is often 
very difficult, particularly when you consider that governments have to 
balance various other priorities (demands for improving standards of 
living, for acceptable public services and so on). So politicians are subject 
to competing and confusing pressures which they have to navigate.
In Britain, as in many other developed countries, the widespread 
perception that liberal parliamentary democracy is by far the ‘least worst’ 
form of government appears to have weakened. Survey research suggests 
that, across a range of wealthy democracies, the number of people who 
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believe it is essential to live in a democratic system is declining, and the 
number of people who think it would be ‘good’ or ‘very good’ to live 
under a military dictatorship is increasing (albeit from a low base).2 Until 
the 2017 general election saw a bounce in youth turnout, young people 
were clearly becoming less interested in joining political parties and in 
voting than previous generations.
For now, suffice to say that it seems as though democratic governments 
in Western countries have weakening legitimacy. In other words, people 
appear to be less and less convinced that elected ruling parties, whatever 
their alignment, are capable of acting in the interests of national popu-
lations as a whole. 
This situation is manifested in various different ways. There is a 
growing fear among many commentators (and excitement among others) 
that the British people are devolving back into a pitchfork-wielding 
mob. For many moderates and liberals, the unusually high youth turnout 
in 2017 was a confirmation of this rather than a refutation.3 The para-
digmatic villain in this respect is Michael Gove, who became notorious 
for a sound bite during the Brexit campaign. When challenged with 
the argument that the majority of academic commentators believed that 
leaving the EU would have negative consequences, he said that ‘I think 
people in this country have had enough of experts’. This caused much 
dismay in many quarters4 as exemplifying the intellectual degeneration 
of British democracy. Brexit became, of course, the focal point for this 
worrying, with the default narrative among centre-left ‘Remainers’ being 
one of a gullible population being sold obvious snake oil. Indeed, much 
excitement was generated in this demographic at the imminent possibil-
ity of being able to say ‘I told you so’.5
Clearly this is more than a British phenomenon. Donald Trump 
turned not knowing very much into a campaign-winning advantage, and 
in doing so became the great symbol of so-called ‘post-truth politics’6 – 
the idea that it has become more useful for political leaders to regurgitate 
inaccurate bullshit that reinforces people’s existing prejudices than 
develop an accurate understanding of a situation.* From this perspective, 
the simplest response to Brexit/Trump is to look with furrowed-but-
* My problem with this idea is not so much that there isn’t a lot of this kind of thing 
going on; more that it is wrong to present it as a new development. People who are familiar 
with British newspapers, upon being told about the ‘post-truth era’, will wonder when the 
‘truth era’ was and how they managed to miss it.
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caring brow upon the non-expert and easily led mentality of voters on 
the opposing side. 
Certainly, it is possible that the narrative of ‘the world is being hi-jacked 
by yokels who revel in their own ignorance’ has become a very powerful 
one, and may yet form the basis for renewed interest in liberal-left politics 
if the right figureheads can be found to articulate it. But it is not my 
aim to help in these efforts. We are better off looking in a much less 
superficial way at the relationship between expertise, government and 
class. In this sense, complaining that people should listen more carefully 
to experts overlooks some very important things: it ignores the extent to 
which ‘expertise’ can be appropriated in the service of capital (think of 
the ‘scientific management’ expounded by Taylor as discussed in Chapter 
4); and it also ignores the high-profile failures of ‘experts’ themselves, 
particularly in the economic domain. It is not anti-intellectualism to say 
that European economic experts failed to avoid the financial disasters 
of the last decade, and have likewise failed to find an adequate solution 
to the crisis that doesn’t involve the inhumane and destructive ‘financial 
waterboarding’ of countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
Something that goes hand in hand with distrust of democracy and 
distrust of experts is conspiracy theory. The idea that everyone’s problems 
are attributable to a shady and malevolent clique has graduated from 
fringe obsession to the centre of the political agenda. This is reflected 
in the proliferation of increasingly vague nouns which serve as media 
punching bags: ‘elites’, ‘the establishment’, ‘globalists’, ‘Brussels bureau-
crats’ (or, in the US, ‘Washington insiders’), and sometimes just pronouns 
(‘they’). The vagueness of these accusations means they can be brought 
out at almost any juncture and sound plausible. 
But, again, it is short-sighted to say that ordinary voters have 
simply become more gullible, and more prone to demagogic political 
leaders who use this sort of rhetoric. Capitalism’s elite institutions are 
themselves becoming vaguer, as shown in Moretti and Pestre’s study 
of the grammar and syntax used in World Bank publications.7 These 
documents talk recurrently about what is supposed to happen in any 
given country to aid its development, while becoming increasingly fuzzy 
on the question of who is supposed to do it and how. We could also 
look at the way no expert commentator interviewed on the news is able 
to reliably anticipate how ‘the markets’ will react to political circum-
stances, instead limiting themselves to providing post hoc rationalisations 
of up-or-downswings. In other words, the apparent fact that fewer 
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people now trust experts is not as worrying as the state of expertise itself 
under financialised capitalism, which has managed to produce a world 
of opaque confusion in which many people, including governments, feel 
powerless and uncertain about how to act. 
adequate forms and alien powers
Before looking at government in Britain today, I will offer a short the-
oretical detour. How have Marxists historically thought about the role 
of government and politics? The first Marxist ‘theory of the State’ is 
expressed, albeit very briefly, in the Communist Manifesto, where gov-
ernments in capitalist societies are described as ‘but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie’. In other words, 
government is ultimately a means of organising society to achieve the 
best results for capital. Taken out of context, this could resemble the kind 
of conspiracy theories discussed previously, with government and capital 
in cahoots behind the machinery of power.
But elsewhere, while retaining this general gist, Marx adds many 
subtleties to his analysis of political power. In Capital, he discusses the 
role of the British government in introducing the Factory Acts, which 
imposed limits on the working day. This was to some degree a response 
to pressure from radicals and reformers, and was pushed through in 
spite of opposition from capital. However, Marx argues, the government 
sought to ensure that this legislation did not, in practice, impose much 
of a burden, creating various loopholes and providing for very weak 
enforcement: ‘parliament passed five labour Laws between 1802 and 
1833, but was shrewd enough not to vote a penny for their carrying out, 
for the requisite officials, etc’.8 
This reading sets a pattern: ostensibly progressive reforming legisla-
tion is generally viewed warily by Marxists, since they suspect it is more 
likely to be a way of keeping labour quiet while ultimately doing little 
harm to capital’s interests. Indeed, if it defuses potentially damaging 
class conflict on relatively non-threatening terms, it has done capital a 
big favour.
In Grundrisse, Marx writes repeatedly of the need for political insti-
tutions to be set up in a way that is ‘adequate to the needs’ of capital. 
There is something Darwinian about this view of politics: institutions 
and laws that obstruct the M-C-M' cycle will either be forced to change 
or become obsolete over time, like the ancestors of giraffes whose necks 
government . 97
were not long enough to reach leaves. For instance, in the legal system: 
laws that facilitate public access to common resources were phased out 
as capitalism developed, whereas laws that ensured transparent private 
contracting and the protection of private property have proliferated. 
In the Marxist view, it is not that these laws are introduced and then 
capitalist society comes about as a result. Rather, the M-C-M' process 
forces political, social and legal institutions to adapt or die. 
So it is far too simple to say that capitalists control government. 
Government makes its own decisions, but it has to do so with the 
question of ‘how will this affect capital?’ constantly in mind. As a result, 
things like ‘business confidence’ become unreadable and remote forces 
that terrify governments into pursuing capital-friendly policies. There 
are thousands of individual investors controlling vast quantities of 
massed capital, looking for somewhere to put it. Governments know 
they have to get their ‘confidence’, but since capital is the collective 
product of countless individuals all competing with each other, rather 
than something which speaks with one unified voice, it often does not 
know how. Consequently, ‘business confidence’ becomes an alien power: 
a disembodied collective entity whose terms must be met, except that 
there is no way of knowing, generally, what these terms actually are. 
Usually, the UK government has responded to this situation by point-
lessly but extravagantly punching labour in the face as hard as it thinks 
it can get away with (metaphorically speaking).
We can apply the idea of searching for ‘adequate forms’ to various 
important political questions. While, for instance, the motivations of 
many Brexit voters were of a decidedly capital-unfriendly kind (worries 
about socio-economic insecurity, deteriorating community, anti-
globalism), this is almost certainly not how the political architects of 
the project see it. For the latter, the real motivation has been the belief 
that the regulations entailed by EU membership obstruct British capital. 
Even highly Europhile British politicians have implicitly accepted this 
premise and had sought to reshape the EU in a more capital-friendly 
way until Brexit made this a moot point. I return to this later. But as 
the Brexit episode shows, finding these adequate forms can be a highly 
conflicted and confusing process – many British businesses are deeply 
worried at the prospect of leaving the EU and see it as a gamble gone 
horribly awry. So governments try to do what is best for capital, but there 
is usually intense disagreement over what this means in practice. 
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Miliband and ‘Common Sense’
Various later Marxists sought to sketch out a more complete ‘theory of 
the State’, and in doing so tended to minimise the chaotic and Darwinian 
reading of government implied in the idea of ‘adequate forms’. The 
most influential exchange on the topic was the debate between Ralph 
Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas, which occupied the pages of the journal 
New Left Review in the 1960s and 1970s,9 and which is incisively 
analysed by Theda Skocpol.10
Miliband was an influential Marxist academic at the London School 
of Economics (among other places), who is now better known as the 
father of Ed and David. In fact, on the right, he is most notorious as ‘the 
man who hated Britain’, following a famous newspaper article which 
broke the news that he wrote a sniffy diary entry about English nation-
alism when he was 17.11 The article in question was part of an attack on 
his son, back when he looked like having a credible chance of being the 
next prime minister. Consequently, Ed was forced to respond by talking 
solemnly about how much his dad, contrary to reports, actually thought 
Britain was great. At the time, this episode summed up the narcissis-
tic spirit of the age: it seems a bit much to blame the gullible public 
for the advent of ‘post-truth’ politics when the country’s most influen-
tial newspaper is arguing with one of its leading politicians about so 
twee and pointless a question as whether or not a dead academic ‘loved 
Britain’.
Whether he loved or hated Britain, Miliband was a major innovator 
in the Marxist analysis of government. The motivation for his classic 
book The State and Capitalist Society was his annoyance at the ‘polyarchy’ 
argument held by influential academics such as Robert Dahl, which 
remains highly influential today. Polyarchy theorists believed that 
different groups (be they manufacturing lobbies, trade unionists, 
consumer organisations, agricultural interests, banks, religious groups 
and so on) competed with each other to influence government. They 
also believed that in the long term a democratic polyarchy would mean 
that no one group could decisively dominate all the others; ‘all the active 
and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at 
some stage in the process of decision’.12 Governments, then, mediate 
and balance between different interests, and do so depending on various 
factors, including things like ideology.
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Miliband was contemptuous of this argument. He believed that one 
particular force (i.e. capital) was not simply one of many competing 
influences on government, but was the decisive influence. Parliamentary 
democracy, while ostensibly giving voice to everyone, in fact reinforced 
this influence, for various reasons. One reason, in his view, was that 
business and state elites tended to be drawn from wealthier back-
grounds, and therefore had a shared interest in maintaining the status 
quo. Because they share similar backgrounds and tight personal inter-
connections, capital is far more likely to have the ear of government than 
those representing labour (such as unions). Miliband does not, of course, 
rule out that people from more humble backgrounds could penetrate 
these circles, but he does think that those who enter government from 
the outside will always come under irresistible pressure to remain within 
the confines of ‘respectable’ opinion. So Miliband is not interested in 
‘meritocracy’ per se; it’s more about the way in which proximity to power 
makes everyone more conservative irrespective of background or views. 
For Miliband this has very important ideological consequences. It 
means that business elites can establish their own values as the point 
from which all ‘sensible’ political debate must begin, and from which 
people cannot stray too far without being considered unacceptably 
extreme. The voice of ‘business’ therefore appears as the only one able to 
talk in good faith, as a kind of neutral arbiter that is able to give a down-
to-earth view of what the economy needs, away from the political fray:
Businessmen themselves have often tended to stress their remoteness 
from, even their distaste for, ‘politics’; and they have also tended to 
have a poor view of politicians as men who, in the hallowed phrase, 
have never had to meet a payroll, and who therefore do not know 
what the world is about. What this means is that businessmen, like 
administrators, wish to ‘depoliticise’ highly contentious issues and to 
have these issues judged according to the criteria favoured by business. 
This may look like an avoidance of politics and ideology: it is in fact 
their clandestine importation into public affairs.13
This false ‘depoliticisation’ of business means that the interests of 
business come to be seen as synonymous with the national interest. 
Therefore, according to Miliband, the very idea of the ‘national interest’ 
is a biased and ideological one, since ‘common sense’ always constructs it 
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with reference to what is best for business. This point is very important 
and I come back to it in later chapters.
Such a view is reinforced through what he calls indoctrination; in other 
words, the rigging of ‘ideological competition’ towards one side. He refers 
to various institutions – most obviously the media, but also education 
among others, which he says narrow down the limits of acceptable 
discussion. From leaving the nursery, he believes that a ‘pot pourri’14 of 
conservative ideology is presented to people as simply common sense: 
for instance, that what is good for business is good for everyone, and that 
there is such a thing as the ‘national interest’ which must be pursued by 
anyone in public life. 
In this sense Miliband gave quite a ‘personalised’ analysis: business 
elites have power because they have direct interpersonal ties to 
government. They essentially control the state in their capacity as influ-
ential individuals. But it quickly becomes apparent that the situation is a 
lot more wayward than this in reality. 
Poulantzas and the Functionalist State
Miliband’s highest-profile critic (within Marxism) was the philosopher 
Poulantzas, who vehemently rejected Miliband’s person-centric analysis. 
He disliked the idea that there is a particular group of people who have 
an iron control over the apparatus of government. For him, the state* is 
a kind of institutional crystallisation of class relations. In other words, a 
network of institutions and relationships that is not in the hands of any 
one group, but which acts in a ‘relatively autonomous’ way to stabilise the 
capitalist system. 
What might this mean? By its very existence, the state creates a 
‘political’ arena where social conflicts are fought out, without ever 
needing to spill over into the realm of production. So, for instance, rather 
than workers making direct demands of capitalists in the workplace 
itself (quite a scary prospect for capital), there are representative organi-
sations (such as the Labour Party) who are supposed to fight their cause 
in a more indirect and restrained way in the House of Commons. The 
conflict between labour and capital is diverted into the world of parlia-
* here is a danger of conlating the terms ‘state’ and ‘government’. he diference is 
usually that ‘the state’ is a broader term, comprising all sorts of things like the police and 
military, the judiciary and so on, whereas government refers to the speciic people elected 
(or not) to make policy decisions.
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mentary procedure before it can pose a serious threat to the basic power 
relationship between labour and capital.
Likewise, according to Poulantzas, the state has to intervene in the 
interests of stability when capitalism is in trouble. So, for instance, 
Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells use Poulantzas’s ideas to explain 
the initial steps of globalisation.15 They argue that it was engineered 
by governments as a means of rectifying the destabilising problems of 
the 1970s: declining profits, trade union strength and fewer opportu-
nities for profitable investment. ‘Globalization was, in fact, induced by 
the state, as a way out of the crisis. Not under the command of corpo-
rations, but certainly with corporate interests as a fundamental concern: 
this is the kind of policy that Poulantzas could have characterised as an 
expression of the relative autonomy of the state.’16
Poulantzas’s view of the state is therefore a ‘functionalist’ one,17 
meaning that the state is defined and understood according to the specific 
role it has to fulfil (rather than being seen as, say, one entity with its own 
agenda which does not necessarily fit easily with a wider ‘system’). It is a 
stabilising influence which has a defined purpose: binding a potentially 
conflict-riddled and crisis-prone system into a sustainable whole. Hence, 
although coming from different angles, both Miliband and Poulantzas 
assign a kind of ‘managerial’ role to government. This is made more 
explicit still in Fred Block’s work,18 which presents government as the 
long-term ‘manager’ in contrast with the short-termist energies of capital. 
So the state may do various things that capital might dislike in the short 
term, like levying taxes in order to pay for services or infrastructure, but 
which are necessary for the sustainability of the system. When I talked 
about globalisation and financialisation Chapter 3, I suggested that it is 
becoming harder for states to ‘manage’ capitalist economies in this way. 
I will return to this point in more depth towards the end of this chapter. 
Following on from these arguments, it is obvious that, in the Marxist 
view, things like socialised health and education systems are not created 
in capitalist societies for humanitarian reasons. They appear because 
they have a necessary role in supporting capital accumulation, providing 
ways of training or maintaining a workforce without individual capital-
ists having to pay for these things themselves. This creates interesting 
tensions. While the ‘welfare state’ has become a major rallying point for 
the political left in recent years, historically many Marxists have tended 
to distrust it, seeing it as a means of giving people a bare minimum to 
prevent them from demanding any more. Welfare systems may benefit 
102 . class matters
labour in many respects but they do so as a by-product rather than an 
end. The end is to maintain an environment in which capital can go on 
extracting and reinvesting surplus value. We might ask: if public services 
get delivered all the same, why does this matter? This becomes more 
evident when we look at the subject in more depth.
public services and capital
Public services are important in supporting the M-C-M' process. 
Without the provision of healthcare or education, for instance, the 
quality of the workforce would deteriorate, and capitalists would be 
stuck. In this sense, public service provision by the state is an indirect 
way of subsidising the creation of surplus value. By socialising the costs 
of health, training, even (sometimes) things like housing, government 
pays for things that individual capitalists would otherwise have to pay 
for from their own profits (since they can’t manage if their workers are 
perpetually ill, or completely unskilled, or cannot find anywhere to live 
near their workplace). It does this either through taxation, which spreads 
around the burden of funding these things, or just by going into debt. 
This means, importantly, that public sector workers are bound up 
into the same system of extraction as private sector workers. Capital 
extracts value from them just as it does from anyone else, it’s just that 
this happens in a more indirect way. This may just sound like quibbling 
over terminology, but it helps us recognise some very important things. 
The NHS, for instance, is widely revered and romanticised on the left in 
Britain as an example of a ‘socialist’ holdout in a capitalist system. There 
is some truth in this, but it is a socialist system which must inevitably 
always be adapting itself to capitalist needs. The NHS must try to find 
forms adequate to the system it inhabits, with important practical con-
sequences. This observation is particularly significant in a period of 
austerity. Under austerity policies, where government is actively trying 
to lessen the burden placed on the capitalist class as a whole (i.e. by 
reducing taxes levied to pay for public services), there emerges an urgent 
need to shrink public services which clearly outweighs the objective of 
improving or maintaining the quality of service provided. It could never be 
the other way around. 
It is also clear that public service provision is a site of class struggle. 
Evidently, wage levels must enable workers to pursue a sustainable 
standard of living, but what this actually means depends on social 
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attitudes about what constitute tolerable living conditions. The stronger 
the voice of labour, the higher the expectations that must be met. The 
same thing can be said of public services. It may be that the state wants 
to reduce the tax burden on capital, but its ability to do this by cutting 
public services will depend on how prepared people are to fight. Hence 
under post-2008 austerity, one of the most important political stakes has 
been the extent to which government can get away with shrinking the 
socialised burden of public services, without social tensions getting too 
inflamed. I will return to this below.
Public services could well also be a more direct source of profit for 
capital. Capital has an existential need to find profitable sources of 
investment. This could involve geographical expansion – finding new 
markets and new sources of labour in different countries. However, it 
could also involve opening up areas that already exist within a given 
territory, including public services. David Harvey uses the term ‘accu-
mulation by dispossession’ to get at this idea of capital trying to convert 
common resources into commodities that can be bought and sold for 
profit. Various Marx-influenced researchers have applied this idea to 
privatisations of public property, notably of natural resources like water 
supply.19 In what follows, I will apply these general points to public 
services in the UK, in particularly health and education. 
Education, Training, ‘Employability’
To some extent capital assumes different forms, and behaves in different 
ways, from country to country. Writers on political economy have tended 
to classify Britain (alongside the US) as a more ‘liberal’ system than other 
developed countries such as Germany, France, Japan or the Scandina-
vian economies. Capital is generally more ‘impatient’, demanding higher 
levels of managerial control with less legal or regulatory interference, 
particularly from unions, along with an expectation of greater flexibility 
and shorter-term returns on investment.20 I discussed the implications 
of this specifically for UK labour markets in Chapter 3, and considered 
how various trends such as financialisation have affected things. 
But what about other aspects of society? If public services are shaped 
by the interests of capital, then the nature of capital clearly matters. Influ-
ential writers such as Peter Hall and David Soskice and the ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ school see British capitalism as depending on a particular 
form of education and skills system, namely a low-skills equilibrium.21 
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Because capital moves around quickly and demands high levels of flex-
ibility, there needs to be a steady supply of workers who have a highly 
generalised set of basic and ‘portable’ (i.e. non-industry-specific) skills. 
For this reason, things like vocational apprenticeships have typically 
been less developed in Britain compared to so-called ‘coordinated 
market economies’ such as Germany or Japan. These kinds of things 
require organisation and mutual commitment between public training 
providers, worker representatives and private employers. If a worker is 
to dedicate time to take very specific vocational training, there needs to 
be a stable job in industry at the end (otherwise it’s a waste of time and 
effort). These kinds of mutual commitments between labour, state and 
capital do not really exist in Britain.*
International orthodoxy in education policy is that training and 
skills systems have to become more ‘employer-led’.22 In other words, 
there is a growing awareness of the need to make sure that people come 
through education more adequately adapted to the needs of capital. 
This preoccupation, however, does not always fit with other political 
objectives. Since the crisis, and particularly when Vince Cable was at 
the Department for Business, Information and Skills, British politicians 
have been desperate to show they were taking the ‘high road’ to recovery. 
There was a well-meaning desire to encourage longer-term investment 
in skills on the part of employers. The hope was that, by doing so, the 
economy could be rebalanced away from finance and towards manufac-
turing, along with improved prospects for workers to upskill themselves 
to job security. 
The problem is that this kind of approach is not adequate to the 
needs of British capital, and hence has not materialised. In the UK, 
once employees enter the labour force, training and upskilling become 
highly voluntaristic, and dependent on the employer’s buy-in. Successive 
UK governments have seen little scope to challenge this: they agonise 
about why employers don’t bother to invest more in training, despite 
presumably also being aware that vast swathes of the UK labour market 
(call centre work, many service and retail jobs, highly routinised manu-
facturing or logistics) only really require low skills.23 There is, evidently, 
an antagonism between what is seen politically as a Good Thing (training 
people) and what suits the needs of capital (a generally low-skilled, easily 
* It is important to note that countries like Germany or Japan no longer look as 
‘coordinated’ as they used to, but that is the subject for a diferent book. 
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moulded workforce, and training systems that don’t require much from 
individual employers). 
Consequently, in the UK apprenticeship schemes, long presented as a 
panacea which ties together the obsession with improving skills and the 
sense that we need to stimulate ‘good’ manufacture (as opposed to ‘bad’ 
finance), have evolved in a disappointing way. They frequently provide 
low-skilled and low-prospect positions, essentially renamed in a way 
that sounds social democratic and virtuous.24 Historically, significant 
damage had already been done to apprenticeships schemes in Britain 
since the 1980s, owing to factors such as the public sector withdrawing 
from fields like construction, and the acceleration of vertical disintegra-
tion (i.e. subcontracting).25
The mismatch between what capital wants and the desire to improve 
skills is also obvious in relation to higher education. This sector has been 
expanding, in part fuelled by successive governments’ belief that Britain 
is becoming a ‘knowledge economy’. There is some truth to this, in the 
sense that work in Britain is becoming more polarised, with growth in the 
highest- and lowest-paid jobs but middle-earning ones being stripped 
away.26 This might, on the face of things, imply the need for more people 
with graduate-level skills as opportunities for reliable work in non-grad-
uate jobs decline. But the knowledge economy rhetoric has obscured the 
extent to which the British economy still relies on highly routine and dull 
work, and as a result the push in this direction has led to a rising problem 
of overqualification.27 There is an emerging generation of graduates who 
have skills which British capitalism is simply not equipped to put to good 
use. ‘The number of graduates [has] now “significantly outstripped” the 
creation of high-skilled jobs’.28 Many graduates find themselves working 
in low-skilled jobs for extended periods while waiting for a graduate job 
to come along.29 
Once again, observe the mismatch between what governments think 
is good (more highly skilled graduates) and what actually suits capital. 
In practice, the ideology of ‘employability’ has evolved as an increas-
ingly important concern in British education, as a means of defusing 
this tension – or at least of making students believe it is their own fault, 
which amounts to the same thing. Employability – in other words, how 
well-adapted graduates are to what employers want – is something that 
increasingly concerns British universities. More prestigious universities 
perhaps a little less, since their graduates are presumed to have a stamp of 
approval that helps them on the job market anyway. But where graduate 
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employment rates are a worry, courses may be designed and reshaped 
with the question constantly lurking: ‘how will this programme of study 
fit with what employers want?’ 
Hence ‘employability’ is refracted through a fairly vague set of 
assumptions – either university staff inferring what they think employ-
ers might want, or the pontifications of employers themselves voiced 
through various committees and business ‘engagement’ panels. This 
‘employer-higher education interface’30 is now accepted as common 
sense in many universities, particularly as league tables have taken off 
and universities are increasingly judged on what their graduates end up 
earning. When surveys of employers reveal they are unhappy with the 
level of skills of UK graduates (as they do very frequently), this is always 
taken as a pronouncement of doom from some unimpeachable author-
ity. But what role the UK’s ‘employer-driven’ skills system may play in 
the problem is rarely, if ever, questioned. Hence, while it is very obvious 
that access to differing levels of social, cultural and economic ‘capital’ 
give more affluent students a vast head start in ‘playing the game’,31 it is 
equally important to recognise the way in which the terms of this ‘game’ 
are set by the demands of capital. 
Health
One thing I did not mention in relation to education was the idea of 
public services as a source of profitable investment for capital. While 
this does happen in education, it is arguably more sensitive in the case 
of health. Obviously, there are a lot of capitalists who would love to 
exercise some ‘accumulation by dispossession’ on the British health 
system. In theory, delivering healthcare can be very profitable. But from 
capital’s perspective, the last three decades in British health policy have 
been characterised by raised hopes and continuing frustration, because 
making money from the NHS is not always easy and often encounters 
resistance on the ground. 
There have been various waves of efforts to extend private profit-
making in front-line health services, particularly in England, with the 
most important tool being the purchaser–provider split, which has 
progressed through various different guises. This is where local health 
institutions (such as general practitioner (GP) consortia or hospital 
trusts) are re-envisioned as commissioning organisations who buy in 
care on behalf of the public, potentially from private companies. The 
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Coalition government’s Health and Social Care Act was the most 
significant recent manifestation of this idea, pushing large chunks of 
NHS money on to Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) – groups 
of GPs responsible for commissioning services in their area from any 
willing provider. This has led to an urgent discussion on the left about 
the possibility of wholesale privatisation of NHS services. 
Proportionately, the amount of NHS services transferred to for-profit 
companies is comparatively small. Privatisation has been ‘gradual and 
inexorable’ rather than a rapid ‘explosion’; the amount of NHS money in 
private hands has gone from about 4 per cent in 2009–10 to about 8 per 
cent in 2015–16.32 It may well be that the government has had a premed-
itated strategy to privatise large sections of the NHS, but they have gone 
about it in a fairly blundering fashion. As Nick Krachler and Ian Greer 
show,33 the Health and Social Care Act encountered various obstacles 
which proved very difficult to overcome. For one thing, it was imposed 
at a time of austerity: the fact that there was so little money about meant 
a lot of private companies felt it wasn’t worth the trouble of taking over 
NHS services. For another, the institutions on the front line of privati-
sation (i.e. the CCGs) appear to be somewhat brittle and in many cases 
may not have the stomach to push through controversial privatisations 
in the face of public opposition. Government has generally failed to 
depoliticise the NHS and many retain a strong sentimental attachment 
to it, and consequently CCGs are very susceptible to pressure on the 
part of motivated and organised local campaign groups.34 If one wants 
to force through highly sensitive privatisations, you really need the iron 
fist of central government rather than little consortia of local doctors. 
This may help explain why Jeremy Hunt sought new legal powers to 
unilaterally shut down or restructure public hospitals.35 
This latter point hints at a much wider issue, which is to do with 
capital as a whole rather than specific capitalists wanting to profit from 
healthcare. Above, I argued that socialised health spending serves a 
particular purpose in a capitalist economy: to relieve the burden of main-
taining a functioning workforce from individual capitalists. We might 
dismiss this observation as just a difference in terminology, so long as 
the result is something which benefits everyone – and, of course, there 
are also extensive political pressures at work which have extended and 
preserved the scope of the NHS. But looking at things this way helps us 
to understand a fact that is so widely accepted as common sense that its 
strangeness is rarely recognised: the extent and resources of the NHS, 
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like that of any health service, are ultimately limited and conditioned 
by what is tolerable to capital. This is particularly salient given that, as 
argued in Chapter 3, British capital has become much less indulgent of 
taxation and regulation since the 1970s, meaning budget pressures have 
intensified.
The human costs of this in the NHS are very extensively documented 
on a regular basis in the news and do not need to be repeated here. 
Expanding waiting times, people being treated in a corridor rather than 
a ward, relentless attacks on the terms and conditions of health workers 
and so on. But the real point of interest here is a simple one: the NHS 
is not this bastion of socialist independence in a sea of capitalism. It 
is on a tight leash. There is no independent entity that evaluates what 
resources are required to meet the population’s health needs, and which 
demands that government adapt the wider economy so that these can 
be provided (which might make sense, given that healthcare is arguably 
the most important thing for any society to provide). It is the other way 
round: health has to adapt to the economy. To this end, its budgets are 
set by central government, and the health secretary has extensive and 
increasing powers to reorganise it as s/he sees fit. 
So, for people on the left, it is politically useful to sentimentalise ‘our’ 
NHS (recall the tribute to it in the 2012 Olympics opening ceremony), 
but this sentimentality can also be a problem – as, arguably, is the 
left-wing fixation on what percentage of the NHS is being outsourced 
to the private sector. Quasi-privatisation has been a priority of successive 
governments, but it only benefits small segments of capital. The bigger 
issue, and the more important thing from capital’s perspective, is the 
need to apply intense budget pressure so as to lower the costs of the 
system as a whole. 
The need to find a health system adequate to twenty-first-century 
British capital defined New Labour’s NHS policy during their years 
in power. Growing, and increasingly complex, public need demanded 
greater investment, but this had to be done in such a way that ‘tax and 
spend’ policies were avoided. The ‘Third Way’ ideology that talked in 
grand terms about revolutionising the manning and planning of health 
services was arguably just a post hoc rationalisation of this basic reality.36 
The main effect of the policy obsession with ‘competition’ and the market 
was not so much crony capitalism – i.e. a nefarious scheme to hand 
NHS services to mates in the private sector – but just plain capitalism: 
growing pressure on NHS workers themselves to produce more and 
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more indirect surplus value to capital as a whole. This meant extracting 
more work for less, and it is this obsession that defines working life in 
the NHS today as much as in Sports Direct or Amazon. NHS staff are 
harder to bully than those warehouse workers in some respects (since 
they are typically higher-skilled and more likely to be unionised). But 
in other ways they are easier to push around, since they tend to be very 
squeamish about making too much of a fuss in the workplace because of 
their sense of duty. 
Hence ‘our’ NHS has become a very bad employer. Front-line 
work in hospitals is being more intensively monitored by an increas-
ingly distinct managerial layer, imposing targets on staff to accelerate 
treatment times and other targets, though many workers have evidently 
been quite effective in retaining their professional autonomy in spite of 
these measures.37 Hannah Cooke interviewed nursing staff and found 
an infestation of what they called ‘seagull managers’: people who ‘fly in 
from a great height, make a lot of noise, drop a lot of crap, then they fly 
off again’.38 Her research shows ‘flexibilisation’ has been used to justify 
changes that intensify managerial control over nurses: increased training 
was promised (which would ‘release [their] untapped potential’), but 
this turned out to mean they were expected to do more things faster. 
Managers remained distant and unsupportive in this process, circling 
round to administer aggressive and punitive public ‘bollockings’ to those 
who were not keeping up. The proportion (a quarter) of NHS staff who 
say they have been bullied at work is extraordinarily high.39 The fact that 
this work intensification has not been accompanied by corresponding 
increases in staffing levels has had very serious consequences, as cases 
such as the Mid Staffs hospital trust show.40
Real-terms NHS pay has stagnated, as in the rest of the public sector.41 
Job insecurity has increased, resulting in a fear-driven culture of longer 
hours.42 The increasing unilateralism of central government in the NHS 
is also evident in the case of staff working conditions, most notably the 
junior doctors’ dispute of 2016. Many observers were taken aback at the 
bluntness of the tools used by Jeremy Hunt in this conflict, which appear 
to make a mockery of the ‘respect’ and ‘partnership’ language which is 
all-pervading when the NHS talks publicly about its staff. Hunt essen-
tially imposed changes without consultation once negotiations did not 
produce the result he wanted. 
But this is merely the most high-profile manifestation of something 
that is common across the public sector: increasing unilateralism on 
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the part of government as employer. In areas such as teaching, local 
government and the police, negotiation structures in pay-setting have 
been weakened and the union role as a negotiating partner has been mar-
ginalised.43 One of the key innovations of academy schools, for instance, 
has been to get around national-level bargaining with unions,44 thus dis-
organising the teacher’s labour market. Across the civil service, trends are 
towards work intensification, targetisation, deskilling and the weakening 
of individual staff ’s decision-making capacities.45 Government, in other 
words, is asserting itself with some force in its capacity as employer, in 
order to boost the indirect surplus value created in the public sector. 
More on Public Functions
Talking about health and education can only give a very narrow view 
of public services in Britain. It is obviously impossible to talk about 
everything here, but some other issues need to be mentioned. For 
instance, housing in Britain is another case where the need for systems 
to evolve in a manner that is adequate to the requirements of capital has 
completely steamrollered social need, with some strange and jarring con-
sequences. Given that housing has emerged as a rock-solid investment 
for capitalists with more money than they know what to do with, buying 
up properties in cities like London is a very useful way to store up 
excess capital. Referring to a flat development exclusively for the global 
super-rich in Vauxhall, John Lanchester writes:
Look at it from a Vauxhall local’s point of view. 1. Housing is in 
crisis and desperately needs fixing; 2. The single biggest thing to be 
happening in the local economy in decades is a housing development; 
and yet 2 has nothing to do with 1, will not alleviate it in any respect, 
and may (if it succeeds in flooding the London market with yet more 
foreign capital) make it worse.46
There can be no clearer example of the way in which questions of social 
need spiral off into almost surreal territory when subordinated to the 
needs of capital. 
It is important to note that, as I argued in the case of the NHS, austerity 
policies are not really about ‘shrinking the state’, strictly speaking. They 
generally involve the state reducing the extent of the services it provides. 
But in order to push through this objective it tends to require the rein-
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forcement of central government authority. In the arts, attempts to make 
money go further in the sector have involved the rapid extension of 
centrally imposed accountability bureaucracy.47 In local government, the 
centre has used its iron control over the allocation of resources to force 
local authorities to cut back on service provision massively. In the past 
this has involved quite brutal clampdowns on local authorities (such as 
the militant Labour councils of the Thatcher era) who have sought to 
retain greater influence over local taxing and spending. One of Tony 
Blair’s maxims was: ‘if you want to drive through systemic change, you’ve 
got to drive it from the centre’.48
Bureaucratically speaking, this assertion of central power often 
happens through channels that are popularly assumed to have the 
opposite effect. The ‘marketisation’ of public service delivery – i.e. putting 
particular functions out to competitive tender so potential providers can 
bid to be awarded contracts – does not diminish central government 
power. Instead, it creates a new institutional relationship between 
purchaser (i.e. government) and provider that is largely sealed off from 
outside influences (such as public participation in the planning of service 
delivery),49 meaning that cost-cutting objectives can continue with fewer 
obstacles. This (rather than the questionable assumption that for-profit 
private suppliers are better value than in-house public services) may be 
why the contracting out of public services is so important in forcing 
through austerity measures. 
The point here is therefore a very simple one. Public services are 
ultimately structured and limited by the need to assume a form which 
is adequate to the requirements of capital accumulation. This basic 
requirement can lead to the failure of key strategic initiatives, such as 
apprenticeship schemes, or the turning over of things like housing to 
‘market forces’ with surreal consequences. More fundamentally, though, 
in recent years it means government using its power to force down costs 
in the public sector to contribute more effectively to the indirect accu-
mulation of surplus value. 
But where does this leave the idea of government as the ‘manager’ 
of capital? Looking at British public services that characterisation 
doesn’t seem to fit. Consider developments like the Health and Social 
Care Act. This was not about ‘stabilisation’ or ‘long-term management’: 
it was simultaneously highly radical and destabilising (as an attempt to 
marketise healthcare provision), but also very badly thought through 
(for instance, in the way in which this objective conflicted with austerity 
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priorities, as described above). The government has often appeared 
utterly clueless in its efforts to cut costs, such as when it fired 4,000 
public sector staff only to find it couldn’t manage without them.50 Or 
when David Cameron became confused about why his government’s 
‘savings’ were actually having negative effects on public services in his 
constituency, rather than merely affecting ‘back room bureaucrats’ who 
may only have existed in his own head.* In this context I want to revisit 
some of the Marxist ideas around government introduced earlier.
blood sacrifices to alien powers
Though the human sacrifice is the most talked about, there were 
actually many types of sacrifices in the empire. The people believed 
that they owed a  blood-debt  to the gods. They wanted to avert 
disaster by paying the endless debt. Blood was a common theme – 
the sacrifice that the gods required. So, animals would be sacrificed, 
as well as humans. Also, there was ritual blood-letting, where people 
would cut themselves to offer their blood to the gods.51
In Chapter 3, I wrote about the more short-termist and compromise-
averse sides to capital that have come to the fore under financialisation, 
and discussed its effects on the British labour market. But what does 
it mean for government policy? Mainly, it makes it much harder for 
them to fulfil the ‘managerial’ role often assigned to them in Marxist 
theory. Above I quoted Carnoy and Castells, who emphasised the role 
of governments in initiating globalisation as a fix for the crises of the 
1970s. However, ‘once the progress of globalisation was set in motion, 
it slipped largely out of the control of states’.52 In other words, they 
unleashed a force and then found they weren’t sure how to deal with 
it. The ‘functionalist’ state becomes a dysfunctional one. Government 
essentially needs to assume a form which it hopes can guarantee that 
* He wrote to the head of Witney council: ‘I was disappointed at the long list of 
suggestions loated in the brieing note to make up signiicant cuts to frontline services 
– from elderly day centres, to libraries, to museums. his is in addition to the unwelcome 
and counter-productive proposals to close children’s centres across the county. I would 
have hoped that Oxfordshire would instead be following the best practice of Conservative 
councils from across the country in making back oice savings and protecting the frontline’ 
(quoted in Crewe, see note 48). 
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financial actors across the economy can make sustainable profits. Cédric 
Durand writes:
The austerity measures running down public services and impinging 
upon social rights seek to guarantee continuity in the interest payments 
that administrations pay out. Meanwhile, structural reforms have the 
goal of supporting firms’ profitability – and thus their capacity to pay 
dividends and interest and generate gains on the stock markets – by 
reducing the price of labour and opening up new spaces for their 
operations.53
Nonetheless, the policies needed to assume an ‘adequate form’ under 
financialised globalisation are difficult for governments to identify. It is 
obvious that states across Europe are finding it harder to develop ways 
of regulating their economies which are conducive to stable growth. The 
post-war system that lasted until the 1970s was stabilised by a mutually 
reinforcing series of factors: rapid wage growth, new technology, ‘class 
compromise’ and an economy dominated by large, vertically integrated 
firms. However, as Matt Vidal argues, there is no combination on 
display in developed capitalist economies today that appears capable of 
generating the same growth rates or similar rates of profit.54 Instability 
is the norm in Europe. 
Financialisation exacerbates this dysfunction for government policy. 
The fast-moving and self-referential character of financial markets (in 
other words, the fact that they respond primarily to their own price 
signals rather than to what is actually going on in the ‘concrete’ world of 
production) makes it harder for governments to understand and plan in 
advance how their economies will develop in the longer term.55 It is no 
use establishing durable institutions for training, collective bargaining or 
industrial policy if capital wants to move about more and more quickly 
across sectors and borders in pursuit of value. It has therefore long been 
theorised that, since the 1980s, state policies have been pushed towards 
greater short-termism, relinquishing various tools that could foster insti-
tutional stability.56
It is too simple to say that national governments have simply lost 
power. This is the case in some respects, but I have also argued that 
we have seen a reassertion of central authority in others. Chris Howell 
shows how, across the developed world, governments have been highly 
proactive in reshaping regulatory institutions in order to give more 
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freedom to employers, and push aside other actors that may act as a 
counterweight.57 I illustrated this previously with regard to employment 
relations in the NHS, but it has been a similar story in the public 
sectors of most European countries.58 While different countries present 
different contexts, the main contrasts seem to be in the pace of change 
rather than the direction.
The problem is that, while these kinds of measures may be adequate 
to financialised capitalism, this does not mean they can produce stability 
in the longer term. Various macroeconomists have shown how shifting 
more power away from labour and towards capital can have destabi-
lising effects.59 However, these policies continue to be pursued despite 
poor results. The need to gain the ‘confidence’ of financial markets has 
acted as an alien power over successive British governments, pressuris-
ing them to become more and more ‘market facing’ at any cost. This 
means squeezing out any impediments to the free movement of capital 
and to the fluctuation of market prices, whatever the consequences.60 
As one of the most financialised economies, the UK must therefore also 
be an archetypal ‘competition state’:61 in other words, one in which the 
government competes against others to impose the fewest burdens on 
capital, and to support it proactively wherever possible. The bottom line 
is this: shifting the balance of power from labour to capital has become 
more important to British governments than the objective of stable 
growth in the longer term. 
This situation is reinforced at a global level by an arcane superstruc-
ture of arbitrary judgement, as exemplified by organisations such as 
credit ratings agencies (CRAs), which set themselves up as the voice of 
capital. Timothy Sinclair’s work is important here.62 As investors have 
become less patient and less tied to individual productive businesses, 
the amount of concrete knowledge they have about potential credit 
recipients diminishes. CRAs have emerged as a highly flawed response 
to these knowledge gaps, as they assign ‘scores’ to countries’ credit-
worthiness. But Sinclair shows how the variables involved in these kinds 
of scores are opaque, speculative and highly subjective; inevitably so 
given the vast complexity of the social systems which are supposed to 
be encapsulated within it. Credit scores are thus a means of imposing 
a reassuring (but possibly delusional) sense of order on to a volatile and 
unknowable economic environment. 
Preserving Britain’s ‘AAA’ credit rating and thus the confidence 
of capital was one of the primary goals of austerity as envisioned by 
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George Osborne.* In this sense, a lot of the damage done to public 
services since 2010 come to look like fairly arbitrary sacrifices designed 
to appease an alien power (‘the markets’) which is fundamentally vague 
and unknowable. Certainly, financial markets are often invoked in a 
reverential, quasi-mystical way. Their judgements are rarely predicted 
accurately by expert media commentators, and rationalisations for why 
they have reacted to a given situation are almost always post hoc. In this 
context, it seems quite legitimate to doubt the credibility of ‘experts’, 
since they appear to serve the same process as a high priest in theocratic 
societies; finding after-the-fact explanations for bad (or good) things 
that have happened, rather than having any real powers of prediction.63 
The problem here is exacerbated by the way in which CRA judgements 
have become increasingly politically motivated over the last decade, with 
a growing propensity to punish insufficiently right-wing governments. 
Previously, this outlook only really applied to weaker economies, but 
since 2008 has increasingly been levelled at the most economically stable 
countries as well.64 
The main source of blood sacrifices was, as we have seen, labour, 
whose position relative to capital has been hammered via restrictive leg-
islation, increasingly coercive welfare systems, severe restraint over wages 
and the undermining of job security. British politicians have shown an 
almost religious devotion to undermining the working conditions of 
British labour. Since the 1970s the most coherent trend is that of class 
discipline: rendering workers more malleable from capital’s perspective, 
and reducing their opportunities to engage and negotiate with their 
employers. This was the story told in Chapter 3.
This dynamic is also evident in the attitude of British governments 
(Conservative, Coalition and Labour) towards the European Union. 
One likely prospect of Brexit is a reintensification of competition with 
the rest of Europe for trade and investment. There is a strong possibility 
that Britain will cut taxes and spending in an effort to attract capital 
away from the EU,65 and seek to exert even greater pressure on labour. 
This indicates an important (if hardly well-concealed) tension that is 
likely to weigh heavily on British politics in coming years: many who 
voted to leave the EU did so as a rejection of the consequences of intense 
international competition, which is likely the exact opposite motivation 
from that of the real architects of Brexit. For the latter, the attraction 
* hough under his chancellorship the UK’s credit rating was indeed downgraded. 
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is precisely the hope that through Brexit Britain will be liberated to 
compete more fiercely.
As such, the confrontation between Brexiters and Remainers generates 
a lot of heat and noise but overlooks the extent to which even the most 
enthusiastic Europhiles in British politics have had an ingrained Euro-
scepticism in many respects. This is particularly so regarding efforts to 
harmonise social regulations. New Labour sought to water down and 
wriggle out of key pieces of European legislation that were designed to 
mitigate the effects of international economic competition on working 
conditions. With the Working Time Directive, which imposed a Europe-
wide 48-hour limit to the working week, among other stipulations, 
New Labour bargained for an ‘opt-out’ clause for individual businesses. 
The effects of this opt-out are ambiguous: it initially appeared to have 
completely defeated the object of the legislation,66 though more recent 
studies suggest that by placing modest limits on working time it has, to 
some extent, limited surplus value extraction and even made workers 
a bit happier.67 For this reason it is one of the most hated of all EU 
inventions in the eyes of leading Brexiters. 
Another area where New Labour opted out of European employment 
legislation is in worker participation and representation. One of the ways 
British companies respond to more diffuse and fast-moving patterns of 
share ownership is through centralising more power in company CEOs. 
This way they can respond more quickly to market pressures without 
having to involve their workforce, and the UK government has tried 
very hard to render company law adequate to this situation. Along 
with Ireland, it was the UK government that lobbied to water down 
the 2002 Information and Consultation Directive which sought to limit 
companies’ ability to make strategic decisions without prior consulta-
tion with their workforce. Such provisions are arguably quite meagre 
and inoffensive, while giving the impression of being sufficiently fuzzy 
and consensus-driven, which may be why Theresa May made a song 
and dance of promising ‘workers on company boards’, before swiftly 
retracting when placed face to face with actual business leaders.68 While 
UK governments have adopted the Agency Workers’ Directive, which 
stipulates that agency workers should be hired on the same pay and 
conditions as directly employed workers, they have been happy to allow 
UK employers to make full use of the so-called ‘Swedish derogation’ 
(aka the ‘German derogation’), in which this stipulation is not applied 
to pay.69
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sorts of technical compromises at European level in order to reduce pro-
tections for agency workers and increase the freedoms of employers.70
The point, then, is that the British government has always done 
what it can to minimise the burden British workers impose on capital. 
This has defined its approach to regulating the labour market, in a 
whole range of areas including Europe. Often, these measures have 
been chaotic and poorly thought through, seemingly designed to cause 
suffering as an end in itself. Changes to the benefits system are the 
ultimate paragon of scattergun irrationality in the service of labour force 
discipline. A system that pushes people towards homelessness or malnu-
trition through baroque punishments administered for spurious reasons, 
which forces disabled and ill people to apply for jobs they cannot do 
leading thousands of them to premature deaths,71 and a culture of 
mandatory ‘volunteering’ on labour schemes that have no educational 
value whatsoever, all without any discernible positive effect on labour 
market statistics.72 Here, there has not simply been a wild rush to force 
vulnerable people into work regardless of the consequences, but a willing 
recognition that even where these measures fail in reducing unemploy-
ment, they serve a useful purpose in piling extra pressure on people who 
use (or who might need to use) the benefits system. The assumption is 
that it is primarily about changing the behaviour of welfare recipients, 
but the actual intended audience for such schemes is something else: 
politicians want to demonstrate to capital that they are serious about 
making workers afraid.
6Class and Equality
class, ‘identity politics’ and cosmopolitans
One of the recurrent themes of previous chapters has been the profound 
failures of the mainstream centre-left in Britain, as well as in Europe and 
the US. While any number of examples could be chosen, the two major 
humiliations for the left that most interested British people throughout 
2016 were the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election in the 
United States. The main reason these events are humiliations is not 
simply because of the results per se, but because in both cases it was the 
right that successfully deployed the language of class, and the left that 
tried to frame this language as divisive. It was the latter, as a result, that 
was more easily presented as the out-of-touch elite.
This was discussed at length in Chapter 1. But the language around 
class politics has inevitably become closely entangled with other debates 
around identity and diversity, often in counterproductive or self-serving 
ways. A narrative has proliferated which basically runs as follows: it is 
now the political right that speaks for those that have been left behind 
by global capitalism, while the political left is mainly concerned with 
‘identity politics’. ‘Left behind’ is a euphemism used to refer to people in 
communities rendered insecure and/or impoverished by globalisation.* 
‘Identity politics’ is used to denote political movements seeking to secure 
greater inclusion in public life for particular population groups that have 
previously been marginalised – often related to sexuality, race or gender. It 
is now mainly used as a pejorative phrase in more or less the same way as 
‘political correctness’ always has been – its meaning is largely equivalent 
but has the advantage of making its user sound less like Alan Partridge. 
A comedian, in character as an angry left-wing journalist, encapsulates 
an explanation for Donald Trump’s victory which is apparently accepted 
as gospel by many people from a range of political backgrounds:
* See also the ‘just-about managing’ in heresa May-speak.
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If I see, fuck me, one more tweet containing a ‘#TrumpWins’ next to 
a ‘#EverydaySexism’ I’m going to drop a *inaudible* … Most people 
didn’t vote for [Clinton] not because she’s a women, but because she 
offered no palpable change whatsoever … People can’t admit what 
they think, the left don’t allow them to … every time someone on the 
left says ‘you mustn’t say that’ they are contributing to this culture … if 
my mansplaining is triggering you, you can fuck off to your safe space.
This is the right-wing class warrior’s argument repurposed as liberal 
self-flagellation. The story goes that the ‘working class’ has been alienated 
by anti-racism or anti-sexism campaigns. The latter are basically 
minority concerns voiced by cosmopolitans who have no connection to 
the real ‘left behind’, who have quite justifiably embraced right-wing 
nationalism as a result. It is very important to note that, in these kinds 
of arguments, the idea of the ‘working class’ is employed in a way that is 
obviously very different to the category of ‘labour’ as I have been using 
it in this book.
Evidently, global financial capitalism has created insecurity, power-
lessness and a sense of diminished community among many people. The 
failure of the centre-left in Britain and elsewhere has been their inability 
to find alternative means of coping with this problem which are more 
compelling than those proposed by the nationalist right. It has been the 
shift to a more radical approach that has seen the Labour Party take 
some tentative steps to addressing this, a point to which I return in the 
Conclusion. On the international centre-left, by contrast, the tone of 
debate is not particularly encouraging. Take the US, whose left-leaning 
political talk-show scene is thriving in inverse proportion to its ability to 
get its agenda implemented. Some commentators therein have basically 
accepted the right-wing class warrior narrative, deciding that the left’s 
response to Trump should be a period of remorse for having spent 
too much time worrying about the use of racist and sexist language. 
According to the comedian/talk-show host Bill Maher, the left has gone 
from ‘protecting people to protecting feelings’. This kind of material 
is highly reliant on some dubious generalisations about how easily 
offended college students are, enabling the speaker to present himself as 
the tough-but-rational left-winger in a culture of ‘PC gone mad’.
There are two main problems with this wearyingly trendy argument. 
First, because it accepts a very flimsy premise: the intolerant and unrea-
sonable practitioner of politically correct identity politics looms much 
120 . class matters
larger in conservative imagination than in empirical reality. For instance, 
even if there was not a single person that had ever wanted to disinvite 
a ‘mens’ rights activist’ from a university debate, the same people would 
still print news stories about how left-wing students are stifling free 
speech on campuses, and the same audience would still believe these 
stories. Hence, fixating on this as ‘the reason for Trump/Brexit’ becomes 
nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, it misses a much 
bigger and more important truth, which is that Trump and Brexit were 
decisive victories of ‘identity politics’, just identity politics practised by 
very different demographics. There is no more perfect distillation of 
identity politics than Nigel Farage wearing tweed, drinking in a pub and 
talking about ‘real Britons’. 
There is an alternative response which, once again, is expressed more 
loudly and explicitly in the US. This is to take pride in the ‘identity 
politics’ label and double down on it. Another liberal comedian/talk-show 
host, Samantha Bee, responds to arguments such as those advanced by 
Bill Maher as follows: 
Democrats, I know you’re having a rough time, you hate being lost in 
the wilderness … but if your panic over a loss makes you abandon both 
your principles and the people who actually vote for you, then you’ll 
be in the wilderness for a decade … By all means invite working class 
white people to the party, just don’t let them take over the DJ table.*
Here, it is made explicit that the Democrats, as a centre-left party, 
should see its natural base as open-minded cosmopolitans, and be 
fighting primarily on their behalf. According to this line, the conserva-
tive class warrior is not the sad result of the mainstream left abandoning 
its historic constituencies, but the natural enemy it should have been 
fighting all along. This is the kind of argument that ends up with people 
like the bosses of Amazon or Apple being held up as the vanguard of 
anti-Trump sentiment whenever they express queasiness about travel 
bans and the like. They may heap misery and degradation on their 
workers, but at least they believe in openness.
Rebecca Solnit has written a powerful attack on the idea that Clinton 
lost because of her identity politics, making various points: most notably, 
* See the Full Frontal with Samantha Bee segment entitled ‘Democrats in the Wilderness’, 
uploaded onto YouTube on 12 December 2016, and available to view here: www.youtube.
com/watch?v=CH7GCMm1ngA.
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that Trump is in reality a far more practised exponent, and the reason 
that Clinton was labelled the identity politics candidate is more to do 
with her gender than her politics (in this sense, the attack on identity 
politics demonstrates the need for it).1 This is almost certainly true, but 
Solnit also protests that Clinton actually mentioned jobs significantly 
more frequently than she did issues such as abortion or racism. This, she 
suggests, indicates that any female candidate, unless they were explicitly 
running on an anti-abortion platform, would probably be accused of 
only caring about ‘women’s issues’. 
This is highly likely, but it reveals another problem. It is one thing 
to mention the word ‘jobs’ frequently, but this was generally done in a 
highly abstract way: jobs are good things in themselves, and if business 
is confident, the economy will grow and there will be more jobs, and so 
on. But evidently there was a level of emotion and rage in her opponent’s 
language that resonated far more deeply among the ‘left behind’.* It is 
not enough to talk about jobs, it also depends what you say about them. 
Lots of blue-collar Trump voters have jobs, but they are (often) very 
unrewarding ones. Dylan Riley writes that ‘the basic problems to which 
Trump points are demonstrably real’. Much of his support was drawn 
from areas where many people have ‘uncertain prospects’ and where the 
most highly routinised jobs are disproportionately common. ‘But this 
class-based revolt was supercharged by racist and patriarchal resentment. 
This issue is not whether class, race or gender was the decisive factor, but 
rather how they combined’.2
Hopefully I can be forgiven for this short detour into US politics, 
since it has some lessons for what is happening in the UK. In both 
countries, the goals of increased inequality and inclusion on the grounds 
of gender, race or sexuality are jeopardised by the shifting balance of class 
power, and particularly of the complicity of centre-left politicians in 
this shift. Insecurity, class discipline and the hollowing-out of post-in-
dustrial areas produces anger, which the centre-left has done nothing 
to harness; if anything, it has tried to hush it up, and it has done this 
because it’s scared of capital. The fact that the same parties have, over 
the same period, been comparatively more sympathetic on issues relating 
to gender, race and sexuality has made it very easy for ‘identity politics’ 
to be made the scapegoat for class-related failures. The root problem for 
* We need to be careful here, because in the end Clinton still got more votes than Trump. 
But it is still clear that defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory by the Democrats’ 
failures with groups that were traditionally supportive of them.
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centre-left parties is thus not that ‘identity politics’ is incompatible with 
‘representing the working class’, but that their manifest failure to do the 
latter has tarnished their entire project, setting the stage for right-wing 
nationalism to appropriate the language of class. 
As such, this chapter is concerned with looking in more depth at 
the way in which the concept of class (by which, of course, I mean the 
relationship between labour and capital) interacts with other issues that 
connect with the broader idea of ‘equality’ and identity, beginning with 
the subject of gender.
marxism and feminism
There is clearly at least one common thread between Marxist theory 
and feminism: both are ‘theories of power and its distribution: inequality. 
They provide accounts of how social arrangements … can be internally 
rational yet unjust.’3 In other words, both bodies of thought identify 
systems within society which impose a particular set of rules around the 
way resources and power are distributed, and argue that these systems 
lead to the subordination of a particular group. However, because they 
emphasise the subordination of different groups (women or labour), 
there is also a lot of room for tension.
There is, potentially, a fairly crude version of Marxism which dislikes 
feminism on the grounds that it is not sufficiently focused on class 
differences (which, of course, exist between women as well as men). 
Likewise feminists have also criticised Marxism for failing to differen-
tiate between the experiences of men and women within classes. It is 
also true that, historically, labour movements have often undervalued 
or marginalised women’s perspectives. Marxist and feminist arguments 
have clashed quite directly at some points. See, for instance, Rosa Lux-
emburg’s criticisms of suffragette campaigners in the early twentieth 
century: ‘most of these bourgeois women who act like lionesses in the 
struggle against “male prerogatives” would trot like docile lambs in the 
camp of conservative and clerical reaction if they had the suffrage’.4 In 
other words, campaigners from wealthy backgrounds, however worthy 
the cause, can never be trusted when it comes to the real conflict between 
labour and capital. 
There is a lot of common ground concerning the concept of ‘social 
reproduction’. This term refers to the perpetual need for the creation 
and socialisation of a new labour force to replace the old one, which 
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is clearly essential to capitalism if it wants to go on for more than a 
generation or so. This includes functions like childbirth, childrearing 
and all those other factors (education, health and so on) which prepare 
the next generation of human beings to become a labour input.
Some of these social reproduction functions are provided by 
government (see Chapter 5) but much of it is done in the home, and it is 
still, mostly, done on an unpaid basis by women. In this sense, the family 
has a dual significance under capitalism. It is a private space, but one 
with a critical social function. For those within such a space it is usually 
a place of very intense interpersonal relationships, be these loving, 
supportive, authoritarian or perhaps abusive. But it also has a critical role 
in supporting capitalist systems, and in this sense it is something capital 
and state have always needed to administer and account for, in varying 
ways. For instance, in some countries governments try to incentivise 
families to have more children, in others less, depending on the status of 
the economy; in some countries they recognise childcare responsibilities 
within benefits systems, in others they discourage them. 
In this sense, the historical subordination of women in the home, 
under a male breadwinner patriarch, is by no means inconvenient from 
capital’s perspective, because in such an arrangement women end up 
doing an important job for free. Silvia Federici shows how capitalist 
governments throughout history have frequently taken various measures 
to entrench the status of women in domestic life: through imposing rules 
around contraception, limiting their access to jobs or even, in extreme 
cases, through hunting down difficult women as witches.5 
Women’s subordination in domestic life may also be increased as 
a by-product of other processes. The retrenching of the public sector, 
which I discussed extensively in previous chapters, has had particularly 
important implications for women since it pushes many of the jobs that 
could have been done by public services back into the home.6 Ultimately, 
the ‘traditional’ family (i.e. one with a breadwinner and a housewife) is 
a hierarchical structure in itself, because the (waged) job of the former 
generally confers power over the unremunerated work of the latter. 
Here, I am of course talking about ‘the family’ as an institution rather 
than women as a gender. Sometimes men do more domestic work than 
their female partners, but this is still comparatively unusual and so it 
remains the case that family structures are more likely to put women 
into a subordinate position. Conservative thought has often inferred 
from this that the family is the foundation for social order, worrying 
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that women’s increasing labour market participation could lead to social 
breakdown and the emergence of a new generation that is not suffi-
ciently disciplined to take its place in the labour force. They may become 
hoodie-wearing rioters rather than neatly turned-out sources of surplus 
value. So there is an interesting parallel with Marxism: both see the 
family as the bedrock of capitalist social order, but disagree on whether 
this is a good or bad thing.
But things are, of course, more complicated than this, because these 
‘social reproduction’ dynamics do not just support capitalist processes. 
They are also profoundly affected by them. While the conservative view 
worries about the decline of the traditional family unit, it is generally less 
keen to recognise the way in which increasing insecurity at work can lead 
to familial dysfunction and breakdown.7 A system defined by the con-
flictual relationship between two forces within society (i.e. labour and 
capital) is likely to be unstable, chewing up and spitting out the things 
upon which it once relied. 
The increase in women’s labour market participation which Britain 
has seen over the last 50 years has various causes: women’s own efforts to 
resist being confined to the home, increased access to birth control and 
legalisation of abortion,8 alongside broader economic factors including 
the growth of the service industry and part-time work, as well as the 
threat of insecurity and wage stagnation in typical ‘male breadwinner’ 
jobs. ‘Breadwinners’ secured solid wage growth under the post-war 
economic order, but as we have seen, this ‘consensus’ has faltered, neces-
sitating more dual-earner families.
British policy has wrestled with some contradictions in this respect. 
On one hand, it has sought to encourage women’s labour market par-
ticipation, seeing this as a means of increasing productivity.9 Hence it 
has formulated legislation relating to gender equality in the workplace, 
and sought to shift the impetus of the benefits system to provide weaker 
support for childcare responsibilities.10 But on the other, the imperatives 
of post-2007 austerity have worked against these efforts. The difficulty for 
British governments has been to facilitate the labour market experience 
of women while ensuring that policy evolves in a way that is adequate to 
capital ’s needs. The next section looks at this tension in more depth. 
equality and capital
For Marx, the form of ‘equality’ that was adequate from capital’s per-
spective was a highly legalistic one: citizens should have ‘equality’ in the 
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sense that there should be an independent legal system which enforces 
property rights without discrimination and in which everyone has the 
same rights as a private individual. This, clearly, says nothing about (in 
fact, it obscures) the imbalances of power that emerge in the workplace 
and in wider society as a result of capitalist processes. This pattern has 
been replicated in the way British governments have approached the 
issue of discrimination. 
Legislation against discriminatory treatment at work has dripped 
through bit by bit since the 1970s, gradually widening the number of 
characteristics protected against discrimination as well as the forms of 
discrimination which are recognised (beginning with rudimentary pro-
tections against unequal pay levels, shifting towards a more proactive 
push to ‘promote equality’). As Linda Dickens argues, these develop-
ments were sometimes prompted by major shocks, such as eruptions 
of social unrest directed against racist policing methods in Brixton and 
Toxteth in the early 1980s, or the aftermath of Stephen Lawrence’s 
murder in 1993.11 It has also been catalysed by the need to comply with 
EU-level directives (something Labour governments have generally been 
more receptive to than Conservative ones, though with some important 
limits – see Chapter 5). 
This development has involved the creation of new agencies, such as 
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, and new mechanisms, 
such as employment tribunals, intended to enshrine equalities legislation 
in a legal framework. In Britain, these new legal resources have tended to 
provide little or no scope for the involvement of collective actors such as 
trade unions, meaning that they focus solely on righting wrongs against 
individuals rather than using collective force to push employers to make 
positive adjustments.12 In addition, claimants are often at a disadvantage, 
given imbalances in access to legal support and expertise. Consequently, 
as Dickens argues, there is the perpetual danger that equality ‘becomes 
subordinated to the goal of efficiency’,13 with various ‘business reasons’ 
provided for in the legislation that can be invoked to justify unfair 
treatment as necessary for the smooth functioning of capital. 
This kind of equalities legislation was a key agenda of New Labour 
throughout their period in office. The Equality Act of 2010, one of 
their final actions before losing power, sought to expand positive duties 
towards the ‘mainstreaming’ of equality in public sector organisations, as 
well as imposing greater responsibilities on private employers to monitor 
and adjust their equality provisions. The emphasis on ‘positive’ duties 
126 . class matters
is important here: organisations were not supposed to just react when 
individuals sue them over something that has affected them, they are 
supposed to try to iron out barriers to equality in a more proactive way. 
So, for instance, organisations should consider and implement policies 
to prevent homophobic bullying, rather than waiting for an individual 
to make a complaint after experiencing it.14 ‘Should’, here, is of course 
ambiguous: the Act provided no definite instruction for organisations to 
do this, it just requires them to give ‘due regard’ to equality concerns. This 
voluntaristic approach and softly-softly language is typical of the British 
approach: capital is like a field of wild horses liable to get spooked and 
stampede if you do anything that it might actually notice.
The ‘equality agenda’, while generally non-threatening to capital, 
still ran up against economic crisis and austerity. There can only be 
one winner in such a collision. George Osborne’s ‘emergency budget’ 
of 2010 was challenged legally by the Fawcett Society.15 They argued 
that austerity looked likely to violate equality legislation by dispropor-
tionately impacting women. Women rely more on public services, and 
are more likely to work in public sector employment, for instance. They 
said that the government should have done a ‘gender impact assessment’ 
to consider the consequences of their policies for women’s jobs and pay. 
Nonetheless, the challenge was rejected, for reasons Hazel Conley para-
phrases as follows: ‘the budget was complex and needed to be done to a 
tight timetable and therefore an overview of the gender impact would 
have been difficult’.16 In other words, who in their right mind would 
bother? Later, Conley adds that
a compelling case for a judicial review seems to have been eclipsed 
by a desire to maintain political stability in the face of the economic 
crisis. Another view of the events is that the State, in the form of the 
government and the judiciary, moved to express the interests of capital 
at the expense of working women.17
In various respects the Cameron government did seek to run with the 
New Labour equalities agenda, since it is a very good way of burnishing 
progressive credentials while posing little genuine threat to the balance of 
power between labour and capital. Equalities legislation had developed 
in a relatively benign environment where voluntaristic attempts to 
prod capital towards a ‘positive duty’ on equality were quite tolerable. 
But under the Coalition’s austerity programme the range of tolerabil-
class and equality . 127
ity narrowed sharply with key provisions that emphasised the positive 
duties of employers being scrapped on the grounds that it constituted 
‘red tape’, obstructing the reduction of public expenditure.18 
It is fairly obvious why women, in particular, should be disproportion-
ately affected by public expenditure cuts. Public services are particularly 
important to women because ‘they free women from unpaid care in 
the family, provide substantial opportunities for paid caring work and 
provide safer environments for women to work and live in’.19 When 
public provision withdraws, social reproduction functions are pushed 
back into the home, on to the unpaid labour of (usually) women. The 
loss of public sector jobs and their replacement with private sector ones 
(as was Coalition policy) disadvantages women, who are more likely to 
work in caring professions.20 As Conley also points out, many services 
which provide vital lifelines to particularly vulnerable women, such as 
domestic abuse support services, suffered heavy cuts.21 Austerity has thus 
undermined women’s access to services, their incomes and job security, 
and their own personal security.22 
Austerity has also caused comparable problems for people from 
ethnic minorities. Ethnic minority groups are generally likely to be in 
lower-paid work with higher risks of in-work poverty, as well as in more 
routinised work with lower levels of control over their labour process.23 
Nabil Khattab et al. find that, while religious and ethnic minorities fared 
about the same as ‘Christian White British’ ones in terms of unem-
ployment since the 2008 recession, they did proportionately worse in 
terms of other factors, notably in income levels, part-time employment, 
and rates of overqualification.24 Discrimination against these groups is 
obviously not a new phenomenon, though it has arguably increased over 
recent decades.25 However, as I argued when discussing women’s labour 
market participation, it appears that UK legislation remains relatively 
weakly adapted to tackling these kinds of problems. The most extreme 
case of the reversal of progress in terms of equality and ‘inclusion’ 
during the austerity period is the one inflicted on disabled people. The 
welfare system’s treatment of the sick and disabled has been mentioned 
previously, has greatly intensified since 2010 and has been considered a 
violation of basic human rights by the United Nations.26
These indicators are often seen as pointing to higher rates of ‘social 
exclusion’ among these kinds of groups, a situation exacerbated by austerity 
policies which have dismantled public initiatives aimed at ‘including’ 
people from minority backgrounds, such as ‘inclusion-through-sport’ 
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schemes.27 From a Marxist perspective, there are problems with the term 
social exclusion. It generally refers to groups of people who do not have 
access to jobs, skills or community support networks. Given what I said 
earlier, it seems strange to define these kinds of people as ‘excluded’ from 
British capitalism, since the creation of a large population of people who 
do not have access to the means of supporting themselves is an integral 
feature of capitalist economies.* 
Still, there is evidently a tension in British capitalism, between the 
aspiration for so-called ‘social inclusion’ (since ‘exclusion’ can create 
labour market frictions and burdens on the welfare state) and the evident 
desire not to impose too much on capital (which has been greatly 
heightened by crisis and austerity). In this context, an extensive ideolog-
ical industry has emerged seeking to reconcile these things. This revolves 
around the concept of the ‘business case for diversity’, which has now 
become dominant in mainstream attempts to promote the interests of 
under-represented groups in the workplace. 
This ‘business case’ is the idea that equality and diversity is good, 
not necessarily as an end in itself, but because it can benefit capital. 
Networking events and conferences are built around encouraging women 
to advocate for fairer treatment on the basis that it can improve things 
for their employers, with a particular focus on how to avoid spooking the 
boss with too much equality talk.28 This may be why Harriet Harman was 
among the Blairite politicians most demonised by the right: she seemed 
like she actually wanted women’s equality for its own sake rather than 
just in pursuit of the higher goal of the M-C-M' cycle. The acceptable 
feminist icons of the day must simultaneously be capitalist icons: for 
example Sheryl Sandberg, whose advice for women focuses on ways 
of conducting oneself assertively in high-powered business situations 
rather than raising any more systematic questions about the relationship 
between labour and capital and its effect on women.29 The business case 
for diversity also has unexpected disadvantages: some clever statistician 
can always come along and demonstrate that, in certain circumstances, a 
more diverse workforce is actually a problem for business.30 
A more productive approach for advancing demographic equality is to 
think about how it relates to wider labour–capital conflicts. Equalities, 
* At the risk of seeming glib, I should add that, under capitalism, pretty much by 
deinition anyone who acts as labour is ‘socially excluded’, since they are excluded from 
owning the means of production and all the forms of power this entails.
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for instance, have become more and more central to trade union work. 
This is partly because members themselves have become more diverse, 
notably as the public sector, rather than mining and heavy industry, 
has become the spine of union membership. The highly legalistic and 
individualistic approach to equality legislation is a problem for unions 
since it creates fairly shallow ways of addressing these kinds of problems, 
avoiding any kind of collective power for labour. There is some evidence 
that a legal framework for equalities has strengthened trade unions’ hand 
in many cases, lending more gravitas to their wider attempts to negotiate 
better conditions.31 But this remains a more unreliable and limited 
model for representing labour’s interests than real collective bargaining, 
which has of course continued to decline over the same period.32 On a 
rhetorical level, it is hard to argue for unions when the ‘business case’ for 
equality is all-pervading.
But collective action on labour’s part can get at problems that are far 
beyond the scope of legalistic approaches, because they can be proactive 
and independent rather than simply following governmental rules. 
Dickens writes, with regard to gender equality, that
collective bargaining permits the needs and interests of women 
– and men – as they perceive them to be ascertained and acted on. 
Collective bargaining, resting on representative structures, provides a 
way of giving women a voice; an ability to define their own needs and 
concerns and to set their own priorities for action.33
In this sense, it would be a bad mistake for class politics to buy into the 
pejorative rhetoric around ‘identity politics’ and so forth. Trade unions 
lose their purpose if they cannot plausibly claim to represent the wider 
workforce rather than small sections of it. The perception of British 
trade unionism as a highly macho environment has not done it any good. 
Conversely, demographic equality has often been contained within limits 
that are acceptable to capital, which may explain its slow progress. If it is 
to go beyond being tolerated, and more substantive gains are to be made, 
then it requires collective action on the part of labour, actively pushing 
for better pay claims that address discrepancies, and demanding positive 
action from organisations even (or, especially) where this is inconvenient 
for capital. 
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capital and immigration
There has emerged a widespread belief in British politics that immigra-
tion is a taboo subject that is always hushed up in political discourse. This 
is manufactured. In reality, anyone in their thirties that follows the news 
will have spent their entire adult life with an almost constant stream 
of ‘debate’ about immigration being sluiced into their ears and eyes, 
generally of a highly strung and sensationalist type. But this is a useful 
fiction for people with an unhealthy fixation on the topic, because it lets 
them present themselves as the forthright slayer of sacred cows rather 
than just people who say the same irrelevant things over and over again.
Politicians, particularly those on the centre-left, have fallen for this 
gambit embarrassingly easily. Now, one of the most common sights in 
British politics is the social democratic politician declaring with faux 
self-righteousness that ‘the time has come for a frank debate around 
immigration’, or some variant thereof. Over the years, this dismal cliché 
has been perpetuated by various Labour luminaries such as Andy 
Burnham (in 2016), Yvette Cooper (in 2017), Gordon Brown (in 2010), 
and Ed Miliband, who even printed it on a mug in 2015. Of all potential 
dystopian futures that could befall the British people, one of the most 
plausible is one in which there is no news available except the sound 
of centre-left politicians calling for a ‘frank debate about immigration’, 
beamed out on a continuous loop across a desolate landscape ravaged 
by economic decline and environmental chaos. These luminaries appear 
unaware that this debate continues quite happily without them, increas-
ingly assuming an explicitly racist aspect, as (to pluck one example out 
of thin air) when one newspaper complained bitterly about how NHS 
resources had been spent trying to keep alive the children of a Nigerian 
visitor to the UK.34
In this context it has been very easy to make an anti-immigration 
argument that is rooted in the language of class; even one with slightly 
mangled Marxist overtones. There is some intuitive sense in the idea 
that migration works in favour of capital and against labour, since it 
creates a cheap and easily bullied labour supply. So, this logic continues, 
immigration is a tool of capital, just like outsourcing or union-busting. 
It is increasingly common to hear this even on the radical left now. This 
line of reasoning also fits very nicely with the superstition that nobody is 
allowed to talk about immigration, since it conjures the idea of an elite 
conspiracy. Hence the increasingly popular conflation between being 
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‘working class’ and being a right-wing nationalist – this was the starting 
point in Chapter 1.
The more pessimistic arguments about the material consequences 
of migration in Britain – that migrants deplete the supply of jobs and 
undermine wages – tend to be either inaccurate or half-truths. Migrants 
obviously increase the supply of labour but they also increase the demand 
for it, since while working they also consume products and services. 
Once the latter part of the equation is taken into account, there is little 
obvious reason why the overall effect should be negative. There is little 
evidence that migration has much of an effect on overall employment 
rates.35 With regard to wages, findings are ambiguous and do not suggest 
a strong connection on a wider societal. Stephen Nickell and Jumana 
Saleheen estimate a very slight negative impact on British wages from 
immigration, but note that this effect is extremely small overall and is 
concentrated in one particular context: low-skilled service work.36 This 
concentration at the lower end of the service sector is compounded by 
the fact that migrants tend to end up doing work of a much lower skill 
level than they are qualified for.37 The effects of immigration on ‘native’ 
wages is further dampened by the way in which recent migrants tend to 
end up doing jobs that were already being done by previous migrants 
already in the country38 – notably highly precarious and transient jobs 
like temporary seasonal work.39 Overall, the idea of a migrant-led 
collapse in British wages is unconvincing because the labour market is 
so segmented. 
This point about segmentation was illustrated by a particular furore 
concerning the sandwich chain Pret a Manger, when it emerged in 
2017 that only a very tiny proportion of the people that apply for work 
there are ‘native’ British. The reaction to this kind of story is interest-
ing, because it tends to lead to some fairly triumphalist responses from 
liberals (e.g. ‘See? I told you immigrants aren’t the problem – British 
people don’t want these jobs anyway’), which then hardens into a much 
nastier rhetoric around the supposed laziness of British youth. On the 
subject of UK applicants to Pret, one observer ponders ‘What is that 
about? These are hard jobs, potentially physically demanding. I’m not 
sure we prepare people very well. They are paid national living wage. 
We need to work on attitudes to work, that’s a challenge for employers.’
Why don’t teenagers recognise that it counts as ‘a success’ to be a 
young person who ‘[comes] to work at somewhere like Pret’?40 This 
encapsulates the mainstream prescription for British young people: 
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worried about the future? Simply lower your expectations for what you 
can get from working life. It is also a fairly transparent divide-and-rule 
tactic which capital has used on labour for centuries: saying to British 
workers ‘why don’t you work as hard as the immigrants?’ and saying to 
the immigrants ‘why don’t you work as hard as British workers?’ The end 
result is everybody working harder to the exclusive benefit of capital. 
However, focusing on these kinds of statistical debates misses a much 
more important point. I have, so far, been talking about how migration 
affects labour market competition: in other words, what consequences does 
it have for the dynamics of supply and demand? But we should know by 
now that this is the wrong question. Instead, we should ask: why should 
labour be subject to these dynamics in the first place? 
We saw earlier that ‘supply and demand’ are not natural laws with the 
same status as gravity; they are products of decisions made by capital 
(and potentially others). In Chapter 3, I argued that one of the key char-
acteristics of post-war British capitalism was the way in which collective 
bargaining and the welfare state, at least partially, took wages out of com-
petition, rendering workers less vulnerable to fluctuations in supply and 
demand. As we have seen, the decline of these kinds of mechanisms is not 
something that simply happened; it was engineered by state and capital 
over recent decades and has intensified under austerity. Research41 shows 
that even where the migrant effect on wages was at its most negative 
(−2 per cent in low-skilled service work), this pales in comparison to 
the −8 per cent impact of the financial crisis across the economy as a 
whole.42 In this sense, migrants become a personalised scapegoat (based 
on evidence which is always assumed rather than actually provided) for 
much more impersonal class imperatives.
The conflictual relationship between labour and capital needs to be 
applied to understanding migrant labour just as much as to any other 
kind, and this implies at least some form of resistance on labour’s part. 
Against the stereotype of the cowed and docile migrant under total 
control by employers, it is important to recognise how many migrant 
workers seek to escape degrading jobs, often by moving on to find better 
conditions elsewhere.43 Many of the agencies that bring migrant workers 
from countries in Central and Eastern Europe shamelessly inflate the 
prestige and value of getting a job in Britain, creating a jarring disconnect 
between migrant workers’ own sense of self-worth and the bullshit jobs 
they may end up doing.44 
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In Chapter 2 I described how Marx, in the first volume of Capital, 
made remarks about migration controls that initially seem to contrast 
with the situation today (or at least the media presentation of ‘uncon-
trolled immigration’): capitalist governments were seeking to restrict the 
movement of labour for fear of workers’ ‘mobility power’ making things 
difficult for employers. On one level this just shows that the context has 
changed, but it also illustrates how control over a person’s legal status 
in a country, and their ability to move around, is inevitably a labour–
capital issue (even if it is driven by sentimental nationalist pressures). 
The more restrictions are placed on an individual’s movement and 
access to services, the more their status is differentiated from the ‘native’ 
population, the more they come to resemble the powerless victim of 
capital evoked by the right-wing class warrior. This is why people are 
wrong to scoff at David Davis when he says that Brexit might not lead 
to overall declines in the levels of immigration: even if migration itself 
does not decline after Brexit, the power of migrant labour in relation to 
capital certainly will.45
There is a relatively simple and straightforward Marxist line on immi-
gration, which has fallen chronically out of fashion but which is no less 
true for that: labour is labour, whether conducted by ‘native’ workers or 
migrants. Anyone who acts as labour has a shared interest in standing up 
to capital and suppressing the destructive consequences of labour market 
competition. In this respect, improving the rights and earning power of 
migrant workers is clearly also good for all workers. Marx used to write 
letters to Friedrich Engels fretting about the way in which Irish migrant 
workers were seen as rivals rather than allies by English ones, facilitating 
capital’s very simple divide-and-rule tactics. 
Overcoming these divisions is, of course, much easier said than done. 
Many migrants are clustered in the more ‘precarious’ ends of the labour 
market, in which trade union representation is highly unusual. Trade 
unions themselves have often been paralysed by these kinds of questions. 
Unions continually have to navigate contradictory pressures to include 
and exclude:46 include, because every worker that does not have union 
representation is one that may be disorganising the labour market by 
undercutting union-agreed conditions; exclude, because workforces 
are easier to organise if entry to them can be restricted. Given that the 
latter course is not usually sustainable in the long term, there seems to 
be a bleak future for British trade unionism unless it can organise more 
migrant workers.
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This is very obvious in specific sectors such as construction where 
capital has, indeed, sought to use migrant labour as an industrial ‘reserve 
army’ to disorganise the labour market.47 In such cases, given that if 
migrants weren’t there employers would just find other means of disor-
ganising their workforce anyway (perhaps through subcontracting chains 
or dubious ‘self-employment’), it seems perverse to blame migrants 
themselves for this. The way to counter these problems is surely to try 
and recruit and represent those migrants themselves, even if various 
officials and members need to be persuaded of the benefits of doing so.48 
There is, of course, a bigger historical issue here for labour. The disor-
ganisation of the labour market has beaten back many of the institutional 
arrangements that enabled workers to punch above their weight. While 
many workers still have union representation and access to collective 
bargaining, these things will ultimately be harder and harder to retain 
if highly insecure and disorganised labour markets become the norm. It 
is increasingly obvious that labour cannot rely on state institutions and 
regulation to advance its interests, and it needs to start organising as a 
class, rather than as a series of segments each with differentiated access 
to rights and representation.49 This means solidarity with migrants as an 
urgent priority.
A common observation, when talking about migration, is that the 
figures regarding wages and employment rates are beside the point, and 
what actually matters is this deeper cultural malaise that comes from 
people seeing their local areas transformed. There are various academics 
now building a lucrative media profile from saying this kind of thing. 
In the right hands this is the most high-minded, and arguably the most 
persuasive, form of anti-immigrant argument. Many British towns and 
regions have suffered not simply from increased insecurity, but also from 
a weakened sense of shared purpose. Regardless of how grim the work 
itself may have been, the community ties and identities that built up 
around Britain’s heavy industry heartlands are very different to those 
that emerge when those areas shift towards an identikit service economy.
It has to be said that this sense of absent community is by no means 
limited to deprived post-industrial areas, as anyone who has lived 
in a white-collar suburb will know. Growing up, I used to watch the 
Australian soap opera Neighbours every day. Looking back, by far the 
most implausible thing about this show was not the plot twists (people 
coming back from the dead, getting divorced and remarried several times 
a year, and so on), but the fact that here was a suburban street populated 
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by people who were fairly affluent except when the plot demanded 
otherwise, in which people living in adjacent houses actually appeared to 
know and care about each other, and have some kind of meaningful role 
in each other’s lives. This is not normal. And the fact that I grew up in a 
culturally homogeneous area with very little immigration did not make 
me feel any closer to this vision (probably the reverse).
The answer to this problem is to observe that community is built 
through struggle. Standing on picket lines together during a strike is 
the best way to make people feel like they have something in common. 
Obviously, this is a kind of community that specifically excludes capi-
talists, but then the whole point of Chapter 1 was to criticise the idea 
of a harmonious social whole where ‘the economy works for everyone’. 
A good society, ultimately, has to exclude capital. And so, rather than 
restrictions on freedom of movement, rather than family values, or 
whatever else, class struggle is the true source of social cohesion. 
7T hnology
[W]hen they look up from their spreadsheets, they see automation 
high and low – robots in the operating room and behind the fast-food 
counter. They imagine self-driving cars snaking through the streets 
and Amazon drones dotting the sky, replacing millions of drivers, 
warehouse stockers, and retail workers. They observe that the capa-
bilities of machines – already formidable – continue to expand 
exponentially, while our own remain the same. And they wonder: Is 
any job truly safe?1 
This quote from The Atlantic is deliberately hyperbolic, but it leads us 
to ask the question: would it be a bad thing if the vast majority of jobs 
currently done by humans were replaced by robots?
The short answer to this is that yes, it obviously would be. It would 
(at least in the short term) lead to mass unemployment, precipitating all 
manner of social and economic problems. The longer answer forces us to 
consider why this is the case. How have human beings managed to create 
a situation in which the elimination of huge amounts of work – much 
of which is tedious, depressing or back-breaking – becomes a prospect 
to be feared rather than one to be celebrated? Enthusiasts for capitalism 
like to talk about its capacity for technological innovation. But the most 
innovative, and the strangest, thing that capitalists have achieved with 
regard to technological progress is the way they have converted it from 
an unambiguous good to a source of anxiety and social neurosis.
You would think labour-saving technological advances should be 
embraced without reservation. By reducing the amount of time spent 
working, people can have greater freedom to do things from which 
they or others may actually benefit:2 spending time with friends and 
family, pursuing things that interest them, looking after the sick or old, 
or whatever else.
It is, of course, the specific rules of capitalist economies that convert 
technological progress from a way of solving problems into a way of 
creating them. Here are two basic facts about capitalism: first, since they 
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are separated from the means of production, workers require a job in 
order to afford a decent standard of living; second, since labour is the 
source of surplus value, capitalists can only be making a profit if they 
are employing human beings. This means that the well-being of any 
capitalist society depends on technological advance remaining within 
strict limits. No human workers equals no profits (in the long run).
Intuitively we might think that surely, being able to avoid having to 
employ anybody is a dream situation for the capitalist. There would be 
no need to pay wages, thus increasing profits. But capital needs labour 
as much as vice versa. Imagine a situation in which all human needs 
and wants can be produced by machines with barely any input from 
human beings. These machines are self-sustaining and require virtually 
no maintenance. Imagine also that these machines remain, as now, 
under the control of capital (rather than under the democratic control 
of society as a whole). Various problems quickly become apparent. First, 
there is the obvious issue that, if nobody has a job, nobody can afford to 
buy the things capital wants to sell. 
But imagine that we could still retain an extensive welfare state which 
would allow people to continue buying things. In that case, there would 
appear to be an even more fundamental problem. Commodities only 
have value because work has gone into producing them. If things can 
be produced without any effort, they have no value. So capital would 
be producing things which, irrespective of their usefulness, have no 
exchange value. Even setting aside people’s ability to pay, prices would 
be on a terminal downwards trend.
What would happen in such a situation (which, for the foreseeable 
future, remains purely a fantasy)? At least two outcomes can be imagined. 
Government might have to step in on capital’s side, either using its power 
to protect artificially high prices, while presumably finding some way of 
ensuring people can continue spending. Alternatively, it may be that the 
system of producing commodities for sale in exchange for private profit 
breaks down; machines could be taken away from capitalists, and used 
to produce things that correspond to the needs and wants of society as a 
whole (communism, in other words). 
This dilemma, evidently, remains a very distant one. The prospect of 
a jobless world will likely keep getting postponed, and the technological 
progress of recent decades has not led to massive increases in unem-
ployment. As some jobs become obsolete, new ones have emerged. In 
addition, for the reasons I have just mentioned, just because an industry 
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can be radically automated, doesn’t mean it will be. In industries such 
as textiles and footwear, for instance, many companies prefer to relocate 
manufacturing operations to parts of the world where technology is 
much less developed, but where more surplus value can be extracted 
from labour.3 In such cases the search for profits slows or even reverses 
technical progress in the workplace. Meek, in his reporting on Cadbury 
plants relocating to Poland, writes:
Because workers in Poland were so much cheaper, automation took 
a step backward when production moved; the honeycombed sugar 
in Crunchie bars, which at Somerdale had been automatically cut 
with high-speed jets of oil, reverted in Poland to being cut the old 
labour-intensive way with saws.4
Despite this, it is also obvious that technology has an important effect 
on employment in Britain, as elsewhere. The likelihood of having your 
job automated out of existence is not simply related to the ostensible 
‘status’ of the job (i.e. its rates of pay and the qualifications it demands). 
There have been attempts to rank the kinds of people that are most, 
or least, likely to be replaced by robots in the near future. It is not the 
lowest-paid jobs that are most at risk (although many of the worst-paid 
jobs are among the most vulnerable, for instance the call centre worker). 
The most endangered are generally those that are highly routinised and 
executed according to standardised procedures – things like book keeping 
and many other mid-ranking administrative positions5 as well as, of 
course, much manufacturing employment. Jobs which in other respects 
are often lower paid and more insecure, such as front-line service industry 
work or cleaning jobs, require more of an intuitive human touch. They 
demand more ‘emotional labour’ – a term proposed by Arlie Hochschild 
to capture the often draining work that many service workers have to put 
in so that their outward mood comes to resemble what managers and 
customers expect, rather than how they are really feeling.6 Consequently, 
they fare better against robot competition. Nonetheless, as technology 
advances, there is no reason to assume that much less routinisable tasks 
will not also be automated.7 University staff, for instance, might render 
themselves superfluous by dispersing PowerPoint slides and recorded 
lectures to paying learners across the globe. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, when we talk about insecurity (or ‘precarity’) 
in the British labour market, we have to be somewhat careful, since 
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there is no clear evidence that contingent employment is expanding 
in the same way as it is in some other countries. The fact that capital 
is dependent on labour for profits makes the mass ejection of workers 
from the labour force highly unlikely. Just as with government policy 
and regulatory institutions, the forms of technological development that 
occur under capitalism need to be adequate to capital’s needs. In the long 
run, this means the most important forms of innovation are not so much 
those that get rid of labour, but those which enable greater control over 
it. Those which remove the technical expertise, creativity and knowledge 
from labour as far as possible and transfer it to capital.
As ever, for Marx, this process is afflicted by internal contradictions. 
As this machinery develops and becomes more oppressive, it also creates 
the potential for a very different use of technology. If the means of 
production are under workers’ control, he writes, they genuinely could 
be used to lessen the drudgery of human labour, and produce enough 
goods to support societies while abolishing the labour–capital relation-
ship. The sophistication of the machine could liberate individuals rather 
than subordinate them. 
Later, in the mid-twentieth century, the development of labour process 
theory, notably following the American Marxist Harry Braverman, 
expanded these ideas around technology.8 Braverman was concerned 
with what he saw as the ‘degradation of work’ in advanced capitalist 
societies. New technology, he argued, should be something that can 
benefit humanity greatly, but the fact that it develops under the initiative 
and control of capital means this is not the case. ‘Machinery comes 
into the world not as the servant of “humanity”, but as the instrument 
of those to whom the accumulation of capital gives the ownership of 
machines’.9 So there is a distant vision of a better way of doing things 
which seems unreachable:
An automatic system of machinery opens up the possibility of the 
true control over a highly productive factory by a relatively small corps 
of workers, provided these workers attain the level of mastery over 
the machinery offered by engineering knowledge, and providing they 
share out among themselves the routines of the operation, from the 
most technically advanced to the most routine.10
In other words, smaller groups of more highly skilled workers who 
assume control of factories, dividing stimulating and boring tasks alike 
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among themselves and who have genuine mastery over productive 
machinery. Combine this with some means of distributing the proceeds 
according to human need rather than the market, and you have, basically, 
the communist utopia. But for Braverman, one of the great problems of 
capitalism was that it prevented machinery ever being used in this way. 
Instead, Braverman argued that, deep down, capital is not really 
that interested in genuinely exciting technological progress. Certainly, 
increasing productivity and saving labour is one advantage, though a 
short-sighted one. But the true agenda was to use technology to create 
more effective labour discipline. Thus, Braverman suggested, machinery 
under capitalism led to the degradation, not the improvement, of work. 
It devalued and alienated the worker by taking their decision-making 
power and initiative away, and breaking their jobs down into simple, 
repetitive and easily quantifiable tasks (here, the paradigm is of course 
the industrial assembly line). Thus,
Machinery offers to management the opportunity to do by wholly 
mechanical means that which it had previously attempted to do by 
organisational and disciplinary means. The fact that many machines 
may be paced and controlled according to centralized decisions, and 
that these controls may thus be in the hands of management, removed 
from the site of production to the office – these technical possibil-
ities are of just as great interest to management as the fact that the 
machine multiplies the productivity of labour.11
To this end he quotes Charles Babbage, the pioneer of the mechanical 
computer: ‘one great advantage which we may derive from machinery 
is from the check which it affords against the inattention, the idleness, 
or the dishonesty of humans’.12 And so, he argues grimly, workers 
themselves regress under the influence of machines: ‘workers in each 
industry today are far less capable of operating that industry than were 
the workers of a half-century ago, and even less than those of a hundred 
years ago’.13 This is a profoundly pessimistic vision, foreseeing not just 
the degradation of work but the degradation of human capabilities.
the means of evaluation
We do not need to be quite this downbeat, but nor should we get consumed 
by false optimism. The idea of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘creative 
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industries’ as the core of British industry could easily be presented as a 
rebuttal to predictions of the kind made by Braverman. However, as I 
argued in Chapter 4, we still see the use of technology and new organisa-
tional methods as a means of, if not negating, at least controlling worker 
initiative, even in high-status jobs. I also argued that workers tend to 
resist this, so it is not that there is an ever-increasing cage of control 
encircling labour, but rather that in any job there is inevitably a tension 
between the ability of the worker to exercise their own initiative and 
the imperative for capital to control. In more ‘knowledge’-centric jobs, 
such as education, healthcare or creative industries, this may be done less 
through the implementation of assembly line-type technology, and more 
through the creation of a ‘system’ with rigidly quantified parameters and 
‘metrics’. These metrics – manifested in things like evaluation forms, 
relentless requests for ‘customer feedback’, reporting on time usage – are 
attempts to quantify things that were previously considered too difficult 
to quantify (the process of caring for someone, the process of thinking up 
a lecture or research paper, the process of developing an artistic project).
New information systems are important in this respect. Chapter 4 
discussed how the controlling possibilities of new technology extend way 
beyond the bleeped-at warehouse worker: journalists monitored at their 
desks, live musicians orchestrated by search algorithms and so on. Some 
writers have been led towards the metaphor of the ‘electronic panopticon’ 
– in other words, a system of electronic control which means workers can 
be monitored with an intensity way beyond anything an old-fashioned 
factory foreman could dream of. However, such systems are inevitably 
imperfect, since people try to find ways of resisting this control.14 
French researchers have examined the use of information systems to 
monitor workers at a consultancy firm.15 Mobile information systems, 
where workers can be updating records and communicating with 
management well outside the walls of the firm, mean that ‘management 
is no longer confined to company premises but potentially can exert 
influence anywhere, anytime, even in unexpected contexts’. In their 
study, workers were encouraged to work from home using mobile devices 
they bought themselves, so as to make the organisation more ‘agile and 
flexible’. They thus spent their own money to be able to respond to work 
obligations at any time and any place. Some of the researchers’ interview-
ees thought this was alright. One staff member, for instance, said: ‘I don’t 
regret at all to have bought personally this equipment, in the sense that it 
enables me to be more productive and satisfy my manager.’ One manager 
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rejoiced that ‘I know what consultants in my team do without seeing 
them … even if they are alone, they are never alone, we follow each other 
from a distance.’ Here is one of corporate culture’s great triumphs: the 
ability to make creepy surveillance seem like inspiring ‘work hard play 
hard’ camaraderie. 
The main casualty of this triumph was any semblance of control the 
up-and-coming management consultants might have had over their ‘free 
time’:
Our observation revealed that no one wanted to be considered a ‘weak 
link’ … so that mobile technologies were used at their maximum, even 
beyond the company’s implicit expectations … For example, some 
junior consultants used mobile information systems as ‘proof ’ to show 
their involvement with and loyalty to the company, by working at a 
distance on shared files beyond the classical workday hours to finish 
projects earlier than expected, or by showing managers they remained 
on call in the evenings and on holidays. Our observations revealed 
hidden but intense competition among consultants, which mobile 
information systems helped create and continuously reinforce through 
shared behaviours and emulation … ‘I’m working at home and I can’t 
afford not being always connected. Reactivity is an integral part of my 
job, and I don’t want people to think that I’m not working if I don’t 
reply immediately when someone sends an email or calls me’.16
In this case, in a very highly skilled and sought-after professional job, 
technology produces control just as effectively as on the assembly line. 
But rather than transferring knowledge away from the worker, it imposes 
a form of ‘connectedness’ (a modern euphemism for being perpetually at 
the beck and call of capital) which compels knowledge workers to make 
themselves open for extraction in perpetuity. 
Technology also creates new ways of exercising control over the reserve 
army of labour. I talked about this a little with regard to live musicians 
in Chapter 4, but it could equally be said of labour in more cutting-edge 
industries. Crowdsourcing the development of apps has enabled software 
companies to switch from employing salaried workers to getting their 
material from a vast ‘reserve army’ of semi-volunteers.17 The latter, while 
serving the purpose of a highly casualised labour force, are presented as 
small-scale ‘entrepreneurs’. In such cases, control over labour is delegated 
to workers themselves. They are not under surveillance, but in order to 
technology . 143
survive and keep getting work they have to impose strict self-discipline. 
They have to force themselves to learn new things continually, on their 
own time and money (as opposed to in-house training that a ‘responsible’ 
employer might provide). The apps they produce as a result then become 
a cash cow for the company.
Likewise, in the so-called ‘gig economy’, new platforms enable new 
ways of monitoring and evaluating workers where data are inputted by 
customers themselves rather than managers – such as the star ratings 
assigned to drivers on platforms like Uber, or the micro-workers operating 
on online crowdworking sites. For workers, these things have a big 
impact: the knowledge that they can be subject to continual anonymous 
judgement (and will lose work if their star rating drops) can regularly 
lead to them offering more work for less.18 As Trebor Scholz points out, 
‘platform capitalists’ tend to retain control over the data on these ranking 
systems, refusing to allow crowdworkers to use positive customer ratings 
accrued on one platform to be transferred to their records on another.19 
This is capital exercising its ownership of the ‘means of evaluation’. 
Aside from direct control over the labour process and worker sur-
veillance, there is the much broader control that comes with the worker 
knowing they are expendable. I argued in Chapter 2 that Marx does 
not accept the way in which mainstream economists invoke ‘supply and 
demand’ as natural laws with the same status as gravity. Instead, they are 
things which are constantly manipulated by capital. One of the key ways 
in which this happens is through technology. Capital’s control over the 
nature and pace of the implementation of new technology enables it to 
manipulate the industrial reserve army.
Consider here one of the most ubiquitous of modern innovations, the 
automated self-checkout. On first appearances this is a fairly standard 
example of the use of computing technology to replace the work done by a 
human. But on closer inspection this isn’t quite true, since self-checkouts 
involve the same amount of human labour as staffed checkouts do: it’s 
just that this labour is supplied for free by the customer, rather than a 
paid worker. Wages are saved, but work isn’t. As one American observer 
describes it: ‘so it’s 2011 and I’m waiting in line … I see an attorney that 
I know is on $300,000 plus. She’s swiping her own groceries and getting 
nothing for it. Not even minimum wage.’20 For the customer, time is 
rarely saved, and the ‘experience’ is no better (probably the reverse, 
due to the stripping out of human contact). But for the staff, there is 
a sense that their expendability is ratcheted up another notch, and this 
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has consequences. Evidence from Australia, for instance, suggests self-
checkout to be a significant cause of declining wages and increasing 
profits for retail firms.21 Self-checkout technology doesn’t just affect 
checkout workers, but also supervisory staff: Charles Koeber22 refers to 
the little electronic screens that you find at security checks in airports, 
among other places, where the ‘customer’ has to press a smiley or sad face 
depending on how much they enjoyed their time going through security 
(or whatever). Here, technology again outsources the job of evaluating 
and criticising front-line workers to customers.
So, despite raising the threat of unemployment and probably hindering 
new employment growth, self-checkout often does not result in signifi-
cant lay-offs, because people tend to be bumped into a different function 
rather than sacked. For one thing, they have to be constantly on guard to 
deal with the various unexpected items in bagging areas, and so on.23 In 
this sense, the front-line service job is transferred to the customer, and the 
job of supervising the new front-line service worker (i.e. the customer) is 
transferred to the old front-line service worker. Technology in this case 
is thus an aide to complicated managerial hi-jinks, with seemingly no 
purpose other than, presumably, increasing profits somehow. All of this 
suggests that technological progress in and of itself does not need to have 
negative consequences for job quality. As Gallie points out, declining job 
quality in the UK is not necessarily replicated in other countries such 
as Germany, which uses comparable technology in comparable ways.24 
The problem is not so much to do with technology per se but the British 
context: a general rise in (at least perceived) insecurity, and an increas-
ingly disciplined labour force. 
capitalism and the wasting of resources
While many worry about technology and the labour market, others are 
optimistic about technology’s capacity to save the world from the exis-
tential problem of climate change. For the most part, Marxism has been 
comparatively slow to engage with the issue of climate. It is relatively 
easy to use Marxist thought to draw some fairly glib conclusions: given 
that capitalism needs to keep expanding and consuming more resources, 
and given that we have already seen the weakness of governments to 
interfere in this process, we might surmise that capitalism dooms the 
world to climate disaster. 
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Jason Moore coins the term ‘capitalocene’ as a twist on the trendy 
(in academic circles) ‘anthropocene’.25 The latter term is intended to 
indicate that we have now entered a period of history in which human 
activity, rather than anything out of our control – such as continental 
drifts or colliding asteroids – exerts a decisive influence on the world’s 
climate. Moore does not like this term because it imposes a vague 
collective responsibility on all humans, whereas in fact fossil fuel con-
sumption is overwhelmingly conducted by the world’s elite businesses. 
So the ‘anthropocene’, from a Marxist perspective, is a bit of a sick joke, 
since it implies guilt shared across an entire species when in fact the vast 
majority of that species are completely shut out from any say over how 
fossil fuels are used and consumed. 
It is usually assumed that action on climate change can only function if 
it is conducted ‘at the international level’. This is, evidently, because there 
is no incentive for individual countries to regulate over issues like carbon 
emissions on their own, especially in the ‘competition state’ described 
in Chapter 4. Because international cooperation weakens the pressures 
on states to compete by slashing environmental regulations or strength-
ening labour discipline, it is worrying to capital.26 But the problem is 
that, precisely because of these competitive pressures acting on states, 
it is dubious to what extent a proper ‘international level’ actually exists. 
Any international institution is a product of its constituent parts, i.e. 
national-level governments, and the urgent need for national govern-
ments to push the agendas that will best benefit capital accumulation in 
their particular territories presents powerful obstacles to genuine trans-
national cooperation. The ‘structural power of capital’ inclines national 
governments to compete, not cooperate.27 
Consequently (particularly following the US’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement), there is pessimism about the prospects of governments 
intervening effectively around climate change. Some have responded 
with wishful thinking about the prospects of ‘new’ forms of ‘socially 
responsible’ capitalism emerging. This kind of thing usually involves 
a seemingly bottomless faith in ‘the market’ and the supposed human 
ingenuity it conjures: why not just rely on capitalists’ desire for profit to 
prompt them to invent some new commodity that can solve the problem 
of climate change?28 In this sense, the world being saved depends on the 
brilliant whims of telegenic entrepreneurs like Elon Musk. Maybe some 
form of new technology will be invented that saves the world from these 
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terrible problems, without us having to make any significant changes to 
our economic system.
In Marxist terms, there is little value in speculating about the transfor-
mative power of technology unless we also consider how this technology 
may affect the kind of social and economic structures we have (and vice 
versa). This is difficult to do. Steven Shaviro, for instance, has criticised 
science fiction authors for the way they have imagined ‘post-Singularity’ 
worlds29 – in other words, worlds where technology has progressed to 
such an extent that human existence is totally transformed and all needs 
can be fulfilled more or less instantly. He notices that many authors 
that write about this sort of thing seem unable to imagine how this 
might actually affect human society, and tend to assume that various 
things – ‘private property, capital accumulation, branding and advertis-
ing, stringent copyright enforcement and, above all “business models”’ 
– would largely still exist in the same forms as they do today. The point 
here is that just as it is strange to imagine technological change without 
considering how that effects society, it is equally bizarre to suppose that 
technology alone can save the world from ecological disaster without 
corresponding changes to the way society is organised. 
This obsession with technological change as the main motor of human 
advancement, has, for some people, become a ridiculous and pitiful cult. 
Consider the following account of an Apple product launch, which illus-
trates the perfect intersection between smoke-and-mirrors bullshit and 
hard-line control freakery on the part of capital:
[Steve] Jobs’s demonstration of the new phone … was a tremendous 
piece of salesmanship. It’s all the more impressive in retrospect, 
because we now know that the iPhone was nowhere near ready. The 
music player had a tendency to conk out mid-song, the battery died at 
random, it would let a user send an email and surf the net in that order 
but the reverse sequence would crash it. Phone reception was a weak 
point (it still is) so AT&T set up a special tower to boost the signal; 
also the phone Jobs used on stage was rigged to display five full bars of 
signal at all times. He had done what seemed like a hundred rehearsals 
and things kept going wrong. During this process he was, according 
to one of the engineers present, relatively restrained. ‘Mostly he just 
looked at you and very directly said in a very loud and stern voice, “you 
are fucking up my company” or “if we fail, it will be because of you”’.30
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All this bullshit for what is essentially a slightly zazzed-up mobile phone. 
As David Graeber points out, it is hardly the flying cars and robots with 
laser eyes that sci-fi writers from the 1950s liked to imagine we’d have by 
now.31 There is a significant gap between the kind of technological revo-
lutions capitalists praise themselves for, and the actual extent of progress 
that capitalism as a system can tolerate. 
8Media and Ideology
common sense
It has become an accepted cliché on the radical left that people find it 
easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than to imagine the end of 
capitalism. Frightening predictions about climate change and its con-
sequences are by now familiar, to the extent that many people would 
not be particularly surprised if a visitor from the future were to appear 
and tell them that the earth had become an uninhabitable wasteland. 
On the other hand, the mantra when it comes to our economic and 
political system has, for several decades now, been the relentless dirge 
of ‘There Is No Alternative’. As things stand, the prospect of environ-
mental catastrophe is probably a less remote one than the prospect of a 
different kind of economy. 
When I talked about Marxist views on government in Chapter 5, I 
referred to ‘common sense’. This is a highly loaded term which has been 
used very intelligently on the political right. It is most commonly used to 
express the idea that there is an intuitive wisdom possessed by ordinary 
people (or ‘real people’) that can get to the truth of the matter in ways 
that rarefied expertise cannot. This of course brings us back to Michael 
Gove and his experts. Nobody wants to feel like they don’t have common 
sense, and so it becomes very easy to use the term to flatter potential 
voters, readers or social media followers. 
This kind of language, in its own way, has an obvious ‘class’ element 
to it since it is ostensibly an anti-elite discourse. The fact that many of 
its main figureheads (Michael Gove, Nigel Farage, Donald Trump, etc.) 
are themselves elites is not particularly relevant here, and is almost an 
advantage; they are the insiders who are revealing to the outsiders how 
corrupt the world really is. It is a highly effective line of argument which 
has proved very convenient for conservatives because of various looming 
issues (most obviously climate change) where formal and technical 
expertise is very much weighted against their arguments. As such, it has 
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been very expedient to play on the idea of common sense as a legitimate 
alternative to actual sense. 
On one level, the idea of common sense is useful for political oppor-
tunists looking for a nice way of fobbing off unhelpful evidence, from 
whatever perspective. But there are deeper reasons why the idea of 
common sense has been so much more effectively wielded in conser-
vative hands in recent decades. Most left projects tend to be about 
disrupting established hierarchies and the proactive creation of a more 
equal society, which may appear to conflict with the ‘natural order’ of 
things. For example, very few people actually like the idea that the rich 
can buy much better access to essential services such as health and 
education, but this has been so obviously the case for such a long time 
that it seems strange to think you can change it. While many people may 
be sympathetic to the objective, common sense dictates that these things 
are basically inevitable and therefore it is utopian meddling to make too 
much of a fuss about it. 
As we saw previously, writers such as Ralph Miliband saw common 
sense as a set of assumptions about the way things are and must always 
be, like it or not. He also observed that the nature of these assumptions 
takes a particular form which is, of course, adequate to capital ’s needs. For 
instance, for Miliband it is an unshakeable article of common sense that 
what is good for business is basically good for society. People are not 
necessarily expected to be enthused about the business world, and in fact 
many find great enjoyment in ridiculing those who appear to take it too 
seriously, as the success of TV freak shows like The Apprentice indicates. 
However, there is also a widespread assumption that people should not 
do things that unduly upset ‘business’, however much one might like to. 
But, of course, various caveats are required here. Brexit was one sign 
that this form of common sense is losing some traction, given that at the 
time of the vote it was widely supposed that it would be bad for business 
(and maybe this perception even encouraged many Brexit supporters). 
In this respect, the unfortunate fact is that the nationalist right has often 
done a far better job of playing on people’s desire to break out of this way 
of thinking than the left.
Nonetheless, the point remains. The mainstream political right, which 
has dominated British politics for most of the time since the 1970s, 
has been successful because it recognises that it doesn’t actually need 
to enthuse people about the pro-capital policies it has pursued. The 
important thing is to tell people what is unrealistic and utopian; common 
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sense is defined by the ‘limitations it imposes upon our collective imag-
ination’.1 You might want policies that support labour’s interests against 
those of capital, and that’s fine, but in an economy which is entirely 
dependent on capital’s ability to make and reinvest profits, these are 
basically off-limits. 
So the true enemy of this kind of common sense is not so much the 
‘expert’ per se (this is a fairly recent development) but the more demo-
cratic figure of the meddler. Because common sense is about defining 
what is off-limits, most invocations of it need to be directed against some 
individual or group that is tinkering too much with things beyond these 
limits, often in a utopian quest to further the cause of equality. Through-
out much of the 1990 and 2000s, it appeared that large segments of the 
newspaper industry were entirely based on stories which played on one 
particular juxtaposition: between good old British (i.e. English) tradi-
tions on the one hand, and the meddling Politically Correct Brigade, 
who were always trying to ban things so as to further the cause of various 
disadvantaged groups. It’s all very well, so the argument went, wanting 
to create more equality, but actually to interfere with anything that 
currently exists in order to do so violates principles of common sense. 
As a consequence, in various influential papers there has been a 
constant series of stories about how these people wanted to ban a long 
list of treasured cultural hallmarks such as Baa Baa Black Sheep, Thomas 
the Tank Engine, James Bond, piggy banks and Christmas. One might 
comment that, as of 2017, all these things apparently continue to exist. 
But this is somewhat missing the point: through the sheer volume of 
bullshit, there has emerged a widespread sense of a profound tension 
between the common sense possessed by the normal ‘man or woman on 
the street’ and efforts to include disadvantaged groups more in public 
life. This argument has fermented into the darker and more explicitly 
racist and misogynistic language which currently occupies a prominent 
place in the politics of Britain, Europe, America and elsewhere. 
the news media
This idea of politically correct meddlers violating common sense has 
become grimly ironic when applied to Britain’s most important news 
source, the BBC.* Looking at its role tells us a lot about ideology in 
* I realise that in talking about this I am inevitably going to be in the shadow of Tom 
Mills’s excellent book, he BBC: Myth of a Public Service.
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Britain and its relationship to capital. The BBC has long been carica-
tured on the right as an archetypal meddler, when in fact it is impeccably 
in tune with the common sense of the day when it comes to economic 
and political reporting. The proposition that the BBC is biased to the left 
has become forcibly established as fact in many quarters through sheer 
weight of hearsay, often centring on the somewhat implausible claim 
that anti-immigrant voices receive no BBC airtime.2 Indeed, right-wing 
researchers have attempted to ‘prove’ this bias by showing how the news 
stories featured on the BBC website tend to overlap more with those 
covered at the (liberal) Guardian than at the (conservative) Telegraph.3 
The possibility that this may say more about the oddities who inhabit 
the Telegraph’s comment pages than it does about the BBC apparently 
does not occur to them. 
There is a fairly banal ‘centrist’ defence of the BBC against these kinds 
of attacks, which goes roughly as follows: ‘the right claims the BBC is 
biased to the left, but the left claims it is biased to the right. Therefore 
it must be doing its job.’ The problem with this argument is, first, that 
it assumes there must be equal merit in both sides of an argument, as if 
it is biased to give greater airtime to people who believe in the existence 
of climate change than to people who don’t. But the bigger issue is more 
complex than the kind of editorial inflection the BBC might convey on 
a given topic, or whether its interviewers are ruder to Labour or Con-
servative politicians. 
More important is the fact that the BBC typically puts itself firmly in 
line with common sense in Ralph Miliband’s sense: its belief in the unity 
of business and national interests. While, on any given issue, the BBC 
may scrupulously present different sides of an issue, there is an under-
pinning assumption that is rarely, if ever, properly questioned – that the 
happiness of private business is a necessary condition for the ‘economy 
that works for everyone’.
This assumption is most obviously manifested in its coverage of 
business issues. In the numerous ‘business segments’ strewn throughout 
BBC news output, business figures are typically presented as insider 
experts on the economy. They are practitioners who can give us insight 
into whether the economy is doing well or not, or whether a particular 
policy or development is going to be helpful. By contrast, voices repre-
senting labour (mostly trade unions) are more likely to be interviewed 
in the same way as a politician would be, i.e. using the oppositional 
approach that BBC interviewers have made their trademark. This is not 
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necessarily conscious bias; it’s just the assumption that the interests of 
British capital are identical with the national interest, and that anyone 
disrupting the interests of capital had better have a good reason for doing 
so. They probably sincerely believe this, and hence it is not surprising 
that business voices, particularly those from the City, are given such a 
privileged platform as talking heads in BBC news programmes.4 These 
are the voices that are assumed to matter most.
Our particular interest here, of course, is what happens in the case of 
overt conflict between capital and labour, such as strikes. In the event of 
a strike, we can expect the BBC to present ‘both’ sides (though there are 
generally more than two), by interviewing figures from management and 
union camps. But strikes are often very complicated issues with long and 
highly specific histories in that workplace, and it may simply be that the 
BBC lacks the expertise to cover them in much depth. Under John Birt, 
the BBC began systematically ditching actual industrial correspondents 
(i.e. journalists trained to report at the coalface of workplace relations) 
in favour of business correspondents who depend on their ability to 
schmooze corporate spokespeople.5 This is particularly worrisome in 
strike reporting because invariably, in the case of a strike which inconve-
niences the public, the easiest thing to do is blame the union (since they 
were the one that actually took the decision to call it). It is only when 
we look much deeper into cases that we begin to understand workers’ 
grievances and the provocative actions of management, and hence begin 
to comprehend, even sympathise with, the case for the strike. The BBC 
does not set out to be biased against strikers but it usually lacks the 
wherewithal to present their case properly. 
This is obviously not a criticism solely of the BBC. In the 1970s, Paul 
Hartmann found that strikes tended to be presented by the vast majority 
of news sources as resulting directly from the decisions of unions6 – a 
starting assumption from which the rights or wrongs of those decisions 
could be debated in an ‘unbiased’ way. But this is wrong because the 
actions of managers may well initiate or escalate conflicts that end up 
in a strike, but are much less likely to be reported. The ascendancy 
of ‘business’ news (rather than, say, industrial or employment news) 
compounds this attitude. No matter how politely treated an interviewee 
representing strikers may be, they are inevitably asked to justify their 
disruption of the economy.*
* And the reporter’s sympathy instinctively tends to be with management, since this is 
where their contacts come from.
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Similar remarks can be made regarding the BBC’s wider economic 
reporting, particularly over austerity. It does, of course, try to give 
pro-austerity politicians just as hard a time as anti-austerity ones. 
Moreover, it sometimes reports powerfully on the consequences of 
public spending cuts. Nonetheless, there remains an overall reliance on 
business voices for expert opinion on economic policy, cementing their 
position as neutral and technocratic insiders capable of making objective 
pronouncements free from class interest.7 As with industrial disputes, 
economics and financial journalists often do not understand the internal 
workings of the system as well as their business contributors do, resulting 
in a deferential attitude even in the midst of a crisis.8 
Consequently, most news sources, including those like the BBC which 
are supposed to know better, generally fail to get beyond the most simple 
narrative about recent economic policy; what the Keynesian economist 
Simon Wren-Lewis calls ‘mediamacro’: ‘the previous government 
messed up: they spent too much, and it left the UK economy on the 
brink of financial meltdown’.9 As with reporting on strikes, this becomes 
the ‘common sense’ line because it is the most readily understandable 
one; putting labour’s case requires more research and more empathy than 
putting capital’s. The BBC’s self-conscious agonising about the endless 
accusations of ‘left-wing bias’ have probably pushed it into much harder 
stances which combine with the uglier prejudices of the age, notably its 
repeated representation of the situations of benefits recipients in order 
to push a ‘welfare state in crisis’ narrative.10 
marxist views on ideology
In Marxist writing, the topic of ideology has often been brought in 
as a post hoc explanation for failure. Since Marx predicted that labour 
would eventually overthrow capital, we need a story for why this hasn’t 
happened, which discussion of ideology provides. In The German 
Ideology, Marx argues that the ideas that are conducive to the interests of 
the ‘ruling class’ (i.e. capital) tend to prevail more widely across society, 
to the extent that people struggle to see beyond them. 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the 
class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time 
its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means 
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of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.
In other words, capital exerts a disproportionate influence over what 
people think and what ideas are acceptable in capitalist societies, and it 
can do this for a fairly straightforward reason. Because, just as it controls 
the means of (commodity) production, it also controls the ‘means of 
mental production’. Entertainment and cultural industries, the news 
media and so on. 
For later Marxists, such as the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, 
the situation was more complex than this, although inevitably capitalist 
ideas still tended to dominate. Gramsci argued that the stability of 
capitalism was only partly dependent on brutal force (recall he was 
writing in a time and place – Italy under Mussolini – where Marxist 
thought was indeed being actively suppressed through violence) but also 
on consent. Ruling elites are often highly skilled at winning consent for 
their policies. Gramsci suggested that they tended to use emotionally 
resonant ideas to create a sense of community and, consequently, shared 
interest that transcended class boundaries. 
Religion is very good at this, providing a historically reliable way of 
getting people from the poorest to the richest backgrounds to believe 
that they are basically on the same side. But this could be about much 
more trivial things. People on the left, for instance, get angry about how 
Nigel Farage is able to present himself as a man of the people despite his 
privileged background and personal wealth, simply by being repeatedly 
photographed drinking beer in pubs. But the idea of drinking beer in 
pubs has a culturally resonant status as part of many British people’s 
self-identity, so anyone who appears to be at home when doing so has 
a head start in creating the impression of relatability. A lot of bubbling 
tensions around national culture and identity are encapsulated in a trivial 
but resonant image. Obviously not everyone falls for this, but enough do 
to bestow political influence; that is ideology at work.
Later on, as capitalism’s position in the West became stronger, Marxist 
thought around consent becomes more extensive and complex. Indeed, 
for Marx-influenced academics such as those of the Frankfurt School, 
this question became far more interesting than the question of power 
relations in the realm of production (which, after all, is supposed to be 
the root of exploitation in capitalist systems). The result of this current 
of thought was a particularly extensive critique of consumerism as the 
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most effective means of ensuring people’s loyalty to capitalist systems. 
For Theodor Adorno, consumer society basically acted like the Matrix: 
by buying things, people believe they are cultivating a fulfilling individual 
identity, when in fact, he argued, their individuality is being stamped out 
by the capitalist machine. 
Adorno’s main target in this respect was popular culture, and particu-
larly popular music, which he hated (he himself had studied composition 
under the twelve-tone serialist composer Arnold Schoenberg). Popular 
music, he argued, provided the illusion of individuality; you might think 
that listening exclusively to Deicide and Morbid Angel puts you outside 
of mainstream society into some form of rebellious counter-culture, 
but basically you are still buying carefully marketed commodities like 
everyone else, just with different packaging. He believed that popular 
music was repetitive and formulaic: song structures were highly stan-
dardised, the melodies and chord progressions drawn from the same 
simple harmonic palette, the rhythms were based on simple repetitions 
(they’d have to be, otherwise you couldn’t dance to them). In other words, 
it could largely be churned out as if in a Taylorised factory according to 
a standardised template, when true individual expression had to escape 
from these formulas. He applied this across the entirety of popular music 
with an admirable lack of nuance, including (notoriously) to jazz, whose 
improvisatory elements he saw as a fig-leaf for this standardisation. 
Because of this it is quite easy to lampoon Adorno today, as a 
pompous advocate of dry avant-garde music that nobody actually enjoys 
listening to. It is a profoundly unfashionable argument, in any case, 
given that culture journalists nowadays often appear to be in thrall to 
their childhood obsessions with punk or disco and don’t like the idea 
of someone disdaining them for these attachments. However, perhaps 
people are also scornful of the elitist Adorno because the things that 
he hated have now become so commonplace. For instance, we could 
observe the increasing reliance on gift vouchers as a present for friends 
and relations, or the growing popularity of wedding lists. These kinds 
of consumer innovations enable a gift-giver to meet their social obli-
gations, without having the inconvenience of acquiring any meaningful 
knowledge about the other person’s personality, or any understanding of 
the kinds of things they enjoy. Adorno said that such innovations reflect 
the ‘decay of giving … based on the assumption that one does not know 
what to give because one really does not want to. This merchandise is 
unrelated like its buyers.’11 
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He had particular disdain for ‘connoisseurs’ – people who define 
themselves as experts in particular areas of popular culture. Such people 
were trying to buy their way to individuality through amassing large 
record collections. He directed his ire towards ‘jitterbugs’ – a word used 
to describe people who were very into dancing to the mainstream jazz 
music of the 1930s and 1940s. For Adorno, these were
the enthusiasts who write fan letters to radio stations and orchestras 
and, at well-managed jazz festivals, produce their own enthusiasm as 
an advertisement for the wares they consume. They call themselves 
jitterbugs, as if they simultaneously wanted to affirm and mock their 
loss of individuality, their transformation into beetles whirring around 
in fascination. Their only excuse is that the term jitterbug, like all 
those in the unreal edifice of films and jazz, is hammered into them 
by the entrepreneurs who make them think that they are on the inside. 
Their ecstasy is without content.12
This is cynical but quite prescient. Adorno’s ‘connoisseur’ has various 
manifestations today. Consider ‘geek culture’, which has become a 
massively profitable industry. When I was growing up the word ‘geek’ 
was a mild insult aimed at unfashionable people who liked to play board 
and/or computer games, whereas now it is a ready-made consumer 
identity that people can advertise their membership of by buying Big 
Bang Theory merchandise. 
Why talk so much about Adorno and the (quasi-)Marxist critique 
of consumerism here? It is not news that consumerism has been highly 
effective in helping capitalism win people’s support, but it is interesting 
because it says something about the role of the individual in society. 
According to Adorno, the consumer’s relationship to society is basically 
a passive one. The consumer, however ‘discerning’, does not really think 
for themselves and instead latches on to standardised templates designed 
by business. This seems unduly harsh and massively overgeneralised, but 
there is an important insight here that needs to be picked out. For capital, 
human beings are best when they have this passivity, in all the different 
aspects of their identity. As a consumer who follows capitalist sugges-
tions on what kind of goods they want. As a ‘citizen’ who votes once 
every five years but then minds their own business and forgets about 
politics. As a worker who does what they are told by their boss and has 
no interest in joining a union. Unfortunately for capital, people are rarely 
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like this, but Adorno’s philosophy suggests that consumer culture is one 
means of pushing them at least a bit further in that direction.
According to the French philosopher Alain Badiou, another thing 
encouraging people to be passive is a widespread sense of political 
scepticism, which he sees as the guiding spirit of our age.13 In other 
words, he argues, there is a mistrust of ideologically driven change 
in politics which presents itself as robust realism but which actually 
becomes a quite a self-indulgent philosophy that celebrates laziness: 
the sceptic worldview has, in effect, led to a pragmatic rallying to the 
situation as it is at the moment. I would even say: to the satisfaction 
that we find, in this situation, of not having to raise a little finger 
for an idea. Scepticism is also the blessed possibility, and even the 
supreme justification, of only occupying oneself with oneself, since 
nothing can change in the world as it is.14
This is a relatively controversial set of ideas, not least because it could 
be interpreted as a bit bullying. Maybe people are happy getting on with 
their own lives and don’t want to spend their evenings pursuing utopian 
political projects. Maybe they like going out and buying things, and 
certain philosophers are just being jerks by telling them they shouldn’t. 
Maybe, therefore, people like Badiou are simply putting a more radical 
veneer on the idea of the PC meddler who won’t let everyone else get 
on with their lives. Furthermore, while Badiou might well say this about 
France, which in 2017 handed unprecedented power to someone who 
celebrates his own vacuous centrism, what about Britain, where ideolog-
ical conflict appears to be sharpening again? In the rest of this chapter 
I will look at three different forms of human activity – being a citizen, 
being a worker and being a consumer – and consider some ways in which 
this kind of Marxist philosophising may have a point on the issue of 
passivity and scepticism. 
Voting
I have already talked about government in capitalist societies, suggest-
ing that it is wrong to see them as neutral arbiters between different 
interest groups, and instead suggesting that they tend to further capital’s 
interests at the expense of labour’s. Someone could draw a fairly extreme 
conclusion from this: i.e. that there is very little point in voting at all, 
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since in a general election you are choosing between a selection of parties 
that ultimately will not be able to act in labour’s interest (even if they 
wanted to). 
This is, indeed, the argument of some Marxists, including Badiou. In 
his Meaning of Sarkozy, Badiou describes gently mocking the students 
who arrived despondent at one of his seminars the day after the right-wing 
Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidential elections in 2007. Why 
bother getting upset, he wonders, about such a fraudulent process? In 
this sense, he concurs with the old anarchist slogan, frequently found as 
lamp-post graffiti in university cities: ‘if voting changed anything they’d 
ban it’.
There are some problems with this argument. First of all, politicians 
have indeed tried to ban voting, and continue to do so, at least for certain 
kinds of people. If the slogan was completely correct, they presumably 
would not bother. In the United States, for instance, Republican-
controlled state authorities have been fairly open and unembarrassed 
about their desire to prevent certain demographics (mainly black people 
and poor people) from voting (because they assume they will vote 
Democrat). Conservative governments in Britain may be interested in 
doing something similar, albeit with students.15
Badiou might, admittedly, scoff at this objection, saying that political 
parties competing for votes is more to do with the internecine squabbling 
over who gets to act on behalf of capital, than proper change. Even if 
the Republicans in a given state lose because they can’t exclude enough 
Democrat voters, does this actually pose any kind of threat to capital? 
Following Chapter 5, we might concede that he has a point. Certainly, 
unexpected electoral events might throw things off balance. Brexit, or 
the 2017 UK general election, for instance. But despite the turbulence 
these kinds of awkward democratic intrusions cause in the short term, 
capital is very good at reacting to them, and manoeuvring to get the 
situation back to ‘stability’ again (i.e. enabling things to continue on 
its terms). When Syriza was elected in Greece, the forces of European 
capital closed around them to enforce a suffocating austerity people had 
supposedly voted against. If Jeremy Corbyn were to be elected in the 
UK, we would expect a similar move. 
But certainly in this country, the kind of voting-sceptic argument 
Badiou makes is clearly out of fashion, for the obvious reason that the 
radical left has taken control of the Labour Party. There is a growing 
sense that there is more genuine choice on offer at the present moment. 
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We might reasonably speculate that, should the Labour Party under 
Corbyn get elected, it would be forced to tone down the radical elements 
of their agenda significantly, but we still need to pay attention to what is 
happening now, with Labour apparently assuming a considerably more 
leftist stance. It is true that this growth owes much to the unexpect-
edly high turnout in the 2017 election, particularly (but not exclusively) 
among younger people. The constructive Marxist response to this devel-
opment is, first, to celebrate the huge boost the left in this country has 
received as a result of high voting turnout in the election, while also 
recognising the vast obstacles that would confront Corbyn’s Labour if 
they were ever to be given a majority in Parliament.
Second, it is also important to note what the enemy is doing at the 
same time – and this is where we get back to the issue of passivity. It is 
interesting to consider the way the concept of voting has been presented 
in media sources. Until 2017, there had been a protracted decline in 
voter turnout, particularly among the young. People who are wedded to 
the status quo worry about this sort of trend: it raises genuine concerns 
about the state of civic participation, but it also makes government 
insecure about their own legitimacy (which is tarnished if only a small 
number of people bother to take part in the process that gave them 
their jobs). 
Over recent electoral cycles, the response from many quarters was to 
try to cajole people into voting. Particularly on social media, there has 
been an escalating glorification of the act of voting itself, as if someone 
deserves a medal just for doing so – ‘It doesn’t matter who you vote for, 
just make sure you vote!’ being a common slogan. There is a prolifera-
tion of Facebook or Twitter badges users can attach to advertise the fact 
that they have voted. Generally these symbols do not reveal for whom 
the user voted; the implication is that they deserve equal recognition 
whether it was for Labour, Conservatives, the Green Party or the British 
National Party. Some cynical economists argue that many people are 
now voting primarily in order to be able to tell others that they have 
done so.16 
This kind of empty back-patting is the sickly political equivalent of 
the ‘economy that works for everyone’ mantra. Whatever choices you 
express, you should be happy to take part in this great democratic process 
where we all come together to find a consensus while respecting each 
other’s opinions. Badiou is justified in attacking the emptiness of this 
idea, which explicitly chooses to celebrate some overarching number (i.e. 
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turnout) rather than examine the conflicting interests, values or ideas it 
conceals. And it is, essentially, passive. People like to say: ‘if you didn’t 
vote, you can’t complain’. In other words, occasional elections are your 
only moment to express your view: the rest of the time, make sure you 
shut up and don’t moan. If everyone just patted themselves on the back 
simply for voting and considered that their civic duty done for the year, 
without ever getting involved in a union or other kind of campaign, then 
capital would always have everything its own way.
Worse still, as Badiou argues, the result of an election generally gives 
an entirely unwarranted and fatuous sense of decisiveness. He talks 
about this attitude in relation to France: ‘“The French have decided … ” 
says the right-minded press. They have not decided anything at all, and 
moreover, this collective – the French – lacks any existence. Why on 
earth should 51 per cent of French people be “the French”?’ Anyone dis-
illusioned by the way a 52 per cent vote for Brexit has been interpreted as 
‘the will of the British people’ must surely agree that he has a point here. 
But things change. Many of the people who were worried about low 
turnout are currently performing screeching U-turns. Whatever the 
problems with the celebration of voting as an end in itself, once it became 
obvious that getting more (young) people to vote was an important 
strategic objective for the left, many people who had once celebrated 
civic participation were now not so keen. A Times columnist writes:
Last week’s election revealed the judgement of many young voters 
to be as we might expect of those with relatively limited experience: 
hopelessly naïve. They turned out in their droves for a man who 
became a kind of millenials’ prophet: promising to lead them out of 
the Badlands of austerity and towards a future where everything is 
nicer, cheaper, or indeed free. They have voted for a man who would 
have endangered our economy, the whisper of whose name can send 
the pound on a swan-dive … It has been suggested that the great 
turnout of the youth vote is an argument for lowering the voting age 
to 16. Given who they voted for en masse, I would say it’s an argument 
for raising it to at least 21.17
A Spectator commentator describes youthful Corbyn supporters as ‘the 
Middle Britain of tomorrow, entitled millennials who can correctly 
identify the gender pronoun of each Kardashian but think the IRA 
[Irish Republican Army] were a rough-around-the-edges Amnesty 
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International’.18 And The Sun, in a sort of ‘joking-but-not-joking’ kind 
of way, prints cut-out guides for right-wing middle-aged people on ‘how 
to keep your children from voting’.19
There is a lot more where this comes from. When Russell Brand 
– very much the English Alain Badiou – came out as a non-voter in 
2015 he was excoriated as having forfeited his right to play any part in 
reasonable political discussion. When he started encouraging people to 
vote for Corbyn, he no doubt found that the same people hate him even 
more. Generally, I would suggest the following hypothesis: the more 
upset right-wing columnists get about people turning out to vote, the 
more likely the vote in question is to precipitate meaningful change, and 
the more angry capital will get about the result.
Working
They can laugh, they’re no better than me. Just ’cause they’re reps who 
like being reps, and I’m a rep who wants to be something else.
David Brent, in David Brent: Life on the Road
Glorifying ‘participation’ via voting as an end in itself reclassifies people 
who feel alienated from the British political process as self-exiled 
outsiders who can have ‘no right to complain’. When the topic of work is 
discussed in Britain, something similar happens, with a strong tendency 
to distinguish between those who ‘contribute’ and those who do not. I 
have already argued that this is a completely bogus distinction in the 
vast majority of cases, since, as Marx puts it, the ‘reserve army’ of those 
outside paid employment ‘belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the 
latter had bred it at its own cost’. The reasons for this were explained in 
Chapter 2. 
Evidently, Marxist philosophy has a very high regard for the idea of 
work. It suggests that the capacity to design and create things freely is 
a defining human characteristic, and an important source of individual 
fulfilment. However, it is important to stress that work is very different 
from a job. The former could include unremunerated things people do 
for their own satisfaction, or else out of care for others, whereas the 
latter is specifically something people do in order to get a wage. For 
Marxists, one of the most fundamental problems of capitalist economies 
is their twisting of the idea of work into the idea of the job; rather than 
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being a source of creative reward for individuals, it becomes something 
routinised, controlled, boring and alienating. 
In Britain today, it is fairly common to find a masochistic obsession 
with jobs, and whether or not people have them. It is unusual to find 
critical discussion of what jobs are actually like in the national media: 
the assumption is that higher employment rates are good in themselves. 
Increasingly, there is severe moral judgement passed on people that do 
not have jobs, as evidenced by hardening attitudes towards unemployed 
people in recent years.20 Many British people today revel masochistically 
in the latter alternative. For ‘just vote!’ we can also substitute ‘just work!’ 
Don’t talk about what jobs are actually like, just obsess over how many 
people have one.
For a long time, the attitude of politicians on the centre-left has mas-
queraded as ‘realism’: political parties like Labour have to mirror this 
attitude to be in sync with voters (recall the Rachel Reeves quotes in 
Chapter 1). The problem here is that this interprets ‘public opinion’ as an 
independent force of nature which moves according to its own laws and 
to which anyone purporting to lead needs to attune themselves. But this 
public opinion shift has been propelled by politicians and various media 
sources which have worked very hard to strengthen pejorative attitudes 
towards those out of work. The British media, by international standards, 
is highly reliant on negative stereotyping of the poor,21 especially in its 
prurient and unhealthy spotlighting of the sick and disabled.22 Hence 
the other problem with following public opinion: public opinion is 
often heavily influenced by inaccurate information, particularly so in the 
benefits system. People routinely and ‘wildly’ overestimate the levels of 
benefits many people receive, as well as how benefits compare to sources 
such as pensions, and the proportion of benefits that are claimed fraud-
ulently.23 As such, this is an unconventional form of political ‘realism’: to 
be realistic, political leaders need to ensure that their positions match the 
logical conclusions that can be drawn from obvious falsehoods. 
One of the most important consequences of a fixation with whether 
or not people have jobs is that it largely nixes any discussion of the actual 
content and quality of them. As such, it is a highly convenient ideolog-
ical buttress for the modern British labour market, which is recurrently 
labelled a ‘success’ by people who only look at employment rates. The 
moral judgement directed towards people who don’t have jobs can be 
quite ghoulish: for instance, in the monstering of a woman who spent 
some of her welfare money on Prosecco at Christmas time.24 Such stories 
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epitomise a sweaty newspaper obsession with evaluating the way (usually 
female) welfare recipients use money, drawing on all the moral certainty 
of a medieval witch-finder. 
This moralising about unemployed people borders on the unhinged. 
Daytime TV shows will dedicate entire episodes to parading jobless 
individuals in front of an audience for judgement, usually with the hook 
that they have some disreputable reason for their lack of work, such as 
their weight, the number of children they have or (worst of all) because 
they want to pursue an interest they actually enjoy (stonerish musicians 
are a good choice here). Inevitably there is another guest or audience 
member who, let’s say, is equally overweight but who does have a job, and 
who gets a large round of applause for having done so, as the audience 
revels in this proof of the first guest’s fecklessness. This is why the quote 
at the start of this section pays tribute to David Brent; Life on the Road is 
one of only a few examples of a piece of mainstream culture that presents 
neglecting a job you hate in order to pursue a passion for music (however 
deluded) as an understandable and sympathetic way to behave. Sadly, 
Brent funds this through his own savings and holiday pay rather than 
welfare entitlements, but still.
This has obviously also been fed by developments at policy level, 
spearheaded by the sensible ‘realists’ in both the Labour and Conserva-
tive parties. As we have seen, they have shifted welfare policy towards 
‘work-first’ approaches to out-of-work benefits, where the priority is 
to force someone back into work as quickly as possible irrespective of 
how unsuitable or depressing the job. While this approach chimes with 
the common sense of the age, it is also quite a strange phenomenon in 
the grand sweep of history: the glorification of the existence of large 
numbers of people doing menial tasks as an end in itself. 
The consequences of this are such ideological delusions as the 
rebranding of capitalists as so-called ‘job creators’. It is only in a society 
where millions of people are severed from common resources and 
dependent on a wage that ‘creating more jobs’ is seen as a good thing. A 
toddler who draws on a wall, an HGV which knocks over a bridge or a 
highly contagious virus – these are all ‘job creators’. Happily, it appears 
that most British people are more sceptical about the role and motiva-
tions of the ‘job-creating’ class than their political leadership is.25 This, 
however, is one of those popular suspicions that is diligently restrained 
by government and media rather than stoked. The job creator is the true 
164 . class matters
motive force behind society, and the British worker is supposed to be 
their passive beneficiary.
It is not quite true to say that there is no qualitative discussion of 
working life in the UK today. One topic which does loom large in 
popular imagination is bureaucracy. ‘Red tape’ is widely considered 
one of the great ills of British society. It is interesting to consider how 
bureaucracy fits into capitalist economies, since one of the most common 
arguments capital likes to employ against public ownership is that the 
latter is bureaucratic. A Telegraph commentator writes, in a state of high 
perplexity:
There is roughly the same number of employees in the Home Civil 
Service (about 480,000) today as there was in 1979, despite 30 years of 
supposed rationalisation, value for money blitzes and efficiency drives. 
Post-Thatcher Britain was meant to have less government, especially 
after the nationalised industries were privatised, yet we have more 
than ever with extra tiers in Brussels, Scotland, Wales and London as 
well as dozens of central agencies, quangos and regional bodies. The 
cost is stupefying. Figures last week showed that £1 billion is spent on 
the PR of state-run organisations.26
The right-wing supposition is that in any public service there must be 
vast repositories of bureaucrats with no purpose from which hitherto 
wasted money can be extracted ad infinitum. This has led to some of the 
greatest feats of naivety of our age, such as the letter David Cameron 
sent to Witney Council, which I mentioned in Chapter 5.
For the sociologist Max Weber, writing in the early twentieth century, 
bureaucracy was the hallmark of modern industrial capitalism. Weber 
was ambivalent about it: bureaucracy is, at root, a system of rules and 
procedures which everyone has to follow. In other words, one where ‘the 
system’ is master, rather than everyone simply doing as some silver-tongued 
demagogue says. In some respects this is more progressive than systems 
of tribal or religious authority where power is centred in particular indi-
viduals, sometimes for highly mystical reasons, or else accident of birth. 
However, Weber also described bureaucracy as an ‘iron cage’; as modern 
economies became more and more complex, bureaucratic systems would 
extend, suppressing individual freedom and creativity.
Weber’s pessimism might be widely shared today, and arguably one 
of the most important and resonant stereotypes we have is that of the 
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‘jobsworth’, who pedantically follows bureaucratic procedures much to 
everyone else’s frustration. As Graeber27 argues, the argument that the 
public services are bureaucratic but the private sector is not has been 
an important ideological basis for privatisation and budget cutting. The 
standard conservative assumption is that bureaucracy is meddling: it 
comes from attempts to impose utopian phantasms such as health and 
safety measures, diversity regulations or workers’ rights upon the world 
of private business which just wants to get on with competing. 
This assumption needs some breaking down. It is very obviously false 
to imagine a neat distinction between the free and competitive market, 
and the world of rules and regulations. In the Marxist view, the fact 
that capital is under competitive pressure creates an urgent need for very 
intense control within the ‘realm of production’ (i.e. over the worker). 
The various examples of workplace control examined in Chapter 4, for 
instance, meet the popular definition of bureaucracy in that they imply 
the imposition of a ‘system’ over and above individual initiative. These 
kinds of things are rarely described as such because they are bureaucratic 
measures designed directly by capital. If government were to legislate 
to prevent warehousing companies from monitoring their workers with 
tracking machines, or to stop them forcing workers to wait at lengthy 
security queues on their way in and out of work, this would be widely 
interpreted in conservative eyes as the creation of more bureaucracy, even 
though the extent to which individual freedom is subordinated to an 
impersonal system would in fact have been greatly reduced.
This goes to show that ‘bureaucracy’ is not about meddling per se, but 
more specifically about control. The question is not whether we interfere 
with ‘the market’ and management, but who exercises control and at 
whose expense. In a highly competitive market, it is not that bureau-
cratic control doesn’t exist, but that capital has the exclusive right to 
impose it on labour. Richard Walker and Gene Brewer have shown 
how those lower down in public sector organisations tend to experience 
vastly greater bureaucratic burdens than those at the top; and more to 
the point, that senior managers tend to believe that ‘the best strategy for 
reducing red tape is to give themselves more control over the rulemaking 
process’.28 Thus where the public sector adopts marketising reforms, this 
tends to imply the empowerment of management to develop fiercer 
procedures for controlling their staff.29
Bureaucracy protects capital, not just from labour but also from 
consumers. The overwhelming bureaucracies involved in processing 
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an insurance claim or mortgage application, for instance, are there to 
protect the company from risk, not the consumer. The extensive terms 
and conditions customers are required to agree to in purchasing almost 
any service are examples of bureaucracy designed by corporate actors 
who invariably rest safe in the knowledge that the other party will never 
properly understand them. Likewise, if we take private utility companies, 
it may well be that the companies themselves are less bureaucratic 
than the public enterprises that used to run them, but the weight of 
bureaucratic responsibility has not disappeared so much as shifted on 
to the ‘customer’. Today, the good energy consumer is expected to spend 
several hours of their free time on a regular basis perusing data on energy 
tariffs. If they don’t do this, the implication is that they have no right 
to complain about the profits of energy companies because they aren’t 
participating wholeheartedly enough in the market. 
The perception that bureaucracy is only really bureaucracy when it 
enshrouds capital, rather than workers or consumers, is a further con-
sequence of capitalist common sense. The kind of bureaucracy that 
emerges as capitalists go about their business is natural and something 
to be tolerated as an inevitable evil (since what’s good for business is 
good for everyone), and indeed is rarely even labelled as bureaucracy. 
Conversely, the bad kind of bureaucracy is that which impedes capital, 
which is perceived as ‘red tape’ of the most meddlesome variety. 
Responsible Fun
Capital is extremely good at turning the criticisms people make of it to its 
advantage. The French sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello have 
studied the way management talks to itself (i.e. through literature aimed 
at managers themselves), stressing its ‘high moral tone’: ‘management 
literature cannot be exclusively orientated towards the pursuit of profit. 
It must also justify the way profit is obtained … [it must] demonstrate 
how the prescribed way of making profit might be desirable, interesting, 
exciting, innovative or commendable.’30 Hence there have emerged huge 
industries based on trying to get people to feel inspired by the process of 
extracting, realising and reinvesting surplus value. 
Consider, for instance, the global textiles industry and the issue 
of sweatshops. Many British consumers are now aware that a large 
proportion of clothes in high street shops are manufactured in 
conditions that they themselves would consider intolerably bleak. This 
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is not a happy situation and can induce severe guilt among the more 
switched-on, which is of course not good for business. There are various 
responses to this problem. One is the more direct way which is to argue 
explicitly that sweatshop conditions are a great boon to the world’s 
poorest, since the alternative is starvation.31 There is a certain degree 
of brutal honesty to this kind of line: don’t complain about inhumane 
conditions in sweatshops because the manufacturers might get spooked, 
pulling out their investments and leaving their workers with nothing at 
all. This makes sense in an economic system such as capitalism where 
labour either has to contribute (directly or indirectly) to capital’s profit-
ability or have nothing. 
The other approach is not to assuage this sense of guilt through 
repeated recitation of the laws of capital accumulation, but to monetise 
it. It is extremely common now for companies to advertise themselves 
on the basis of their social conscience. Coffee shop walls are plastered 
with feel-good posters telling customers how happy the people that 
grew their coffee are. Private accreditation schemes – where companies 
voluntarily agree to some defined labour or environmental standards 
throughout their supply chains in exchange for being able to advertise 
their conscientiousness – have taken off. 
The important thing about these kinds of initiative is that, in a sense, 
they are a form of labour–capital conflict (in that they revolve around 
the tension between workers’ conditions and the company’s profit), but 
a labour–capital conflict in which labour’s part is generally outsourced 
to the consumer. There is a risk that they marginalise the agency of 
labour itself, offering little role for trade unions in the monitoring and 
enforcement process.32 As Nicole Aschoff argues, even a company that 
relentlessly parades its ‘citizenship’ credentials to its customers may be 
entirely happy to liken union membership among its own staff to herpes, 
or threaten them at private meetings about the dire consequences of 
collective organisation.33 This is an important problem: the complexity of 
global supply chains (with extensive outsourcing of different production 
stages across different sites) means that these standards become difficult 
to monitor and enforce even if the company actually wants to. Conse-
quently, local labour organising – i.e. class consciousness – is an important 
prerequisite for ensuring companies’ ethical credentials are any more 
than a surcharge to assuage consumer guilt.34 
Capitalists have also been trying to address the criticism that the 
business world is a more cynical and aloof area of human activity, with 
little to say to the world of genuine human interaction. This can take 
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profoundly inane forms, such as ‘wackaging’, where commodities are 
marketed primarily as non-sentient but inexplicably jocular friends. For 
instance, a milkshake bottle may list its ostensibly healthy ingredients 
under the headline ‘Get in Fella’ rather than ‘ingredients’. One cosmetics 
company likens using their hand cream to ‘catching the dream bus’.* 
In advertising-speak this kind of infantilisation is called ‘driving the 
conversation with the consumer’.35 Commodities are not the product of 
alienated human labour, they are cute little messages between you and a 
friendly corporation. 
This logic of the ‘conversation’ between company and consumer 
reaches a grim nadir when businesses make forays into social media. 
For example, in one recent instance British Gas lent its support to those 
mourning David Bowie over Twitter:36 ‘Morning all. A year today we 
lost pop icon David Bowie, time flys [sic] don’t it? We’re here till 10pm 
if you need anything. Thanks, Paul #RipDB.’ On such occasions many 
people like to pile in by writing wittily abusive responses. The problem 
is that sending vitriol to British Gas’s social media account still makes 
the mistake of acknowledging the underlying premise: that there can be 
such a thing as a ‘conversation’ between a human being and a for-profit 
utility company. Presumably this kind of conversation cannot be used to 
come to an amicable agreement over unaffordable heating bills.
In this chapter I have highlighted some ways in which capitalist 
processes tend to want individuals to assume a passive role: as otherwise 
disengaged voters, as workers who are just grateful to the job creators, as 
consumers who enjoys their entirely fraudulent and baseless ‘conversa-
tions’ with brands. Fortunately, people are usually too smart to go along 
with all of this. There is resistance in workplaces. People do abuse idiotic 
companies over social media. People can participate meaningfully in 
society through the electoral system under the right circumstances. So 
these ideological systems are not like the Matrix, consciously designed 
by a conniving intelligence to fool people into unquestioning obedience. 
Often, they are practical fixes for emerging problems, as with efforts 
at marketing ‘responsible capitalism’. Sometimes particular attitudes 
are directly encouraged by politicians to create support for a particular 
agenda, as with the increasingly nasty language around work. And since 
nothing lasts forever under capitalism, these kinds of ideological fixes 
can always fragment, leaving angry Times columnists to mutter about 
raising the voting age.
* hese examples taken from the blog http://wackaging.tumblr.com/.
9Conclusion
There are three things I want to do in this conclusion. First, I will briefly 
summarise some of the key points I have emphasised through the book. 
Second, I want to examine other ideas that are currently important on the 
left, such as universal basic income and the notion of ‘post-capitalism’. 
Finally, I want to consider how the arguments made here might apply to 
current (and rapidly changing) political events. 
summary
I said in the Introduction that I wanted to make capitalism look strange. 
Capitalism is a system with a specific set of rules and processes, and these 
rules and processes lead to situations that, when looked at in wider per-
spective, do not make much sense. Consider the perverse and anti-human 
ends to which technological progress is put. Or the way ‘job creation’ is 
held up as an end in itself. Or the subordination of government policy 
to the ‘alien powers’ of confidence and competitiveness. Or the way so 
many people are required to spend a vast proportion of their life doing 
something they may find boring, alienating, exhausting, stressful or 
depressing, purely to furnish surplus value for someone else. To unravel 
these strange outcomes, there are various points from the analysis that 
need to be driven home. 
Class and Classif ication
My main argument is that discussion around class should not simply 
focus on finding ways (however nuanced) of categorising people. Instead, 
I have presented a view of class that is more about understanding the 
relationships between groups of people who fulfil different economic 
roles in capitalist societies. Dividing between labour and capital would, 
of course, be far too binary if my goal were to provide a categorisation 
system into which to sort people. But this is not the objective. Instead, 
I have argued that ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ are not identities but processes, 
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which people enact, and which impose certain pressures and impera-
tives on them. The relationship between labour and capital, plus the 
centrality of profit as the driving force of the economy, lead to demands 
and pressures over which nobody really has control, and to which organ-
isations, individuals and even government are subordinate. In Chapter 2 
I used the Marxian phrase ‘alien powers’ to get at this idea.
Capitalists, in particular, are driven by the need to advance the 
M-C-M' cycle continually. These pressures, in turn, are often the motor 
of change in wider society. Look, for instance, at the extent to which 
government policy, or change in the economic institutions regulating 
society, are defined by the need to keep this cycle going at all costs.
There is a second response to the argument that talking about labour 
and capital is simply too broad: once we recognise that the relation-
ship between these classes imposes certain imperatives, then we can also 
identify such a thing as a labour–capital relationship. At its bluntest, this 
suggests the following maxim: in any situation where a capitalist relies 
on extracting surplus value to be realised as profit, and where workers are 
separated from the means of production (or from access to marketplaces, 
as with supposed freelancers in the ‘platform economy’), we can expect 
certain outcomes. There will be a continual need to exercise control over 
what the worker does with his or her working day. There will be the 
recurrent conflict of interest over wages and working time resulting in 
the kinds of ‘small thefts’ against workers as described in Chapter 4. The 
worker’s individual creativity and autonomy will come to be subordi-
nated to systems defined and organised by the capitalist. There will be a 
need to find some means of organising and disciplining people outside 
of the labour force so that they can be called on or rejected by capital as 
is required. 
I am, clearly, not saying that every single workplace is a hell of control 
and conflict. What I am saying is that these dynamics, though they work 
out extremely differently from context to context and operate much more 
oppressively in some circumstances than others, are evident in some form 
right across any capitalist society, from the worst-paid and lowest-status 
jobs through to ‘elites’ as in the ‘knowledge’ or ‘creative’ industries. 
Government
In discussing how these alien powers operate on government, I 
emphasised the idea of adequate forms. States have to try and mould 
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their policy approaches and institutions into shapes that are conducive 
to the continuation of the M-C-M' cycle. This is a difficult and con-
flictual process, and I tried to illustrate the tensions in Chapter 5, with 
particular reference to health and education systems. These systems, 
ultimately, have to be subordinated to the interests of capital. This could 
take the form of fiddling with their purposes to be better adapted to 
the ‘needs of the market’ (e.g. ‘employability’ and disappointing ‘appren-
ticeship’ schemes), or it could take the form of opening public resources 
up as a source of profit (e.g. with NHS privatisations or the housing 
market). But most of all, in recent years, it has taken the form of grinding 
austerity as government seeks to squeeze out more indirect surplus value 
on behalf of capital, lowering the costs of ‘social reproduction’.
I also argued that government’s role in guiding the evolution of 
adequate forms is made harder by the financialisation of the economy. 
In an effort to gain the ‘confidence’ of financial markets, British govern-
ments have made enormous sacrifices. In particular, they have pursued a 
policy of class discipline: weakening rights for labour and making people 
more scared of unemployment, to create a more malleable workforce 
better adapted to the extraction of shareholder value.
The fact that government is subject to these kinds of pressures is 
obviously important when it comes to discussing things like democratic 
participation and electoral politics. Governments under capitalism can 
never act disinterestedly as mediators between labour and capital, still 
less on labour’s side, and to imagine they can do so is fantasy. This, it 
should be clear, is not an ‘anti-voting’ argument, but it is an argument 
against the idea that voting is, in itself, enough. The line, which has been 
increasingly common in recent years – that ‘if you can’t vote you don’t 
have the right to complain’ – is a naive and reactionary one. It rests on 
the false assumption that social divisions can be resolved through parlia-
mentary means. Alien powers, and the dependence of the economy on 
private profit, will always tightly constrain the most radical government.
It is clear from the preceding that the first place capital has to be 
challenged is in the workplace. To put it bluntly, a doubling of the 
rate of trade union membership, and of the numbers of people willing 
collectively to challenge the power of their employers at work, would 
do far more to make Britain a better place than any conceivable general 
election result. The workplace is where many people spend most of their 
waking hours for most of their lives. Any improvement of the conditions 
under which people work – the amount of control they can exercise over 
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their labour process, the ability to demand better terms and conditions, 
the level of security they have, the extent to which they can exercise 
creative agency – is a victory for humanity as a whole. So the most 
important thing people can do is to start standing up for themselves 
more proactively in relation to their employers, demanding considerably 
more from the latter, whatever the particular kind of labour they provide.
Common Non-Sense
These arguments also lead to some other points that need considering. 
It may be possible that, in the wake of recent political events, notably 
the Brexit referendum and the 2017 general election, some of the plat-
itudinous discussion around the idea of the ‘economy which works for 
everyone’ will fade away. No political leader is going to come out and 
directly say ‘I want an economy that only works for some’, but it may 
be that they are more forthright and honest in designating winners and 
losers from the policies they are proposing. The great breakthrough 
of Jeremy Corbyn’s 2017 election campaign was his willingness to 
vocalise the idea of targeting the rich to a degree which was unthinkable 
following New Labour. Likewise, in response the Tory press geared up 
for an all-out discursive assault on young people. Despite the vacuous 
pronunciations from self-styled moderates, the left–right divide in 
British politics clearly resurfaced in 2017.
This development might make the political landscape more divisive 
and conflictual, but probably also more honest. The interests of labour 
and capital do not fit well together and so people ultimately do have to 
pick a side. There is a growing recognition that people – particularly, 
but definitely not exclusively – the young, do not swallow the common 
sense that ‘what is good for business is good for everyone’. They will 
come under attack for this, either being patronised or directly slandered, 
depending on the extent to which the media source in question wants to 
be considered a respectable voice. But this is a step in the right direction. 
I will come back to this at the end.
capital and the future
How does contemporary left-wing thought respond to the situation we 
have now? Often, its response is fairly weak. It emphasises things like 
higher taxation (or moving against tax avoidance/evasion), in order to 
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build better public services. But the arguments I have made so far in 
this book suggest that this sort of measure is likely to remain inadequate 
tinkering, which does not really get to grips with the central fact of our 
societies: the dominance of capital over labour and government. 
A more radical idea which is gaining traction (on the right as well 
as on the left) is universal basic income (UBI). In other words, paying 
everyone in the country (not just the poorest) a set amount as an 
absolute minimum right. On the left, UBI is presented as a response 
to technological change. The assumption is that technology will lead 
to jobs being phased out. In this sense UBI can present itself as a fairly 
pragmatic solution. It recognises that affluent high-skilled workers are 
also threatened by technology, and supposes, reasonably, that future 
labour markets may demand more shifts between jobs and more need to 
develop transferable skills. Under UBI, so its proponents argue, people 
could have periods outside of work in order to develop new skills without 
losing the ability to support themselves. 
Put this way, it is a fairly intuitive prospect. Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams,1 for instance, argue that the left should propose a two-
pronged movement: the acceleration of the replacement of jobs through 
technology on one hand, and UBI on the other. We could thus move 
towards a system as envisioned by Marxists such as Braverman: less 
work is needed all round, but this is not a problem since those without 
work have other forms of support. In this sense, UBI could be a means 
of partially liberating the individual from the imperatives imposed by 
capitalist processes.
But there are problems with this idea. Jane Lethbridge, perhaps 
suspicious of the adoption of UBI by some writers on the right, raises 
a number of concerns.2 For one thing, UBI can never replace proper 
public services, such as healthcare which is free at the point of delivery, 
or proper children’s services, or libraries, or socialised support for the 
sick or disabled. Hence there is, in some quarters, a rather sinister idea 
that consent can be bought for the dismantling of these things through 
UBI – as in: ‘here’s a basic monthly cash handout, go and shop around 
for all those public services you once expected as a right’. In this sense, 
for all its apparent radicalism, UBI might one day turn out to be a fairly 
cheap way of securing continued capitalist stability while public services 
are retrenched further and further. The level of UBI and the conditions 
attached to it would, in all likelihood, be set by central government and 
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in this sense be no more independent of capitalist imperatives than the 
NHS is (see Chapter 5). 
Lethbridge’s other critique is arguably even more important consid-
ering the argument we have made so far in this book. The idea that 
UBI can be a panacea completely sets aside the problem of work. The 
left version of UBI rests on the idea that it will diminish people’s need 
to work, and in this sense will be a liberation. I have a lot of sympathy 
for this view, of course, given the amount of pointless drudgery within 
capitalist workplaces. Quite conceivably, UBI might strengthen workers’ 
positions by making the prospect of unemployment less frightening. But 
this point alone cannot compensate for properly questioning the way 
work is conducted in capitalist societies. Why does labour have to be 
separated from the means of production? Why is it only able to work 
insofar as it provides surplus value? UBI cannot answer this.
Clearly, capitalist work relations are going to persist. Currently, it is 
fashionable to raise the idea of ‘post-capitalism’ and ‘post-work’, among 
some people on the political left.3 The basic version of this argument 
goes as follows: increasingly, societies are able to produce material 
progress outside of the traditional capitalist work relationship, and in 
a way which capitalists are fundamentally unable to grasp or control. 
High-tech innovations are produced in flashes of inspiration or through 
constructive group interactions, and so cannot be controlled or legislated 
for by management as if on a construction line. Individuals control their 
expertise and inspiration, not capitalists. At the same time, new techno-
logical platforms (such as Wikipedia, or else other forms of open-source 
software and data-sharing technology) create scope for things to be done 
in a more collaborative way outside of the marketplace and outside of the 
control of capitalists. Therefore, we are already moving towards a society 
in which decentralised networks of citizens create things and govern the 
world around them without the input of capital. Broad societal fixes like 
UBI are the central prescriptions following from this argument, moving 
our focus away from the problem of control and exploitation within the 
workplace itself.
This kind of discussion is far too optimistic, mainly because it fails 
to recognise how important capitalist work relations still are, and will 
continue to be. Paul Thompson and Kendra Briken have punctured these 
arguments quite effectively.4 For one thing, they point to the naivety of 
supposing that ‘knowledge workers’ cannot be controlled by capital in the 
same way as factory workers. Chapter 4 offers support for this argument. 
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High-tech firms such as Apple, Thompson and Briken argue, however 
much intangible ‘inspiration’ goes into their end product, still pursue a 
business model dominated by an obsession with cutting labour costs, 
leading to exploitative and highly controlled circumstances for workers 
right through their supply chains. ‘Collaborative’ digital platforms such 
as Uber are actually intensely hierarchical business models, where those 
that supply the labour power are under intense control, and contribute 
massively to the profits of company elites. As I argued in Chapter 7, new 
online ‘means of evaluation’ are pervading forms of control that are more 
opaque from the worker’s perspective than Taylorist methods and thus, 
arguably, even more alienating and unfair. It is true that not all ‘platforms’ 
are like this, but such companies are not outliers of the new digital age: 
they constantly ‘invade and seek to dominate’ the marketplace, and in 
this effort they are leaving ‘collaborative, peer-to-peer production’ in 
the dirt.
Hence these more sunny prognoses about the potential to surpass 
capitalism buy into the PR of high-tech firms far too readily. When 
‘sharing economy’ companies claim that they are non-hierarchical 
networks, it is obviously a mistake to believe them. Those who see a 
new ‘post-capitalist’ world emerging fetishise the ideas of ‘decentralisa-
tion’ and ‘the network’. The emphasis is on small groups who collaborate 
in the production of innovative technologies which are then diffused 
through sharing technology, all the while in the absence of government 
and through breaking down corporate monopolies. The emphasis is 
perhaps as much to do with a desire not to be associated with failures of 
the past (i.e. statist Communism) as it is a genuine enthusiasm for these 
ideas in themselves. Besides, these kinds of highly decentralised partic-
ipatory networks are good primarily for the cliques that participate in 
them.5 They are never going to be strong enough to counterbalance state 
and capital, and so this fetishisation of decentralisation is misplaced. 
Better to have one strong, organised and centralised labour movement 
than a hundred decentralised peer-to-peer networks. 
Ultimately, capital itself has to be challenged. People who act as labour 
need to start asking: why can’t we start to organise things ourselves? Not 
through fetishising small-scale networks, but by demanding greater and 
greater control over the large organisations that dominate our society. 
The productive facilities that make things, the logistical networks that 
move things around the country, sophisticated information and commu-
nications systems. These things could be in public hands. They could be 
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used not for private profit, but as a means of creating and distributing 
the things that society actually needs and wants. There would be no 
alien power of competition forcing people to work harder in exchange 
for less, or forcing governments to compromise on the quality of public 
services. People would not be forced to spend much of their lives in an 
alienating and conflictual labour–capital relationship. Technology which 
saves labour could be welcomed. 
The election of 2017 was shortly followed by the disastrous Grenfell 
Tower fire. Today, the first principles of our society are private property 
and private profit, and anything else – such as providing safe living 
conditions for poor people – is only possible insofar as it conforms to 
those f irst principles. But we could operate differently: one of our first 
principles could be that everyone should have a home, and ‘the economy’ 
might have to bend itself to achieve that goal rather than vice versa. 
We could say the same about health or education. It is the centrality of 
capital accumulation as the motor of our economy that so distorts these 
priorities.
final thoughts: britain after the 2017 general 
election
Despite the fact that the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn obtained 
fewer seats than the Conservatives under Theresa May at the 2017 
general election, it evidently came out of it very well. Corbyn’s leadership 
had been widely ridiculed and written off, not just by the vast majority 
of newspaper commentators, but the most of his own MPs. May called 
her snap election in April 2017 because she saw a huge poll gap opening 
up and a divided Labour Party, and saw an opportunity to crush her 
opposition and usher in a potentially endless period of Tory dominance. 
Yet the election resulted in a hung parliament. May’s authority and 
legitimacy to rule was massively reduced, and the Conservative Party 
came to look weak and scared. Corbyn’s Labour Party got 40 per cent of 
the vote, which is almost as high as Tony Blair managed in his landslide 
victory of 1997. He emerged from the election vindicated against the 
charges that his vote would collapse, and looking far more convincing as 
a future prime minister than May. Why?
The first thing to note here is that May tried to use the idea of class 
to her advantage and it backfired. She had previously talked repeatedly 
about her desire to stand up for ‘working-class’ people, making heavy use 
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of the ‘right-wing class warrior’ rhetoric I identified in Chapter 1. But 
there were huge and obvious contradictions in this persona, because she 
was clearly utterly terrified of the world of business and was never strong 
enough to challenge austerity and the ‘free market’ in any significant way. 
As we have seen, anti-immigrant language ultimately does nothing to 
hinder capital, and people who use this language in an effort to advance 
the cause of labour will, sooner or later, be exposed as weak charlatans. 
So it was in June 2017. May’s claim to be representing workers, while 
all the while berating nurses for wanting a pay rise while on live TV, just 
appeared inconsistent and implausible. Pretty much the only thing she 
had to offer labour was racism, which, gratifyingly, was revealed as flimsy 
and unpersuasive.
The British media were utterly unequipped to deal with this eventu-
ality. A long list of commentators, who had heaped scorn on Corbyn’s 
supporters on the basis that were consigning the Labour Party to history, 
were now revealed to have been out of touch with a growing current of 
public opinion. Certainly, they had relied on a limited range of reference 
points, which they tended to see as yielding eternal and unchanging 
lessons. For instance, many had taken the fact that Labour lost the 1983 
election on a comparatively left-wing manifesto, and won the 1997 one 
on a comparatively right-wing one, as evidence of some unquestionable 
law that Labour has to be right wing or die. This argument did not take 
into account the fairly obvious point that, as circumstances change, the 
things people are and aren’t likely to support politically also changes.
In one sense, it was remarkable that Corbyn made such progress, 
because the platform he was running on was pushing at the boundaries 
of capitalist ‘common sense’ as it has been described here. He did not 
appear to accept unquestioningly that what is good for business is good 
for society, and that, therefore, the rich must be wrapped in cotton wool. 
He was unashamed about wanting to tax the wealthiest more, and had 
an explicitly redistributive agenda. Various nationalisations were also 
mooted. What changed to make this more acceptable as an electoral 
platform? It may be that for all its grimness, the Brexit vote had a strangely 
liberating effect. The ‘right-wing class warrior’ line unleashed Brexit as a 
means of making political gains out of the consequences of globalisation. 
Its main architects thought this would help British capital by rolling 
back various EU-derived regulations (see Chapter 5). But actually they 
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(whether intentionally or not*) broke a taboo. Like a child who defies 
its parents for the first time and wants to do it again, the British people 
were apparently no longer willing to be terrified into doing what ‘the 
markets’ wanted them to do – the right wing of the Conservative Party, 
which sees itself as the most devoted acolyte of capital, opened the door 
to something else. 
It is tempting to argue that Corbyn’s progress was due to him 
reigniting the class struggle, but there are various reasons why this is 
very premature. First, Labour’s unexpectedly good showing was at least 
in part due to the divisions in the capitalist class caused by Brexit. As I 
argued earlier, Brexit has been conducted as a conflict between different 
views on what is good for British capital. The Conservatives went too far 
in their ‘right-wing class warrior’ rhetoric, and scared a lot of very rich 
people who believe that British capitalism has to be open. Consequently 
it is in Remain areas that support swung most strongly to Labour in 
2017. In strong Leave areas, if anything, things went the other way. 
This is not the same as a class revolt against the authority of capital. 
It may be that a lot of very wealthy capitalists see Labour as less threat-
ening at this particular juncture than the Tories under May. Moreover, 
it is also true that Corbyn’s own language (and more frequently that of 
high-profile advocates such as Paul Mason) tended to fudge occasionally 
towards the standard ‘immigrants undermine British wages’ line, which, 
as we saw earlier, is misleading and likely to damage rather than help 
the prospect of a stronger pro-labour platform. There is not yet enough 
self-confidence to reject these dead-ends explicitly, and this stems from 
the enduring power of the right-wing class warrior rhetoric identified 
in Chapter 1.
Second, while the Labour manifesto was praised for winning a lot of 
support, it was generally informed by the same ‘economy that works for 
everyone’ paradigm that I was criticising in Chapter 1. The key selling 
points were slightly higher taxes for the richest in exchange for better-
funded public services. Once this is accomplished, the argument ran, 
everyone could benefit, since better health and education systems are 
better for business as well. This is not intended as a criticism, since to do 
more than this would have been beyond the pale for a British audience. It 
is simply to observe that it is not possible to imagine government being 
* It probably varies depending on how much an individual wants actual power or just to 
be a celebrity.
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run, at the moment, by people who are actively prepared to take labour’s 
side against capital: the best we can hope for is fairly soft redistribution 
via the tax and welfare systems. As I argued earlier, true progress for the 
UK would be re-empowering labour in the workplace. It’s possible that 
Corbyn realised this, but did not feel the population was ready for it to 
be at the heart of a general election campaign. 
Third, there are certain weaknesses in policies that ostensibly seem 
radical – such as nationalisations, which moved towards the top of 
Labour’s agenda. I made the point repeatedly in Chapter 5 that nation-
alisations, in and of themselves, do not necessarily mean one in the eye 
for capital. It is a problem for those specific capitalists who want to 
make profits out of public service delivery. But the main requirement 
of public services under capitalism is that they benefit capital in general: 
i.e. by helping with ‘social reproduction’ and the creation of ‘indirect 
surplus value’. Nationalisations do not exempt public services from these 
functions and can just provide a more brutal means of enforcing them. 
As shown by the example of the NHS, government is just as likely as 
capital to make life miserable for those that work for it. In other words, 
nationalising things per se does not help us much. What matters is 
breaking the control capital has over our economy as a whole.
Of course, the bigger issue is as follows: let’s say the Labour Party is 
elected on a comparatively radical manifesto, what would happen then? 
There would be dire warnings from capital and its interlocutors in the 
media that his policies would lead to a disastrous loss of confidence, 
investments moving abroad, labour being jettisoned to shore up profits, 
and so on. In fact, this started to happen after the 2017 election, with the 
Chancellor Phillip Hammond seeking to rally businesses into explicit 
support for the Conservatives over Labour, presenting the idea of a 
Corbyn-led government as a sufficiently existential crisis that etiquette 
and norms around corporate impartiality need to be discarded.6 The 
closer Corbyn gets to power, the more likely this is to becoming a reality: 
investment strikes, dire warnings of job losses and capital flight. For now, 
the reason this kind of capitalist violence is relatively restrained is because 
business elites are terrified about what the Conservatives are doing with 
Brexit. In other words, Corbyn is progressing because capitalists as a 
class are divided: they can’t decide whether a socialist Labour or a Tory 
Brexit is worse. This dilemma would go away if Corbyn assumed power.
Another question is whether Corbyn’s own party would have the 
stomach for this kind of development. The right wing of the Labour 
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Party always used to say that they shared these left-wing principles 
but needed to compromise on them to get into power, otherwise those 
principles were pointless. Whether you accept that argument or not, 
there was always something disingenuous about it: even when it seemed 
the Labour Party does have a credible chance of power under Corbyn, 
the same figures were still trying to get rid of him and even, in some 
cases, actually pledging allegiance to his discredited opponents in the 
Conservative Party.7 In other words, they do care about principles more 
than they care about Labour being in power: it’s just that those principles 
are unshakeably in line with pro-capital common sense. Anyone who 
really wants to change the country needs to recognise that the point is 
not to avoid spooking business with moderate policies, but to prevent 
this kind of coercive power being exercised in the first place by emascu-
lating capital. Any electoral advance by radical political parties needs to 
go hand in hand with increasing assertiveness by those who act as labour, 
and growing preparedness to assume control over the organisational and 
technological resources that are used to create and distribute goods and 
services. At the present time, with trade unionism and strike activity 
at historic lows, this latter part seems to be missing. This could be the 
Corbyn movement’s fatal flaw.
But there is no point listing reasons for caution unless I suggest reasons 
for optimism as well. One narrative that emerged from the election was 
that the main cause of Corbyn’s (relative) success was the high turnout 
among young people, which could be conveniently attributed to pledges 
around abolishing tuition fees and reinstating the Education Mainte-
nance Allowance. This, in turn, gave right-wing commentators their 
new talking point: that young people today are entitled idiots (recall 
some of the quotes I offered in Chapter 8). Others make a fist of being 
conciliatory. The Tory MP Margot James says that ‘we need to make 
the case for wealth creation to a new generation of young people’.8 Ross 
Clark is sad about a growing disaffection among young people towards 
capitalism and cautions that right-wing people need to find a way of 
rebuilding this divide.9 Much in Britain depends on this not happening.
In fact, it is overstating things to say that Corbynism is dependent 
on the young, since Labour did better than the Conservatives among 
various other age groups as well (according to YouGov, in 2017 one 
became more likely to vote Tory than Labour at age 47). ‘The bulk of 
the Labour vote came from those more middle-aged than young.’10 But 
let’s accept the argument, and consider the question it raises for the 
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purposes of this book. If it’s true that young people are swinging things 
in important elections now, does that mean (as has already been claimed 
many times since the election) that age is becoming a more important 
societal division than class? The answer is that this might be the case 
depending on what we understand by class. If we see class as a means of cat-
egorising according to social/economic/cultural capital, then yes, maybe 
age is more important as a predictor of electoral preference.
But it is obvious that many people in this country, not just the young, 
do not like the world they are being offered: bad wages and insecure jobs, 
‘democratic’ governments which are out of their depth when dealing with 
global capital, a sense of powerlessness at work and beyond. These things 
are widespread and they are not just limited to particular groups like the 
‘precariat’ and other categorisations. These are issues that affect anyone 
who is severed from the means of production and forced to furnish 
surplus value to capital in exchange for a wage. It is why pensioners are 
likely to remain the only group who are completely immune to radical 
left politics in this country in the coming years. If young(ish) people are 
at the forefront of these changes it is because they have most to lose from 
a life spent in service to capital.
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